Poor quality analogy: should ed25519 only have been incorporated into protocols in conjunction with another cryptographic primitive? Surely requiring a hybrid with ecdsa would be more secure? Why did djb not argue for everyone using ed25519 to use a hybrid? Was he trying to reduce security?
The reason this is a poor quality analogy is that fundamentally ecdsa and ed25519 are sufficiently similar that people had a high degree of confidence that there was no fundamental weakness in ed25519, and so it's fine - whereas for PQC the newer algorithms are meaningfully mathematically distinct, and the fact that SIKE turned out to be broken is evidence that we may not have enough experience and tooling to be confident that any of them are sufficiently secure in themselves and so a protocol using PQC should use a hybrid algorithm with something we have more confidence in. And the counter to that is that SIKE was meaningfully different in terms of what it is and does and cryptographers apparently have much more confidence in the security of Kyber, and hybrid algorithms are going to be more complicated to implement correctly, have worse performance, and so on.
And the short answer seems to be that a lot of experts, including several I know well and would absolutely attest are not under the control of the NSA, seem to feel that the security benefits of a hybrid approach don't justify the drawbacks. This is a decision where entirely reasonable people could disagree, and there are people other than djb who do disagree with it. But only djb has engaged in a campaign of insinuating that the NSA has been controlling the process with the goal of undermining security.