I took a look at the team. Is it considered apropos to state how surprised you are that developers who come across as relatively senior are capable of making an incredibly fundamental security mistake such as this? It looks like this was just the default Rails resource scaffolding.
> Is it considered apropos to state how surprised you are that developers who come across as relatively senior are capable of making an incredibly fundamental security mistake such as this? Only if you're concerned that you can't tell who is "relatively senior." In this case, your judgement was unfortunately wrong.
Never Give Your Information To 10 Minute Old Startups
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Re: Never Give Your Information To 10 Minute Old Startups
#22That wasn't merely a "security vulnerability". It was also a demonstration that the people running the business have absolutely no idea what they are doing when it comes to security, privacy, or testing and release processes. (Actually, there is an alternative explanation, which is even worse: they knew and didn't care. I prefer to assume naivety rather than malice.)
Unfortunately, the only sensible action when faced with a business like this is to run away and not look back for a very long time, except perhaps to check who the people responsible were so you can avoid anything else they work on in the near future as well.
Re: Never Give Your Information To 10 Minute Old Startups
#23If you let them know and they ignored you, then I understand that you'd want to write an article and spread it around. It's important that customers know when a company doesn't value their security. At that point, the proper way for them to handle it is to quietly fix it, and then let all their affected customers know so they have a chance to change their security settings.
However, if you didn't give them a bit of time first, then you are doing more damage than good to them--and their customers.
Re: Never Give Your Information To 10 Minute Old Startups
#24Am I the only one getting a download.gz file?
Re: Never Give Your Information To 10 Minute Old Startups
#25Am I the only one getting a download.gz file?
Re: Never Give Your Information To 10 Minute Old Startups
#26if anyone else is having problems viewing this: it's a serious hole in icebox, the service featured here http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4619132 if you've used that service, the information you entered was publicly visible (key to access aws, etc) (the thread linked above says it has now been patched). [i don't understand why, but when i access the link for this thread i get the gzipped page as a download; linux…
What OS/Browser are you using?
Re: Never Give Your Information To 10 Minute Old Startups
#27This incentivizes people to fix things quickly and preserves the reputational value of breaking into things without researcher-vendor relations getting adversarial when you announce something like "I harvested a couple dozen of your customers' API keys" or "Here's an exploitation roadmap you can follow in your browser" in a public forum.
Re: Never Give Your Information To 10 Minute Old Startups
#28Re: Never Give Your Information To 10 Minute Old Startups
#29if anyone else is having problems viewing this: it's a serious hole in icebox, the service featured here http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4619132 if you've used that service, the information you entered was publicly visible (key to access aws, etc) (the thread linked above says it has now been patched). [i don't understand why, but when i access the link for this thread i get the gzipped page as a download; linux…
What OS/Browser are you using?
Re: Never Give Your Information To 10 Minute Old Startups
#30Security stuff aside, I'm curious why a system would be designed this way. Surely (in most systems) all users have the same page for managing their account (eg: /account) or is this system designed so that the management portion (eg: what a support person would use) is the same as what the users use? I don't think I've encountered a site that had accounts edited this way before.
The last time I used Rails (2009), the way RESTful URLs are set up encouraged this pattern. It's simple enough to restrict access to the user in question, but it is (or was) easy to overlook.