Pandora doesn't hash their passwords • Hacker News Board

Re: Pandora doesn't hash their passwords

#81

Post by stcredzero » Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 1:48 AM UTC

ryanwaggoner wrote: post #47

JohnsonB wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Simple, for every user that the hackers have, try their password for the associated email account, guaranteed they will gain access to many email accounts. Now they have access to their banking accounts.

This could happen, but do we have any evidence that it has? I'm being serious...I constantly hear about widespread leaks of passwords, but the most I hear about it is people having their email hacked by a botnet to...send spam. Have their been any large scale attacks to gain access to bank accounts to then clean them out somehow? On top of that, how does getting access to someone's bank account even help you? You hav…

> This could happen, but do we have any evidence that it has? I'm being serious...I constantly hear about widespread leaks of passwords, but the most I hear about it is people having their email hacked by a botnet to...send spam.

The more password databases are hacked, the better password cracking becomes, and the more sites black hats get access to. It's a vicious cycle. Yes, people sometimes do get large amounts withdrawn from bank accounts.

Re: Pandora doesn't hash their passwords

#82

Post by tzs » Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 1:49 AM UTC

peterwwillis wrote: post #74

tzs wrote: post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If a site is indifferent, incompetent, or stupid about password security, you should assume they are the same with credit card security until proven otherwise.

This is an incredibly dangerous assumption. It implies they're doing credit card security right just because they put a crypt() call in their code. Always assume they're doing it wrong, because usually they are.

I'm not suggesting that implication. The implication is that when you know someplace seriously botched security in one area, you should assume all their security is suspect.

The default most of us have to use is to assume when we use websites is that they are doing things right, so seeing no problem in one area (login passwords) doesn't change anything about our confidence in the rest of the site (credit cards). It stays at default.

Re: Pandora doesn't hash their passwords

#83

Post by aiiane » Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 1:55 AM UTC

cbsmith wrote: post #80

aiiane wrote: post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Even if that's the case, though, that actually only mitigates the least problematic issue here (namely, how the passwords are stored on Pandora's end). At least the stored passwords there are behind other forms of security - so regardless of whether they're stored in plaintext or hashed on Pandora's servers, it'd still take an actual breach of Pandora's servers to retrieve them. The real, major issue here is the fact…

1) No matter what they do, if someone walks up to a computer that you're logged in to, they have a very good shot at getting your plaintext password (there's a distinct chance it's in a memory buffer somewhere). With a minor bit of effort, they can get access to any future password you use. This is a basic principle of security for anything other than MAC style security systems (and even then...) 2) I think there is…

Re #1: There's still a matter of degree, however - this takes zero technical knowledge and zero external tools, works on every platform that Pandora runs on, and requires maybe 5 seconds of time.

Re #2: Again, it's a difference of degree. Invalid TLS certs will at least give a browser warning that a user isn't used to seeing (in modern browsers), cluing them in that something might be up. Sure, some users might bypass it anyway, but there's at least some tip-off. Furthermore, there's no reason why the password needs to be in the DOM past the login page, which can easily be served over full HTTPS with no user experience impact. Yes, that can still fall prey to session hijacking if you don't use HTTPS for the rest of the site, but session hijacking doesn't give you passwords that you can use to go break into other sites.

Re: Pandora doesn't hash their passwords

#84

Post by jarrett » Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 1:57 AM UTC

aiiane wrote: post #73

cbsmith wrote: post #71

There may be a security issue here, but I think there is a distinct possibility that it certainly isn't what people think. Pandora needn't store the password on their servers. Just posted this to the Google+ thread: Okay, I just did a simple test of what happens when I change my Pandora password. There is a record of HTML local storage keyed on "jStorage" which appears to be a giant JSON blob. A specific attribute wh…

Even if that's the case, though, that actually only mitigates the least problematic issue here (namely, how the passwords are stored on Pandora's end). At least the stored passwords there are behind other forms of security - so regardless of whether they're stored in plaintext or hashed on Pandora's servers, it'd still take an actual breach of Pandora's servers to retrieve them. The real, major issue here is the fact…

Very true! And here's a realistic attack scenario:

Malorie goes to the coffee shop/train station/airport terminal and sets up a public wifi network. The network--be it provided by a laptop hotspot or a router with custom software--is programmed to intercept request/response cycles as follows.

Every response, except those that are part of Malorie's attack, is replaced with a redirect to Pandora's settings page. Some fraction of users will have a Pandora login cookie, which means they'll see the page.

Further, every response for the Pandora settings page gets a tag of Malorie's creation. The JS reads the value attributes of the password and email fields and sends them to Malorie's server.

Malorie then has a bunch of email/password combos. A lot of users will have reused that same combination on many different sites. Quite possibly their email accounts too, which would facilitate even more account takeovers via password reset emails.

So now Malorie can steal entire online identities. From people who reuse passwords, anyway.

To protect against this and many other attacks, everyone should avoid reusing passwords. A password manager, such as the excellent 1 Password, is the most practical solution.

