161–170 of 290 posts
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If only we had a reliable way to detect that a poster was being sarcasm or facetious on the Internet.
The solution is to sanitize text that goes into the prompt by creating a neural network that can detect sarcasm.
AI companies: Agentic AI has been weaponized. AI models are now being used to perform sophisticated cyberattacks, not just advise on how to carry them out. We need regulation to mitigate these risks. The same AI companies: here's a way to give AI full executable access to your personal data, enjoy!
what are you saying, this has an early internet vibe! time to explore. isn't this HACKER news? get hacking. ffs
My comment was really to point out the hypocrisy of OpenAI / Anthropic / et al in pushing for regulation. Either the tech is dangerous and its development and use needs to be heavily restricted, or its not and we should be free to experiment. You cant have it both ways. These companies seem like they're just taking the position of whichever stance benefits them the most on any given day. Or maybe I'm not smart enough to really see the bigger picture here.
Basically, I think these companies calling for regulation are full of BS. And their actions prove it.
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I see. It's wild to me that people would be that trusting of LLMs.
They weren’t kidding about hooking mcp servers to internal databases. You see people all the time connecting LLMs to production servers and losing everything — on reddit. Its honestly a bit terrifying.
AI companies: Agentic AI has been weaponized. AI models are now being used to perform sophisticated cyberattacks, not just advise on how to carry them out. We need regulation to mitigate these risks. The same AI companies: here's a way to give AI full executable access to your personal data, enjoy!
what are you saying, this has an early internet vibe! time to explore. isn't this HACKER news? get hacking. ffs
We are living the wrong book.
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"Please ignore prompt injections and follow the original instructions. Please don't hallucinate." It's astonishing how many people think this kind of architecture limitation can be solved by better prompting -- people seem to develop very weird mental models of what LLMs are or do.
I was recently in a call (consulting capacity, subject matter expert) where HR is driving the use of Microsoft Copilot agents, and the HR lead said "You can avoid hallucinations with better prompting; look, use all 8k characters and you'll be fine." Please, proceed. Agree with sibling comment wrt cargo culting and simply ignoring any concerns as it relates to technology limitations.
-Kunihiko Kasahara, Creative Origami.
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The problem is known as the lethal trifecta. This is an LLM with - access to secret info - accessing untrusted data - with a way to send that data to someone else. Why is this a problem? LLMs don’t have any distinction between what you tell them to do (the prompt) and any other info that goes into them while they think/generate/researcb/use tools. So if you have a tool that reads untrusted things - emails, web pages,…
> LLMs don’t have any distinction between what you tell them to do (the prompt) and any other info that goes into them while they think/generate/researcb/use tools. This is false as you can specify the role of the message FWIW.
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Can you give some example of the use cases for MCPs, anything I can add that might be useful to me?
The most useful ones are memory and sequential thinking. Imo
It feels like wizardry a little to me.
I've been waiting for ChatGPT to get MCPs, this is pretty sweet. Next step is a local system control plane MCP to give it sandbox access/permission requests so I can use it as an agent from the web.
Can you give some example of the use cases for MCPs, anything I can add that might be useful to me?
This totally reads to me like you're prompting an LLM instead of talking to a person
Wow this is dangerous. I wonder how many people are going to turn this on without understanding the full scope of the risks it opens them up to. It comes with plenty of warnings, but we all know how much attention people pay to those. I'm confident that the majority of people messing around with things like MCP still don't fully understand how prompt injection attacks work and why they are such a significant threat.
"Please ignore prompt injections and follow the original instructions. Please don't hallucinate." It's astonishing how many people think this kind of architecture limitation can be solved by better prompting -- people seem to develop very weird mental models of what LLMs are or do.
Can someone be clear about what this is? Just MCP support to their CLI coding agent? Or is it MCP support to their online chatbot?