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Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

alexschapiro.com

161–170 of 301 posts

Re: Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

#161

I am at a loss for words. This wasn't a sophisticated attack. I'd love to know who filevine uses for penetration testing (which they do, according to their website) because holy shit, how do you miss this? I mean, they list their bug bounty program under a pentesting heading, so I guess it's just nice internet people. It's inexcusable.

This was my impression after reading the article too. I have no doubt that the team at Filevine attempted to secure their systems and have probably thwarted other attackers, but got their foot stuck in what is an unsophisticated attack. It only takes one chain vulnerability to bring down the site.

Security reminds me of the Anna Karenina principle: All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.

Re: Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

#162
post #150

They took a month to fix this? That’s beyond inexcusable. I can’t imagine how any customer could justify working with them going forward. Also … shows you what a SOC 2 audit is worth: https://www.filevine.com/news/filevine-proves-industry-leade... Even the most basic pentest would have caught this.

Where did it say that they took a month to fix? The hacker just checked in 2 weeks later and it was fixed by that point.

According to the timeline it took more than a week just for Filevine to respond saying they would review and fix the vulnerability. It was 24 days after initial disclosure when he confirmed the fix was in place.

Re: Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

#163
post #153

The bigwigs at my company want to build out a document management suite. After talking to VP of technology about requirements I ask about security as well as what the regulatory requirements are and all I get is a blank stare. I used to think developers had to be supremely incompetent to end up with vulnerabilities like this. But now I understand it’s not the developers who are incompetent…

There's enough incompetence at all levels to go around.

Maybe I have just been lucky, but I have not had the displeasure of working with people either tha incompetent or willfully ignorant yet.

Re: Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

#164
post #153

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's enough incompetence at all levels to go around.

Maybe I have just been lucky, but I have not had the displeasure of working with people either tha incompetent or willfully ignorant yet.

Oh, I should have been more careful in my formulation:

There are organisations that are generally competent, and there are places that are less competent. It's not all that uncommon for the whole organisation to be generally incompetent.

The saddest places (for me) are those where almost every individual you talk to seems generally competent, but judging by their output the company might as well be stuffed by idiots. Something in the way they are organised suppresses the competence. (I worked at one such company.)

> Maybe I have just been lucky, but I have not had the displeasure of working with people either tha incompetent or willfully ignorant yet.

It's very important before you start any new job to suss out how competent people and the organisation are. Ideally, you probably want to work for a competent company. But at least you want to know what you are getting into.

There's a bit of luck involved, if you go in blindly, but you can also use skill and elbow-grease to investigate.

Re: Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

#165
post #150

They took a month to fix this? That’s beyond inexcusable. I can’t imagine how any customer could justify working with them going forward. Also … shows you what a SOC 2 audit is worth: https://www.filevine.com/news/filevine-proves-industry-leade... Even the most basic pentest would have caught this.

SOC2 is mainly to check boxes, and forces you to think about a few things. There’s no real / actual audit, and in my experience the pen tests are very much a money grab. You’re paying way too much money for some “pentesting” automated suite to run.

The auditors themselves pretty much only care that you answered all questions, they don’t really care what the answers are and absolutely aren’t going to dig any deeper.

(I’m responsible for the SOC2 audits at our firm)

Re: Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

#166
post #150

They took a month to fix this? That’s beyond inexcusable. I can’t imagine how any customer could justify working with them going forward. Also … shows you what a SOC 2 audit is worth: https://www.filevine.com/news/filevine-proves-industry-leade... Even the most basic pentest would have caught this.

Unless im missing something, they replied stating they would look into it and then its totally vague when they patched, with Alex apparently randomly testing later and telling them in a "follow up" that it was fixed. I dont at all get why there is a paragraph thanking their communication if that is the case.

Probably given the alternative, being ghosted followed by a no-knock FBI raid

Re: Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

#167

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, you relinquish the right when you agree to their TOS irrespective of if they pay you.

TOS != law They will stop letting you use the service. That's the recourse for breaking the TOS.

I don’t want to pay for a lawyer to argue that for me. != law does not equate to ‘won’t come with a cost’.

I say this as someone threatened by a billion dollar company for this very thing.

Re: Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

#168
post #12

I'm always a bit surprised how long it can take to triage and fix these pretty glaring security vulnerabilities. October 27, 2025 disclosure and November 4, 2025 email confirmation seems like a long time to have their entire client file system exposed. Sure the actual bug ended up being (what I imagine to be) a Is the issue that people aren't checking their security@ email addresses? People are on holiday? These emai…

I'm a bit conflicted about what responsible disclosure should be, but in many cases it seems like these conditions hold: 1) the hack is straightforward to do; 2) it can do a lot of damage (get PII or other confidential info in most cases); 3) downtime of the service wouldn't hurt anyone, especially if we compare it to the risk of the damage. But, instead of insisting on the immediate shutting down of the affected ser…

> I think in the future I'll anonymously contact companies with way more strict deadlines if their customers (or others) are in serious risk. I'll lose the ability to brag with my real name, but I can live with it.

What you're describing is likely a crime. The sad reality is most businesses don't view protection of customers' data as a sacred duty, but simply another of the innumerable risks to be managed in the course of doing business. If they can say "we were working on fixing it!" their asses are likely covered even if someone does leverage the exploit first—and worst-case, they'll just pay a fine and move on.

Re: Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

#169

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Where did it say that they took a month to fix? The hacker just checked in 2 weeks later and it was fixed by that point.

According to the timeline it took more than a week just for Filevine to respond saying they would review and fix the vulnerability. It was 24 days after initial disclosure when he confirmed the fix was in place.

Given that the author describes the company as prompt, communicative and professional, I think it’s fair to assume there was more contact than the four events in the top of the article.

Re: Reverse engineering a $1B Legal AI tool exposed 100k+ confidential files

#170
I'm less and less sure that when a billion-dollar company screws up this bad, the right thing to do is privately disclose it and let them fix it. This kind of thing just allows companies to go on taking people's money without facing the consequences of their mistakes.
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