Ironically, this time around the issue was in the proxy they're going to phase out (and replace with the Rust one). I truly believe they're really going to make resilience their #1 priority now, and acknowledging the release process errors that they didn't acknowledge for a while (according to other HN comments) is the first step towards this. HugOps. Although bad for reputation, I think these incidents will help the…
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Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
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Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#72What's the culture like at Cloudflare re: ops/deployment safety? They saw errors related to a deployment, and because it was related to a security issue instead of rolling it back they decided to make another deployment with global blast radius instead? Not only did they fail to apply the deployment safety 101 lesson of "when in doubt, roll back" but they also failed to assess the risk related to the same deployment…
Also there seems to be insufficient testing before deployment with very junior level mistakes.
> As soon as the change propagated to our network, code execution in our FL1 proxy reached a bug in our rules module which led to the following LUA exception:
Where was the testing for this one? If ANY exception happened during the rules checking, the deployment should fail and rollback. Instead, they didn't assess that as a likely risk and pressed on with the deployment "fix".
I guess those at Cloudflare are not learning anything from the previous disaster.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#73A lot of these kind of bugs feel like they could be caught be a simple review bot like Greptile... I wonder if Cloudlare uses an equivalent tool internally?
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#74Earlier quoted context omitted.
> HugOps This childish nonsense needs to end. Ops are heavily rewarded because they're supposed to be responsible. If they're not then the associated rewards for it need to stop as well.
I have never seen an Ops team being rewarded for avoiding incidents (focusing in tech debt reduction), but instead they get the opposite - blamed when things go wrong. I think it's human nature (it's hard to realize something is going well until it breaks), but still has a very negative psychological effect. I can barely imagine the stress the team is going through right now.
That's why their salaries are so high.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#75What's the culture like at Cloudflare re: ops/deployment safety? They saw errors related to a deployment, and because it was related to a security issue instead of rolling it back they decided to make another deployment with global blast radius instead? Not only did they fail to apply the deployment safety 101 lesson of "when in doubt, roll back" but they also failed to assess the risk related to the same deployment…
In this case it's not just a matter of 'hold back for another day to make sure it's done right', like when adding a new feature to a normal SaaS application. In Cloudflare's case moving slower also comes with a real cost.
That isn't to say it didn't work out badly this time, just that the calculation is a bit different.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#76Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#77What's the culture like at Cloudflare re: ops/deployment safety? They saw errors related to a deployment, and because it was related to a security issue instead of rolling it back they decided to make another deployment with global blast radius instead? Not only did they fail to apply the deployment safety 101 lesson of "when in doubt, roll back" but they also failed to assess the risk related to the same deployment…
I'm not sure of the nature of the rollback process in this case, but leaning on ill-founded assumptions is a bad practice. I do agree that a global rollout is a problem.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#78Earlier quoted context omitted.
The article mentions that this Lua-based proxy is the old generation one, which is going to be replaced by the Rust based one (FL2) and that didn't fail on this scenario. So, if anything, their efforts towards a typed language were justified. They just didn't manage to migrate everything in time before this incident - which is ironically a good thing since this incident was cause mostly by a rushed change in response…
yes, but as the article states why are they doing global fast rollouts?
For DDOS protection you can't really rely on multiple-hours rollouts.
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#79Earlier quoted context omitted.
I have never seen an Ops team being rewarded for avoiding incidents (focusing in tech debt reduction), but instead they get the opposite - blamed when things go wrong. I think it's human nature (it's hard to realize something is going well until it breaks), but still has a very negative psychological effect. I can barely imagine the stress the team is going through right now.
> I have never seen an Ops team being rewarded for avoiding incidents That's why their salaries are so high.
In this particular case, they seem to be doing two things: - Phasing out the old proxy (Lua based) which is replaced by FL2 (Rust based, the one that caused the previous incident) - Reacting to an actively exploited vulnerability in React by deploying WAF rules - and they're doing them in a relatively careful way (test rules) to avoid fuckups, which caused this unknown state, which triggered the issue
Re: Cloudflare outage on December 5, 2025
#80What's the culture like at Cloudflare re: ops/deployment safety? They saw errors related to a deployment, and because it was related to a security issue instead of rolling it back they decided to make another deployment with global blast radius instead? Not only did they fail to apply the deployment safety 101 lesson of "when in doubt, roll back" but they also failed to assess the risk related to the same deployment…
“We have spoken directly with hundreds of customers following that incident and shared our plans to make changes to prevent single updates from causing widespread impact like this. We believe these changes would have helped prevent the impact of today’s incident but, unfortunately, we have not finished deploying them yet.
“We know it is disappointing that this work has not been completed yet. It remains our first priority across the organization.”