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AWS multiple services outage in us-east-1

health.aws.amazon.com

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Re: AWS multiple services outage in us-east-1

#611

This is just a silly anecdote, but every time a cloud provider blips, I'm reminded. The worst architecture I've ever encountered was a system that was distributed across AWS, Azure, and GCP. Whenever any one of them had a problem, the system went down. It also cost 3x more than it should.

looks like very few get it right. A good system would have few minutes of blip when one cloud provider went down, which is a massive win compared to outages like this.

Re: AWS multiple services outage in us-east-1

#612
post #487

US-East-1 is more than just a normal region. It also provides the backbone for other services, including those in other regions. Thus simply being in another region doesn’t protect you from the consistent us-east-1 shenanigans. AWS doesn’t talk about that much publicly, but if you press them they will admit in private that there are some pretty nasty single points of failure in the design of AWS that can materialize…

There are hints at in their documentation. For example ACM certs for cloudfront and KMS keys for route53 DNSSEC have to be in the us-east1 region.

Re: AWS multiple services outage in us-east-1

#613
post #369

Every week or so we interview a company and ask them if they have a fall-back plan in case AWS goes down or their cloud account disappears. They always have this deer-in-the-headlights look. 'That can't happen, right?' Now imagine for a bit that it will never come back up. See where that leads you. The internet got its main strengths from the fact that it was completely decentralized. We've been systematically erodin…

Planning for an AWS outage is a complete waste of time and energy for most companies. Yes it does happen but very rarely to the tune of a few hours every 5-10 years. I can almost guarantee that whatever plans you have won’t get you fully operational faster than just waiting for AWS to fix it.

We started that planning process at my previous company after one such outage but it became clear very quickly that the costs of such resilience would be 2-3x hosting costs in perpetuity and who knows how many manhours. Being down for an hour was a lot more palatable to everyone

Re: AWS multiple services outage in us-east-1

#615
post #485

It just goes to show the difference between best practices in cloud computing, and what everyone ends up doing in reality, including well known industry names.

> It just goes to show the difference between best practices in cloud computing, and what everyone ends up doing in reality, Well, inter-region DR/HA is a expensive thing to ensure (whether on salaries, infra or both), specially when you are in AWS.

[deleted]

Re: AWS multiple services outage in us-east-1

#616

Every week or so we interview a company and ask them if they have a fall-back plan in case AWS goes down or their cloud account disappears. They always have this deer-in-the-headlights look. 'That can't happen, right?' Now imagine for a bit that it will never come back up. See where that leads you. The internet got its main strengths from the fact that it was completely decentralized. We've been systematically erodin…

the correct answer for those companies is "we have it on the roadmap but for right now accept the risk"

Re: AWS multiple services outage in us-east-1

#617

aws had an outage. Many companies were impacted. Headlines around the world blame AWS. the real news is how easy it is to identify companies that have put cost management ahead of service resiliency. Lots of orgs operating wholly in AWS and sometimes only within us-east-1 had no operational problems last night. Some that is design (not using the impacted services). Some of that is good resiliency in design. And some…

Three nines might be good enough when you're Fornite. Probably not when you're Robinhood.

Re: AWS multiple services outage in us-east-1

#618

As this incident unfolds, what’s the best way to estimate how many additional hours it’s likely to last? My intuition is that the expected remaining duration increases the longer the outage persists, but that would ultimately depend on the historical distribution of similar incidents. Is that kind of data available anywhere?

I used Claude to get the outage start and ends from the post-event summaries for major historical AWS outages: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/technology/pes/

The cumulative distribution actually ends up pretty exponential which (I think) means that if you estimate the amount of time left in the outage as the mean of all outages that are longer than the current outage, you end up with a flat value that's around 8 hours, if I've done my maths right.

Not a statistician so I'm sure I've committed some statistical crimes there!

Unfortunately I can't find an easy way to upload images of the charts I've made right now, but you can tinker with my data:

    cause,outage_start,outage_duration,incident_duration
    Cell management system bug,2024-07-30T21:45:00.000000+0000,0.2861111111111111,1.4951388888888888
    Latent software defect,2023-06-13T18:49:00.000000+0000,0.08055555555555555,0.15833333333333333
    Automated scaling activity,2021-12-07T15:30:00.000000+0000,0.2861111111111111,0.3736111111111111
    Network device operating system bug,2021-09-01T22:30:00.000000+0000,0.2583333333333333,0.2583333333333333
    Thread count exceeded limit,2020-11-25T13:15:00.000000+0000,0.7138888888888889,0.7194444444444444
    Datacenter cooling system failure,2019-08-23T03:36:00.000000+0000,0.24583333333333332,0.24583333333333332
    Configuration error removed setting,2018-11-21T23:19:00.000000+0000,0.058333333333333334,0.058333333333333334
    Command input error,2017-02-28T17:37:00.000000+0000,0.17847222222222223,0.17847222222222223
    Utility power failure,2016-06-05T05:25:00.000000+0000,0.3993055555555555,0.3993055555555555
    Network disruption triggering bug,2015-09-20T09:19:00.000000+0000,0.20208333333333334,0.20208333333333334
    Transformer failure,2014-08-07T17:41:00.000000+0000,0.13055555555555556,3.4055555555555554
    Power loss to servers,2014-06-14T04:16:00.000000+0000,0.08333333333333333,0.17638888888888887
    Utility power loss,2013-12-18T06:05:00.000000+0000,0.07013888888888889,0.11388888888888889
    Maintenance process error,2012-12-24T20:24:00.000000+0000,0.8270833333333333,0.9868055555555555
    Memory leak in agent,2012-10-22T17:00:00.000000+0000,0.26041666666666663,0.4930555555555555
    Electrical storm causing failures,2012-06-30T02:24:00.000000+0000,0.20902777777777776,0.25416666666666665
    Network configuration change error,2011-04-21T07:47:00.000000+0000,1.4881944444444444,3.592361111111111

Re: AWS multiple services outage in us-east-1

#620
post #466

I realize that my basement servers have better uptime than AWS this year! I think most sysadmin don't plan for AWS outage. And economically it makes sense. But it makes me wonder, is sysadmin a lost art?

> But it makes me wonder, is sysadmin a lost art?

Yes. 15-20 years ago when I was still working on network-adjacent stuff I witnessed the shift to the devops movement.

To be clear, the fact that devops don't plan for AWS failures isn't an indication that they lack the sysadmin gene. Sysadmins will tell you very similar "X can never go down" or "not worth having a backup for service Y".

But deep down devops are developers who just want to get their thing running, so they'll google/serveroverflow their way into production without any desire to learn the intricacies of the underlying system. So when something breaks, they're SOL.

"Thankfully" nowadays containers and application hosting abstracts a lot of it back away. So today I'd be willing to say that devops are sufficient for small to medium companies (and dare I say more efficient?).

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