61–70 of 308 posts
>When you run npm install, npm doesn't just download packages. It executes code. Specifically, it runs lifecycle scripts defined in package.json - preinstall, install, and postinstall hooks. What's the legitimate use case for a package install being allowed to run arbitrary commands on your computer? Quote is from the researchers report https://www.koi.ai/blog/phantomraven-npm-malware-hidden-in-i... edit: I was think…
pnpm v10 disables all lifecycle scripts by default and requires the user to whitelist packages. https://github.com/orgs/pnpm/discussions/8945
>When you run npm install, npm doesn't just download packages. It executes code. Specifically, it runs lifecycle scripts defined in package.json - preinstall, install, and postinstall hooks. What's the legitimate use case for a package install being allowed to run arbitrary commands on your computer? Quote is from the researchers report https://www.koi.ai/blog/phantomraven-npm-malware-hidden-in-i... edit: I was think…
pnpm v10 disables all lifecycle scripts by default and requires the user to whitelist packages. https://github.com/orgs/pnpm/discussions/8945
Earlier quoted context omitted.
No. I am literally describing bog standard use of an ordinary VCS/SCM where the code for e.g. Skia, sqlite, libpng, etc. is placed in a "third-party/" subdirectory. Except I'm deliberately using the words "admit" and "depository" here instead of "commit" and "repository" in keeping with the theme—of the widespread failure of people to use SCMs to manage the corresponding source code required to build their product/pr…
Does the lockfile not solve this?
Here's my `npm` command these days. It reduces the attack surface drastically. alias npm='docker run --rm -it -v ${PWD}:${PWD} --net=host --workdir=${PWD} node:25-bookworm-slim npm' - No access to my env vars - No access to anything outside my current directory (usually a JS project). - No access to my .bashrc or other files. Ref: https://ashishb.net/programming/run-tools-inside-docker/
If only :(
Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're describing a custom registry. These exist IRL (eg jFrog Artifactory). Useful for managing allow-listed packages which have met whatever criteria you might have (eg CVE-free based on your security tool of choice). Use of a custom registry, and a sane package manager (pnpm, not npm), and its lockfile, will significantly enhance your supply-chain security.
No. I am literally describing bog standard use of an ordinary VCS/SCM where the code for e.g. Skia, sqlite, libpng, etc. is placed in a "third-party/" subdirectory. Except I'm deliberately using the words "admit" and "depository" here instead of "commit" and "repository" in keeping with the theme—of the widespread failure of people to use SCMs to manage the corresponding source code required to build their product/pr…
Here's my `npm` command these days. It reduces the attack surface drastically. alias npm='docker run --rm -it -v ${PWD}:${PWD} --net=host --workdir=${PWD} node:25-bookworm-slim npm' - No access to my env vars - No access to anything outside my current directory (usually a JS project). - No access to my .bashrc or other files. Ref: https://ashishb.net/programming/run-tools-inside-docker/
Here's my `npm` command these days. It reduces the attack surface drastically. alias npm='docker run --rm -it -v ${PWD}:${PWD} --net=host --workdir=${PWD} node:25-bookworm-slim npm' - No access to my env vars - No access to anything outside my current directory (usually a JS project). - No access to my .bashrc or other files. Ref: https://ashishb.net/programming/run-tools-inside-docker/
Also I can recommend pnpm, it has stopped executing lifecycle scripts by default so you can whitelist which ones to run.
Here's my `npm` command these days. It reduces the attack surface drastically. alias npm='docker run --rm -it -v ${PWD}:${PWD} --net=host --workdir=${PWD} node:25-bookworm-slim npm' - No access to my env vars - No access to anything outside my current directory (usually a JS project). - No access to my .bashrc or other files. Ref: https://ashishb.net/programming/run-tools-inside-docker/
That seems a bit excessive to sandbox a command that really just downloads arbitrary code you are going to execute immediately afterwards anyways? Also I can recommend pnpm, it has stopped executing lifecycle scripts by default so you can whitelist which ones to run.
Here's my `npm` command these days. It reduces the attack surface drastically. alias npm='docker run --rm -it -v ${PWD}:${PWD} --net=host --workdir=${PWD} node:25-bookworm-slim npm' - No access to my env vars - No access to anything outside my current directory (usually a JS project). - No access to my .bashrc or other files. Ref: https://ashishb.net/programming/run-tools-inside-docker/
That definitely helps and worth doing. On Mac though I guess you need to move the entire development to containers due to native dependencies.