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Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

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Re: Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

#21
I think the difference is that there is still a maintenance of stored value, but that stored value is now able to earn more yield than what you would by depositing it at a bank.

In both the cases described in the article - using Unit or Bridge - you pass on the work of stored value to someone else. But Unit doesn't earn as much by being the stored value as Bridge would because Bridge is invested into T bills / MMFs. Hence, Mercury coin is better than running a bank using Unit.

Is that fair to say?

Re: Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

#22
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> you can lend out the money you earn from selling someNiceCoin to services with higher yields. > And my expectation is that issuers of stablecoins can do even more risky types of lending than Silicon Valley Bank did. To be clear - stablecoin issuers are not allowed to "lend" the money out like a bank or a regulated lender _at all_ - much less doing "riskier" lending. Bridge and Circle still have to, by law, maintain…

1:1 cash/cash-equivalent reserves, which means the best they can do is things like US treasuries / money-market funds Whether US Treasuries are "cash equivalent" is debatable / depends on the specifics. A dollar is worth a dollar tomorrow. A 10-year US treasury might not. Are you saying the holder of a stable coin is not taking a higher long-tail risk than the holder of a dollar in a checking account of a bank?

Yeah that's a good flag.

To be even more specific though, "cash equivalent" and the sorts of treasuries that implies are specifically short-duration ones (ie. this cash cannot be parked in a 10-year US treasury either)

Cash equivalents are short-term commitments "with temporarily idle cash and easily convertible into a known cash amount"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cash_and_cash_equivalents

Re: Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

#23

I think the difference is that there is still a maintenance of stored value, but that stored value is now able to earn more yield than what you would by depositing it at a bank. In both the cases described in the article - using Unit or Bridge - you pass on the work of stored value to someone else. But Unit doesn't earn as much by being the stored value as Bridge would because Bridge is invested into T bills / MMFs.…

This is a great question, I actually don't even think it's strictly a matter of "more" yield.

To dig into your example a bit deeper, there are a few general differences with an (eg.) Unit vs. Bridge.

- With a BaaS like unit, you're often actually forming a partnership _not just_ with Unit (a software provider), but the partner banks Unit works with. More specifically, you're operating two sorts of programs with the partner bank: programs around "money transmission" (_moving_ money on behalf of customers) and around "stored value" (_storing_ money on behalf of customers). Each of these programs tends to be pretty involved - as is having to be in a three-party agreement etc, working with an old-school bank, under legacy banking constructs, etc.

- With Bridge: Bridge is your single partner. Bridge _itself_ has partner banks for the sake of both banking + money movement, but when you store customer funds as stablecoins in a crypto "wallet" Bridge spins up, it is operationally different than if you were to store them as fiat in a customer-specific bank account you opened at Bridge's partner bank, under a classic FBO/DDA program. The partner bank Bridge using is more involved in the money _transmission_ piece, when you want to receive customer funds in as fiat, or push customer funds out as fiat - but the funds being stablecoin at rest would seem to reduce the burden here.

So yes that might result in some cost-saving, but it's also just (vaguely) _easier_ to do from a technical/operational POV.

(Some of the details above may be wrong / vary by provider / etc - but having worked with both of these sorts of providers at some length, this is my "felt" difference and high-level understanding).

Re: Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

#24
post #18
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The difference is in the assumption of "higher risk". Most of this borrowing is eventually the US Govt because the stablecoins are backed by T bills. So its not as much of an arbitrage as you say. But then can you have a world where all the money is only stablecoins and backed by "something"? I think that has interesting implications for monetary supply and central banking

> But then can you have a world where all the money is only stablecoins and backed by "something"? I think that has interesting implications for monetary supply and central banking This strikes me as among the biggest macro risks, and (IIRC) is one of the reasons banks are fighting to prohibit stablecoins from granting yield (to keep the banking system working). A different primitive that is related to stablecoin but…

Why would a stablecoin granting yield keep the banking system from working?

Re: Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

#25
post #24
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> But then can you have a world where all the money is only stablecoins and backed by "something"? I think that has interesting implications for monetary supply and central banking This strikes me as among the biggest macro risks, and (IIRC) is one of the reasons banks are fighting to prohibit stablecoins from granting yield (to keep the banking system working). A different primitive that is related to stablecoin but…

Why would a stablecoin granting yield keep the banking system from working?

The theory, at least, is that everyone would eventually be incentivized to move deposits out of the banking system and into this.

