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Pass: Unix Password Manager

passwordstore.org

81–90 of 186 posts

Re: Pass: Unix Password Manager

#81

Growing tired of Bitwarden in the browser, so this is pretty intriguing. But its hard to forgo mobile compatibility.

Try KeePassXC on desktop, KeePass2Android on mobile (there's something on iOS too).

There are some pass apps for Android, but they're a pain to use.

Re: Pass: Unix Password Manager

#82
How would you build a dead man’s switch for pass? I’d like my family to be able to access my store if I disappear, but not before. The obvious problem: to re-encrypt for their keys I’d need my private GPG key running somewhere, which defeats the point. Has anyone solved this cleanly without leaving a hot key around?

Re: Pass: Unix Password Manager

#83

Pass might work if you really like terminals and only use computers with a Unix-like OS. But if you use a phone, or Windows, pass is just too clunky to use.

The android "Password Store" app is okay'ish, integrates with accessibility API to offer auto fill in many apps.

Re: Pass: Unix Password Manager

#84
post #58

There's a ton of positivity here, but on the balance there are some significant issues with pass that I think bear mention: - The fact that it's essentially unstructured data makes it hard to work with generically. If you have a username + password and need to use those in a script, you'll need to implement your own parser in your shell language in every script you need it in. - `pass generate` to generate new passwo…

For the structure I "solved" that problem by creating folders with three main files: Websites/foo.com/username Websites/foo.com/password Websites/foo.com/email Sometimes I add "/notes" with unstructured text contents, and for a few special cases I created a file "/json" with some machine-readable things in JSON format. It's not perfect, and I do dislike the way that the metadata isn't encrypted, but on the whole I'm…

Yeah sure, but then are the conventions you came up with shared by all the tools in the ecosystem too (ex: browserpass)? Since the keystone (pass) declined to provide strong guidance, you end up with fragmentation and incompatibility.

Re: Pass: Unix Password Manager

#85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>That’s true for any password manager Modern operating systems isolate individual apps such that a malicous app can not access the RAM of another app. There is a difference between not making an effort to protect passwords and requiring an OS exploit to do so.

Memory isolation doesn't really help, though. If you have a malicious process running under the same user account as your password manager, it's still game over since that process could e.g. - capture keyboard input - capture your screen - silently install browser extensions to capture your credentials - modify your shell config, .desktop files, $PATH, … to have you e.g. call a backdoored version of your password man…

For modern operating systems capturing keyboard input is locked down to avoid keyloggers. Capturing your screen requires explicit user permission to do so, popping up a dialog. Apps are isolated so another app can't interfere and install a browser extention or modify shell configs, etc.

Re: Pass: Unix Password Manager

#86
post #58

There's a ton of positivity here, but on the balance there are some significant issues with pass that I think bear mention: - The fact that it's essentially unstructured data makes it hard to work with generically. If you have a username + password and need to use those in a script, you'll need to implement your own parser in your shell language in every script you need it in. - `pass generate` to generate new passwo…

> - The fact that it's essentially unstructured data makes it hard to work with generically. If you have a username + password and need to use those in a script, you'll need to implement your own parser in your shell language in every script you need it in. Fair, but you can use your own conventions. > - `pass generate` to generate new passwords, maybe thanks to the above, replaces everything in the pass value by def…

`pass git diff` decrypts the passwords for me.

Re: Pass: Unix Password Manager

#87
post #45

Browser password managers with passkeys are more convenient for me, but a pass vault can still be useful for recovery codes and API keys. I used pass for a while but couldn’t see what threat model it actually solves: If you let GPG agent cache your key, any script (e.g. an npm post-install) can just run `pass ls` or `pass my/secrets` and dump all your credentials. At that point it’s basically just full-disk encryptio…

You can configure the yubikey to need a PIN and/or touch to authorise the use a GPG key.

My main issue with pass is that it doesn’t work great on iOS with yubikeys.

Re: Pass: Unix Password Manager

#89
post #58

There's a ton of positivity here, but on the balance there are some significant issues with pass that I think bear mention: - The fact that it's essentially unstructured data makes it hard to work with generically. If you have a username + password and need to use those in a script, you'll need to implement your own parser in your shell language in every script you need it in. - `pass generate` to generate new passwo…

> It's very difficult to review history. I stopped using it a while ago, but since everything's encrypted `git diff` won't give you anything useful and IIRC the command line tools were very hard to use for reviewing/restoring passwords when you mess up updates, etc.

pass sets up a .gitattributes and configures git to convert gpg files to text via a custom driver. This enables a text-diff of the encrypted contents out of the box (at least for a store I've just set up to test this).

  ~/.password-store # cat .gitattributes
  *.gpg diff=gpg
  ~/.password-store # cat .git/config
  # ...
  [diff "gpg"]
          binary = true
          textconv = gpg2 -d --quiet --yes --compress-algo=none --no-encrypt-to --batch --use-agent

Re: Pass: Unix Password Manager

#90

How would you build a dead man’s switch for pass? I’d like my family to be able to access my store if I disappear, but not before. The obvious problem: to re-encrypt for their keys I’d need my private GPG key running somewhere, which defeats the point. Has anyone solved this cleanly without leaving a hot key around?

key sharding with a trusted third party? computer systems can't know of your death, or even true time, so you have to trust something like a company holding the secrets for you, or your lawyer...
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