Suggestion for Cloudflare: Create an early adopter option for free accounts. Benefit: Earliest uptake of new features and security patches. Drawback: Higher risk of outages. I think this should be possible since they already differentiate between free, pro and enterprise accounts. I do not know how the routing for that works but I bet they could do this. Think crowd-sourced beta testers. Also a perk for anything PCI…
Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
321–330 of 601 posts
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#322Earlier quoted context omitted.
Large scale infrastructure changes are often by nature completely untestable. The system is too large, there are too many moving parts to replicate with any kind of sane testing, so often, you do find out in prod, which is why robust and fast rollback procedures are usually desirable and implemented.
Akamai manages it.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#323I noticed this outage last night (Cloudflare 500s on a few unrelated websites). As usual, when I went to Cloudflare's status page, nothing about the outage was present; the only thing there was a notice about the pre-planned maintenance work they were doing for the security issue, reporting that everything was being routed around it successfully.
This is the case with just about every status page I’ve ever seen. It takes them a while to realize there’s really a problem and then to update the page. One day these things will be automated, but until then, I wouldn’t expect more of Cloudflare than any other provider. What’s more concerning to me is that now we’ve had AWS, Azure, and CloudFlare (and CliudFlare twice) go down recently. My gut says: 1. developers an…
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#324Earlier quoted context omitted.
They have millions of “free” subscribers; said subscribers should be the test pigs for rollouts; paying (read: big) subscribers can get the breaking changes later.
Free tier doesn’t get WAF. We kept working.
"These new protections are included in both the Cloudflare Free Managed Ruleset (available to all Free customers) ..... "
having some burn in time in free tier before it hits the whole network would have been good?!
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#325Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is the case with just about every status page I’ve ever seen. It takes them a while to realize there’s really a problem and then to update the page. One day these things will be automated, but until then, I wouldn’t expect more of Cloudflare than any other provider. What’s more concerning to me is that now we’ve had AWS, Azure, and CloudFlare (and CliudFlare twice) go down recently. My gut says: 1. developers an…
Management doesn't like when things like this are automated. They want to "manage" the outage/production/etc numbers before letting them out.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#326Kudos to Cloudflare for clarity and diligence. When talking of their earlier Lua code: > we have never before applied a killswitch to a rule with an action of “execute”. I was surprised that a rules-based system was not tested completely, perhaps because the Lua code is legacy relative to the newer Rust implementation? It tracks what I've seen elsewhere: quality engineering can't keep up with the production engineeri…
This is funny, considering that someone that worked on the defense industry (guide missile system) found a memory leak on one of their products, at that time. They told him that they knew about it, but that it's timed just right with the range of the system it would be used, so it doesn't matter.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#327> Disabling this was done using our global configuration system. This system does not use gradual rollouts but rather propagates changes within seconds to the entire network and is under review following the outage we recently experienced on November 18. > As soon as the change propagated to our network, code execution in our FL1 proxy reached a bug in our rules module which led to the following LUA exception: They r…
> They really need to figure out a way to correlate global configuration changes to the errors they trigger as fast as possible. This is what jumped out at me as the biggest problem. A wild west deployment process is a valid (but questionable) business decision, but if you do that then you need smart people in place to troubleshoot and make quick rollback decisions. Their timeline: > 08:47: Configuration change deplo…
I take exception to that, to be honest. It's not desirable or ideal, but calling it "terrible" is a bit ... well, sorry to use the word ... entitled. For context, I have experience running a betting exchange. A system where it's common for a notable fraction of transactions in a medium-volume event to take place within a window of less than 30 seconds.
Vast majority of current monitoring systems are built on Prometheus. (Well okay, these days it's more likely something Prom-compatible but more reliable.) That implies collection via recurring scrapes. A supposedly "high" frequency online service monitoring system does a scrape every 30 seconds. Well known reliability engineering practices state that you need a minimum of two consecutive telemetry points to detect any given event - because we're talking about a distributed system and network is not a reliable transport. That in turn means that with near-perfect reliability the maximum time window before you can detect something failing is the time it takes to perform three scrapes: thing A might have failed a second after the last scrape, so two consecutive failures will show up only after a delay of just-a-hair-shy-of-three scraping cycle windows.
At Cloudflare's scale, I would not be surprised if they require three consecutive events to trigger an alert.
As for my history? The betting exchange monitoring was tuned to run scrapes at 10-second intervals. That still meant that the first an alert fired for something failing could have been effectively 30 seconds after the failures manifested.
Two minutes for something that does not run primarily financial transactions is a pretty decent alerting window.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#328Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Control-plane and data-plane should be separate They are separate. > a react patch shouldn't affect traffic forwarding. If you can’t even bother to read the blog post maybe you shouldn’t be so confident in your own analysis of what should and shouldn’t have happened? This was a configuration change to change the buffered size of a body from 256kb to 1mib. The ability to be so wrong in so few words with such confide…
You really should take some of your pill. > Instead, it was triggered by changes being made to our body parsing logic while attempting to detect and mitigate an industry-wide vulnerability disclosed this week in React Server Components. > Unfortunately, in our FL1 version of our proxy, under certain circumstances, the second change of turning off our WAF rule testing tool caused an error state that resulted in 500 HT…
The exploit they were trying to protect against is in React services run by their customers.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#329Earlier quoted context omitted.
These global cloud outages aren’t the real issue; they affect everyone and get fixed. What is killer is when there is a KNOWN issue that affects YOU but basically only you so why bother fixing it!
I mean, I still prefer to have the ability to fix it myself, because I know I can probably do it in 1h max. I know this doesn't apply to most people, especially those outside of HN though.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#330Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is funny, considering that someone that worked on the defense industry (guide missile system) found a memory leak on one of their products, at that time. They told him that they knew about it, but that it's timed just right with the range of the system it would be used, so it doesn't matter.
This paraphrased urban legend has nothing to do with quality engineering though? As described, it's designed to the spec and working as intended.