Re: Pandora doesn't hash their passwords

#85

Post by rapind » Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 2:01 AM UTC

stcredzero wrote: post #81

ryanwaggoner wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This could happen, but do we have any evidence that it has? I'm being serious...I constantly hear about widespread leaks of passwords, but the most I hear about it is people having their email hacked by a botnet to...send spam. Have their been any large scale attacks to gain access to bank accounts to then clean them out somehow? On top of that, how does getting access to someone's bank account even help you? You hav…

> This could happen, but do we have any evidence that it has? I'm being serious...I constantly hear about widespread leaks of passwords, but the most I hear about it is people having their email hacked by a botnet to...send spam. The more password databases are hacked, the better password cracking becomes, and the more sites black hats get access to. It's a vicious cycle. Yes, people sometimes do get large amounts wi…

This. For more information on why this is the case, here's a pretty good article on it.

http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/08/passwords-under-assa...

The simplified version: Every time a password is cracked it is added to a database of hashes used to hack other databases. Essentially crowdsourced cracking.

Re: Pandora doesn't hash their passwords

#86

Post by [deleted] » Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 2:01 AM UTC

pbreit wrote: post #50

samspot wrote: post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It has to be plaintext in the db, because they can't reverse the hash back to plaintext to send to you.

Not quite true. It could be (and probably is) encrypted in the database.

[deleted]

Re: Pandora doesn't hash their passwords

#87

Post by stcredzero » Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 2:03 AM UTC

peterwwillis wrote: post #79

aiiane wrote: post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Even if that's the case, though, that actually only mitigates the least problematic issue here (namely, how the passwords are stored on Pandora's end). At least the stored passwords there are behind other forms of security - so regardless of whether they're stored in plaintext or hashed on Pandora's servers, it'd still take an actual breach of Pandora's servers to retrieve them. The real, major issue here is the fact…

The fact that someone could physically break into your machine to steal your Pandora password is extremely problematic? I'd hate to see your write-up once somebody knocks over the carton of milk... If they used an HMAC and the secret is stored locally, aside some some sort of JavaScript/browser exploit, it's more secure than a non-MAC cryptographically hashed password, and much more secure than the plaintext password…

> The fact that someone could physically break into your machine to steal your Pandora password is extremely problematic? I'd hate to see your write-up once somebody knocks over the carton of milk...

For users that use the same few passwords everywhere, it could well be a problem.

Re: Pandora doesn't hash their passwords

#88

Post by peterwwillis » Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 2:06 AM UTC

masterzora wrote: post #78

peterwwillis wrote: post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Of course it's easy. You won't necessarily do it right, but you can sure get a crappy version working quickly. Assuming every web developer implemented a crappy password hash and then checked off the 'security' box on their compliance form. Are users more secure? No, because they didn't consider exactly how secure it needed to be . Are you using a sha1 hash? Great. Is it salted? Oh shit, forgot that, let's salt it. O…

When password reuse is common (that is to say, in the real world) it is always the time and place for password security. Sure, you and I know that we should have different passwords for every one of the hundreds of websites we've ever visited and that they should each be as strong as the potential damages of each website warrants and that we should change them on a relatively regular basis. And we are supergood about…

Your argument, then, is that Pandora should apply password hashing to keep people from being compromised elsewhere? Assuming they only had two online accounts this might make sense. Assuming every single one of their accounts, all the same credentials, had perfectly implemented password hashing, this might make sense.

But that is bullshit and we both know it.

There will always be a bad implementation, or a mistake, or an insider, or a man in the middle. If all their 100 accounts are the same creds, it only takes one time and they're fucked.

It is completely impossible to have perfect security on all these accounts. It is inevitable that one will get cracked. At that point, blaming anyone but the user is lunacy.

Re: Pandora doesn't hash their passwords

#89

Post by peterwwillis » Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 2:12 AM UTC

stcredzero wrote: post #87

peterwwillis wrote: post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The fact that someone could physically break into your machine to steal your Pandora password is extremely problematic? I'd hate to see your write-up once somebody knocks over the carton of milk... If they used an HMAC and the secret is stored locally, aside some some sort of JavaScript/browser exploit, it's more secure than a non-MAC cryptographically hashed password, and much more secure than the plaintext password…

> The fact that someone could physically break into your machine to steal your Pandora password is extremely problematic? I'd hate to see your write-up once somebody knocks over the carton of milk... For users that use the same few passwords everywhere, it could well be a problem.

My reply to that argument here: http://hackerne.ws/item?id=4551852

Re: Pandora doesn't hash their passwords

#90

Post by cbsmith » Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 2:17 AM UTC

aiiane wrote: post #83

cbsmith wrote: post #80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

1) No matter what they do, if someone walks up to a computer that you're logged in to, they have a very good shot at getting your plaintext password (there's a distinct chance it's in a memory buffer somewhere). With a minor bit of effort, they can get access to any future password you use. This is a basic principle of security for anything other than MAC style security systems (and even then...) 2) I think there is…

Re #1: There's still a matter of degree, however - this takes zero technical knowledge and zero external tools, works on every platform that Pandora runs on, and requires maybe 5 seconds of time. Re #2: Again, it's a difference of degree. Invalid TLS certs will at least give a browser warning that a user isn't used to seeing (in modern browsers), cluing them in that something might be up. Sure, some users might bypas…

#1: You know what also requires zero technical knowledge and zero external tools and requires maybe 5 seconds of my time? Typing in a new password for the account and clicking "save".

#2: It needn't be an invalid TLS cert. It could be a valid TLS cert pointing to another domain. The browser provides no warning and you only notice it if the check the domain is different from the one you expect. Watch out for domains that are only different because they use a funky character that looks like the one you are expecting.