Live data from Hacker News

Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

arstechnica.com

131–140 of 372 posts

Re: Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

#131
post #27
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Lots more devices are safe BFU than just Apple's. It's not that complicated on a technical level - it's basically full-disk encryption. Apple sells the illusion of security and privacy, but they're not meaningfully more secure or private except from the device's owner. Remember when they made a big deal of blocking Facebook tracking, while simultaneously adding their own intrusive tracking?

> Lots more devices are safe BFU than just Apple's. It's not that complicated on a technical level - it's basically full-disk encryption. So we agree: it's puzzling that Google can't manage to do it.

Can't manage to do what? Google devices are still full-disk encrypted at BFU... this article is a nothingburger and many previous version charts have been put out over the years.

Re: Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

#132
post #13

I've set up GrapheneOS on my Pixel with 2FA fingerprint + PIN unlock. No way will anyone be getting into it without my cooperation. My only issue was less compatibility with my local emergency services, since they can't see me on a map for some reason if I call from a GOS phone. My solution to that was a second Pixel as an emergency phone - one with the stock OS, that I'll swap sims with and take with me when hiking,…

First I’m hearing Graphene causes issues with E911 - is this a setting?

Is it E911 or an A-GPS issue?

Re: Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

#133

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I read from an old HN post that three letter agencies hate graphen OS. The author heard it from defcon or some similar conference. I couldn’t find the post anyway :/ I think it is buried under one of the posts that discuss Defcon and Blackhat.

Wouldn't it be a total mindfuck if it turns out that Graphene is less secure[1] than stock Pixel, and this is all part of an ANOM-style honeypot operation that has Feds hyping it up, to trick interesting targets into adopting a less-effective security posture. 1. Such as via slower 0-day responses, for instance. This is a thought experiment, I'm nor alleging that this is what it is.

Those honeypot phones clearly use marketing aimed at criminals and make all sort of false promises and clearly aren't technical and transparent projects like GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS community doesn't tolerate discussion of crime or implying you are a criminal on their official community chat rooms and forum. Doesn't make sense for it to be a project aimed at luring in criminals.

Anyway, GrapheneOS ships security patches very quickly, often bumps kernel versions quicker than the stock OS etc. Security isnt only reactive, also proactive. Some features like MTE even outrule entire classes of vulnerabilities.

Re: Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

#134
post #3

They couldn't answer the question most on my mind: "We’ve reached out to Google to inquire about why a custom ROM created by volunteers is more resistant to industrial phone hacking than the official Pixel OS. We’ll update this article if Google has anything to say."

So much for all the security posturing by Google lol.

Re: Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

#135
post #3

They couldn't answer the question most on my mind: "We’ve reached out to Google to inquire about why a custom ROM created by volunteers is more resistant to industrial phone hacking than the official Pixel OS. We’ll update this article if Google has anything to say."

GrapheneOS makes security trade-off that are inconvenient to the user. This results in a far more secure device, but nonetheless a device that the general public would find far more annoying. Google would lose a proportion of its user base by implementing the same protections. Example: https://old.reddit.com/r/GooglePixel/comments/ytk1ng/graphen... Also Google Pay is missing.

Google Wallet works but tap-to-pay NFC payments don't because Google enforces strong Play Integrity for that portion. They only allow Google certified OSes to use it. It's a sad choice on their part, not GrapheneOS' fault or choice.

Re: Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

#136
post #80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

GrapheneOS makes security trade-off that are inconvenient to the user. This results in a far more secure device, but nonetheless a device that the general public would find far more annoying. Google would lose a proportion of its user base by implementing the same protections. Example: https://old.reddit.com/r/GooglePixel/comments/ytk1ng/graphen... Also Google Pay is missing.

Which particular thing you consider inconvenient or even annoying? You can even install Google Play there. I see just one minor tradeoff - no face unlock.

The face unlock is deliberately left out. Non-EOL Pixel hardware, the only currently support phones, don't have the hardware to support secure face unlock. They lack the sensors. Face unlock on current Pixels is not secure and should be avoided, on stock OS as well.

Re: Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

#137
Since nobody else has mentioned it... "vulnerable to hacking" is doing a lot of heavy lifting here. It's "vulnerable" about as much as my LUKS desktop system is vulnerable.

These charts have been available for years and don't tell us anything particularly scary IMO.

This "hacking" especially for BFU/turned-off Pixel devices, at best would amount to brute-forcing your password, either on-device or after copying the flash elsewhere.

Short of using top-secret multi-million dollar 0days or something, there is no inherent Pixel flaw that lets them bypass the device's encryption or anything crazy like people are thinking. They still have to get your password somehow, just like anyone else.

Re: Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

#138
post #80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Which particular thing you consider inconvenient or even annoying? You can even install Google Play there. I see just one minor tradeoff - no face unlock.

That is a major feature. It prevents coerced unlocking.

That's not the reasoning. The reasoning is lack of proper hardware support on supported devices for secure face unlock.

Coerced unlocking also holds true for fingerprint in some instances and that's worked around by using 2FA (fingerprint + password/PIN).

Re: Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

#139

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Wouldn't it be a total mindfuck if it turns out that Graphene is less secure[1] than stock Pixel, and this is all part of an ANOM-style honeypot operation that has Feds hyping it up, to trick interesting targets into adopting a less-effective security posture. 1. Such as via slower 0-day responses, for instance. This is a thought experiment, I'm nor alleging that this is what it is.

Now in grapheneosin the updates settings it allows you to apply Google's upstream security patches, but grapheneos is forbidden from releasing the source code for these until a certain time later. You can read more about it on their blog. I have them enabled. At least I can rest easy knowing the Grapheneos Devs are able to inspect the code on users behalf even if they can't yet release it.

Will Graphene release the patches concurrently with Google? If there's a lag, then then Graphene is a tiny bit less safe in terms of one-day/n-day bugs.

Not having the source of the patch adds some friction to all attackers, but reversing vulnerabilities from binary patches has a long history.

Re: Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

#140
post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Google OS-level integration is absent, and while Google Play Services can be installed, you're still missing things like Chromecast. Also, there's more manual configuration (although I don't remember exactly what, I've never used GrapheneOS). A lot of stuff you do get for free, but not all of it, and stuff that's been removed as a "feature" isn't always stuff that nobody wants.

> stuff that's been removed as a "feature" isn't always stuff that nobody wants. Graphene isn't made to cater to what everyone wants. Face ID and fingerprint unlocking so clearly have no place in a hardened OS. "Google OS-level integration is absent" should not be suprising. This said, you ought to be able to have BFU security with stock Android and it's embarrassing Google ships stock vulnerable.

Fingerprint is present in GrapheneOS. Face unlock and pattern unlock are left out because insecure. Patterns unlock is insecure in design. You start at a certain point and the next points you can go to are very limited (not the same point again and you have to be able to reach it). This makes it hard to make a strong lock. Face unlock is insecure because lack of proper hardware for it on the supported phones. Fingerprint is secure. Coercion can be worked around via 2FA feature (fingerprint + pass/PIN).
Post reply on HN