(I am not sufficiently expert here to comment on the odds of an outcome like that)

Re: Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

#26
post #7

I'm not sure if I'm missing the point here, but stablecoins could be exchanged for something of value at a fixed price. The USD used to be this - you could exchange it for gold. But it was more convenient to give paper money than exchange gold. A Big Mac may cost $5 now, $10 in the future. But I would like a Big Mac Coin that lets me exchange it for one Big Mac in any time in the future. It has value as long as McDon…

So, a future?

Yes, but McChicken futures :)

Re: Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

#27
post #10

This is how I understand the uprising of stablecoins, let me know if I am wrong: One of the best businesses is to offer this service: Give me your money, I'll give it back to you later. Because then you can lend out that money to someone who offers this service: Give me your money, I'll give it back to you later. Plus some interest. You now have a business which, at almost no cost, generates money. The interest offer…

I think this is somewhat reasonable, but with plenty of asterisks / not the "arbitrage" this would imply. There is still a "real", regulated money-holder in the loop - it's just Bridge (the manager of the cash reserves backing the coin - and licensed money transmitter etc etc). Or in the case of USDC - Circle, the "money-holder" / manager of reserves (also has tons of licensed / is very regulated). And the ETH networ…

Everything you're describing makes sense in terms of legal requirements, but none of it seems to require any form of cryptocurrency or stablecoins.

Re: Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

#28
post #27
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this is somewhat reasonable, but with plenty of asterisks / not the "arbitrage" this would imply. There is still a "real", regulated money-holder in the loop - it's just Bridge (the manager of the cash reserves backing the coin - and licensed money transmitter etc etc). Or in the case of USDC - Circle, the "money-holder" / manager of reserves (also has tons of licensed / is very regulated). And the ETH networ…

Everything you're describing makes sense in terms of legal requirements, but none of it seems to require any form of cryptocurrency or stablecoins.

This was also where I initially landed after finding out that the custom stablecoin could not leave my Bridge instance.

I think the role that crypto plays in enabling this is as a neutral, credible storage layer on which this token can be held, that is not my Postgres database as (eg.) Bridge - these tokens still are actual ERC-20s/etc that are present on-chain, as are the wallets that hold them -- but yeah, I'm:

- not sure how instrumental that actually is here

- not sure if that's just incidentally the easiest structure for Bridge, whose primary business revolves around facilitating payments via stablecoin (now, as a part of Stripe)

Re: Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

#29

This is how I understand the uprising of stablecoins, let me know if I am wrong: One of the best businesses is to offer this service: Give me your money, I'll give it back to you later. Because then you can lend out that money to someone who offers this service: Give me your money, I'll give it back to you later. Plus some interest. You now have a business which, at almost no cost, generates money. The interest offer…

“At no cost”

Actually there is a lot of cost, in terms of bank reputation, loan underwriting, and finding consumers and businesses to lend to. There is an entire loan servicing department etc.

Banks are allowed to keep fractional reserves and lend out money they create out of thin air.

Stablecoins are not. (Hi, Terra Luna!) Stablecoin issuers like DAI even overcollateralized. That money is sitting there doing nothing. Enter… banks.

USDT rebuffed the EU’s push to get them to deposit into European banks. They prefer US treasuries (and the current admin is lucky they’re doing it because the treasuries are taking a dive… and some of them are even looking into forcing partners to buy US treasuries and issue stablecoins).

The GENIUS act requires stablecoin issuers essentially to keep 100% of the money in deposits and to work with US banks, and prop up the US treasuries and dollar.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/ninabambysheva/2025/05/06/why-s...

You see, originally, Tether (issuers of USDT, the original stablecoin) kept a lot of their collateral in Bitcoin, which was essentially creating an asset bubble / ponzi scheme where newly printed USDT propped up BTC and vice versa. But since the US government started running multi-trillion-dollar deficits every year, it has also become a ponzi scheme, just a sovereign-debt-based ponzi scheme.

That’s the real play here, for a country that’s $35 trillion in debt and needs to keep demand for its treasuries going… because printing money as UBI — to trickle up, get taxed and service the debt properly — just aint in its overton window. The link below goes over exactly how a UBI could solve multiple problems at once over a few decades (help cushion the demand shocks for human labor, help make taxes on pollution and fossil fuels popular, and help the government actually pay off its debt)… but since USA probably isn’t going to do this on a federal level, it might make sense to go bottom-up, town by town:

https://community.intercoin.app/t/ubi-is-not-socialism-but-i...

Re: Why you’d issue a branded stablecoin

#30
post #25
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why would a stablecoin granting yield keep the banking system from working?

The theory, at least, is that everyone would eventually be incentivized to move deposits out of the banking system and into this. (I am not sufficiently expert here to comment on the odds of an outcome like that)

Considering that stablecoins don't pay interest to the holder, I don't know why anyone would be incentivised to move their funds into stablecoins.
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