Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm watching him talk about the two key ingredients of an election (anonymity and trust, for those not watching the video) and thinking "We don't have those in U.S. elections". I live in California, where the voting method is vote-by-mail and you sign your ballot . That breaks anonymity right there, plus there's a barcode that matches address and ballot for traceability, so in theory anyone involved in the election p…
Because of the extreme diversity in voting methods in the US (it varies not only by state, but by county within the state) it's impossible to accurately make any generalization about voting in the US. For example, in my parents' county in Wisconsin, you show up at the polling place, they check you off the list of registered voters, and they hand you a ballot with no individual markings at all. Once you finish filling…
Public trust demands open-source voting systems
221–230 of 292 posts
Re: Public trust demands open-source voting systems
#222Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you can independently verify the election result, then it does not matter if any of the counts were made using proprietary software. If you can not independently verify election results, what good does published source code do? Elections are a process , not a result.
20 years ago I attended an international conference on electronic voting. There were various papers on the form of elections (not on specific products.) The huge takeaway for me was not the technology (or lack thereof). Ultimately all existing (and proposed) systems have flaws. The key was public trust in the result. The first step to sidestepping democracy is to attack the legitimacy of elections. One can attack the…
Re: Public trust demands open-source voting systems
#223Earlier quoted context omitted.
True! In The Netherlands, where I live, we still vote on paper ballots. The ballots are counted by hand. The counting is public, anyone can go and observe the counting.
This is in no way intended to be disparaging: there are processes that work within the scale of small European nations that simply won't at larger scales.
Re: Public trust demands open-source voting systems
#224Earlier quoted context omitted.
True! In The Netherlands, where I live, we still vote on paper ballots. The ballots are counted by hand. The counting is public, anyone can go and observe the counting.
This is in no way intended to be disparaging: there are processes that work within the scale of small European nations that simply won't at larger scales.
I don't quite understand how a country with a mere 5 times more population is unable to enact the same solution at their 'so much bigger' scale.
And France is spread over more time zone than the U.S., so that argument doesn't work either.
Re: Public trust demands open-source voting systems
#225Earlier quoted context omitted.
If it’s just a signature or stamp, won’t the 7 year old ask why those can’t be faked or forged?
That's an inquisitive 7 year old. Definitely reward them. Let's explain. A good voting system needs to guarantee - Secrecy of who voted for whom - Transparency of everything else. The names of everybody in the process, the process itself and all the statistics should be verifiably public. Being an observer to your polling station must be a guaranteed voter right. Similarly all participating parties must have the righ…
My point: reality is messy and simplicity isn't a guarantee of reliability. The things hat really work in our societies are pragmatic, not simple.
Re: Public trust demands open-source voting systems
#226Paper trails on the other hand can be verified and secured physically with chain of custody and proper attestation. Paper output can still be designed to be easy scan, verify and re-tabulate. I would like to see the paper trails scanned and uploaded to a centralized block chain so we can see if one of these things is not like the other. I would also like to see higher definition CCTV cameras monitoring the entire voting process and more of those cameras. That should also be uploaded somewhere they can not be tampered with and if a camera goes offline oopsie doopsie it's all hands on deck. Ballot drop-off boxes and mail in votes need to be outlawed and every state needs voter ID.
Re: Public trust demands open-source voting systems
#227Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's an inquisitive 7 year old. Definitely reward them. Let's explain. A good voting system needs to guarantee - Secrecy of who voted for whom - Transparency of everything else. The names of everybody in the process, the process itself and all the statistics should be verifiably public. Being an observer to your polling station must be a guaranteed voter right. Similarly all participating parties must have the righ…
That sounds like a solid system! Thanks for explaining! Is there any way to prevent the observers from knowing who votes? I could see a scenario where a party chooses observers that are likely to intimidate potential voters (e.g. KKK members in a majority black polling station).
If the police does not uphold the laws that guarantee just elections, if they allow intimidations or treat citizens differently, or if the military tries to influence election results, then you do not have a democracy.
Re: Public trust demands open-source voting systems
#228Earlier quoted context omitted.
Each polling station should have representatives from multiple parties as well as independent observers. > how can a constituent know with absolute certainty that their vote was counted The representative of your party plus independent observer said all votes at your polling station were counted. You know both those community members and know them to be generally honorable. Ergo your vote was counted. > every voter i…
To rephrase: "You should trust political volunteers." Surely we could do better? Testimony doesn't assuage my concerns that the process may not be tamper proof.
You do not have to watch every district, every election, every time. But given that enough people do it, at least once, at least in their own district, then it is easy to see why the system as a whole is trustworthy.
Re: Public trust demands open-source voting systems
#229Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because of the extreme diversity in voting methods in the US (it varies not only by state, but by county within the state) it's impossible to accurately make any generalization about voting in the US. For example, in my parents' county in Wisconsin, you show up at the polling place, they check you off the list of registered voters, and they hand you a ballot with no individual markings at all. Once you finish filling…
Many states require party registration to vote in primary elections, and in states like California the primary is the only election that realistically matters.
(1) California does not require party preference to vote in primaries generally;
(2) California primaries are not (except for the Presidential primary) party nominating elections, they are essentially the open first-round of a two-round general election. (Basically, it is majority/runoff except that there is always a runoff even with a first-round majority.)
(3) For the Presidential primary, California does not require party registration to vote, but does prohibit party-registered voters from voting in cross-party primaries; it is the party (not the state) the decides whether their primaries are open to “no party preference" voters (of the six parties with permanent ballot access in California, the Republican, Green, and Peace & Freedom parties do not allow NPP voters in their presidential primaries, while the Democratic, Libertarian, and American Independent parties do allow them.)
Re: Public trust demands open-source voting systems
#230I live in The Netherlands. We are a reasonable modern country, where a lot of things are automated, even in governmental organizations. However, voting is still done on paper ballots. And those paper ballots are then counted manually. This has huge benefits. There always is a paper trail. It’s hard to manipulate votes without getting caught. If there’s any doubt about a certain district’s results, the votes can be re…
It might not happen much in the Netherlands, but for instance making it so fewer people reach voting stations is a classic move. That's one of the failure mode avoided by the other means.
Voting ballots straight getting lost/destroyed is another failure mode, and yes it happens more than we want it to.
The sheer time to get the vote counted is also an issue, and we've seen voter sentiment shifting while the vote is still ongoing, with the media reporting directly influencing the outcome.
It could still be the saner tradeoff in the end, but it's misleading to present it as some ideal or inherently reliable solution.