151–160 of 181 posts
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The solution is pfsense
Actually, pfsense kind of has a shitty reputation in the FOSS community and opnSense is preferred. But I don't like the limitations of BSD systems in terms of hardware compatibility and performance, so I build my router using a plain Linux distro (Debian).
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You should still be able to use the tapo:// go2rtc stream source even if the camera does not support the rtsp:// via the camera account option. Have a look at my frigate configuration for reference - https://github.com/kennedn/frigate/blob/7c56604e819d2cb1da28...
Fantastic. Why do you use rtsp for some streams and then tapo protocol for others? Are these all tapo cameras?
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I've been blocking by default bigger media files with uBlock Origin to avoid needless resource usage. Cover images are typically blocked, and they are usually useless anyway. It's too bad people spend energy for generating them now.
>> It's too bad people spend energy for generating them now. How do you mean? Some quick back of the napkin math. Creating a 'throwaway' banner image by hand, maybe 15 minutes on a 100W CPU in Photoshop: 15 minutes human work time + 0.025 kWh (100W*0.25h) Creating a 'throwaway' banner image by stable diffusion on a 600W GPU. In reality it's probably less than 20 seconds to generate, but let's round it up to one full…
You are not accounting for the model training (which can't be ignored, first because you can't ignore fixed costs, and second, because we keep training newer models, so amortizing doesn't quite work), rebound effect, the subsidized bot crawling, etc.
I won't comment further on this, this discussion has been rehashed to death anyway and in better ways that I can.
IMHO the better way is to not do meaningless cover images, and this is also true of stock, non-AI generated images (I'm not against art, so if it's your strength, by all means, please do meaningful or nice cover images).
IoT security is generally terrible, but the fact that consumer routers are essentially unaudited black boxes processing all your network traffic is genuinely concerning. Most people have no idea their router firmware hasn't been updated in years and is probably running known CVEs. The supply chain trust model for networking hardware is broken.
The stuff on the shelf, sure, but you can always go 'prosumer-grade' like Ubiquiti or Mikrotik for hardware that actually receives timely updates and has competently written firmware.
Oh awesome, this is using my Frida scripts! These: https://github.com/httptoolkit/frida-interception-and-unpinn... . Nice project, great to see the scripts doing good work in the wild. If you needed any extra additions or tweaks to get them working, I'd love to hear about it.
frida -U \
-l ./config.js \
-l ./android/android-proxy-override.js \
-l ./android/android-system-certificate-injection.js \
-l ./android/android-certificate-unpinning.js \
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Actually, pfsense kind of has a shitty reputation in the FOSS community and opnSense is preferred. But I don't like the limitations of BSD systems in terms of hardware compatibility and performance, so I build my router using a plain Linux distro (Debian).
That's the first I've heard of pfsense having a bad reputation, can you explain? (I haven't used it, genuinely want to know)
I'm guessing not, and it's not really an issue since it can be used entirely locally without, but it's still kinda annoying.
IoT security is generally terrible, but the fact that consumer routers are essentially unaudited black boxes processing all your network traffic is genuinely concerning. Most people have no idea their router firmware hasn't been updated in years and is probably running known CVEs. The supply chain trust model for networking hardware is broken.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Many IoT devices (or Windows when the LAN network location is set to “Private”) expose a wider surface area to local network addresses. Having a competent firewall on your residential router is still useful, especially for those that have no idea how to configure their endpoints securely. Comparing a residential router to a network operator’s router is spurious: those routers don’t perform any sort of filtering for t…
Is there any residential router that exposes internal endpoints be default? I've yet to come across one that does not have a deny-any policy on it's WAN interface and has incoming destination NATs setup up. What use is reducing the attack surface of a device which only ever initiates connections? Edit: also there are network operators that block customer traffic on certain ports liike NetBIOS, SMB or SMTP to name a f…