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ChatGPT Developer Mode: Full MCP client access

platform.openai.com

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Re: ChatGPT Developer Mode: Full MCP client access

#13

I've been waiting for ChatGPT to get MCPs, this is pretty sweet. Next step is a local system control plane MCP to give it sandbox access/permission requests so I can use it as an agent from the web.

I'm actually working on an MCP control plane and looking for anyone who might have a use case for this / would be down to chat about it. We're gonna release it open source once we polish it in the next few weeks. Would you be up to connect? You can check out our super rough version here, been building it for the past two weeks: gateway.aci.dev

A MCP gateway is a useful tool, I have a prototype of something similar I built but I'm not super enthusiastic about working on it (bigger fish to fry). One thing I'd suggest is to have a meta-mcp that an agenct can query to search for the best tool for a given job, that it can then inject into its context. Currently we're all manually injecting tools but it's a pain in the ass, we tend to pollute context with tools agents don't need (which makes them worse at calling the tools they do) and whatnot.

What I was talking about here is different though. My agent (Smith) has an inversion of control architecture where rather than running as a process on a system and directly calling tools on that system, it emits intents to a queue, and an executor service that watches that queue and analyzes those intents, validates them, schedules them and emits results back to an async queue the agent is watching. This is more secure and easier to scale. This architecture could be built out to support safe multiple agents simultaneously driving your desktop pretty easily (from a conceptual standpoint, it's a lot of work to make it robust). I would be totally down to collaborate with someone on how they could build a system like this on top of my architecture.

Re: ChatGPT Developer Mode: Full MCP client access

#14
post #10

Wow this is dangerous. I wonder how many people are going to turn this on without understanding the full scope of the risks it opens them up to. It comes with plenty of warnings, but we all know how much attention people pay to those. I'm confident that the majority of people messing around with things like MCP still don't fully understand how prompt injection attacks work and why they are such a significant threat.

I’m not sure I fully understand what the specific risks are with _this_ system, compared to the more generic concerns around MCP. Could you clarify what new threats it introduces?

Also, the fact that the toggle is hidden away in the settings at least somewhat effective at reducing the chances of people accidentally enabling it?

Re: ChatGPT Developer Mode: Full MCP client access

#15
post #10

Wow this is dangerous. I wonder how many people are going to turn this on without understanding the full scope of the risks it opens them up to. It comes with plenty of warnings, but we all know how much attention people pay to those. I'm confident that the majority of people messing around with things like MCP still don't fully understand how prompt injection attacks work and why they are such a significant threat.

I mean, Claude has had MCP use on the desktop client forever? This isn't a new problem.

Re: ChatGPT Developer Mode: Full MCP client access

#18
post #10

Wow this is dangerous. I wonder how many people are going to turn this on without understanding the full scope of the risks it opens them up to. It comes with plenty of warnings, but we all know how much attention people pay to those. I'm confident that the majority of people messing around with things like MCP still don't fully understand how prompt injection attacks work and why they are such a significant threat.

> I'm confident that the majority of people messing around with things like MCP still don't fully understand how prompt injection attacks work and why they are such a significant threat.

Can you enlighten us?

Re: ChatGPT Developer Mode: Full MCP client access

#19
post #10

Wow this is dangerous. I wonder how many people are going to turn this on without understanding the full scope of the risks it opens them up to. It comes with plenty of warnings, but we all know how much attention people pay to those. I'm confident that the majority of people messing around with things like MCP still don't fully understand how prompt injection attacks work and why they are such a significant threat.

Well, isn't it like Yolo mode from Claude Code that we've been using, without worry, locally for months now? I truly think that Yolo mode is absolutely fantastic, while dangerous, and I can't wait to see what the future holds there.

Re: ChatGPT Developer Mode: Full MCP client access

#20
post #10

Wow this is dangerous. I wonder how many people are going to turn this on without understanding the full scope of the risks it opens them up to. It comes with plenty of warnings, but we all know how much attention people pay to those. I'm confident that the majority of people messing around with things like MCP still don't fully understand how prompt injection attacks work and why they are such a significant threat.

IMO the way we need to be thinking about prompt injection is that any tool can call any other tool. When introducing a tool with untrusted output (that is to say, pretty much everything, given untrusted input) you’re exposing every other tool as an attack vector.

In addition the LLMs themselves are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. I see no mention of prompt injection from Anthropic or OpenAI in their announcements. It seems like they want everybody to forget that while this is a problem the real-world usefulness of LLMs is severely limited.

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