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DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

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Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

#4
> According to the npm statistics, nobody has downloaded these packages before they were deprecated

Is this actually accurate? Packages with weekly downloads in the hundreds of thousands, yet in the 4+ hours that the malicious versions were up for, not a single person updated any of them to the latest patch release?

Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

#5

> An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions How can anyone publish their packages?

There is a detailed postmortem in the linked ticket explaining exactly how this happened.

Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

#7
post #5

> An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions How can anyone publish their packages?

There is a detailed postmortem in the linked ticket explaining exactly how this happened.

This is the same phishing attack that hit junon yesterday.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45169657

Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

#8

> An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions How can anyone publish their packages?

The attacker emailed a maintainer from a legitimate looking email address. The maintainer clicked the link and reset their credentials on a legitimate looking website. The attacker then signs into the legitimate duckdb account and publishes their new package.

This is the second high-profile instance of the technique this week.

Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

#9

> An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions How can anyone publish their packages?

The attacker emailed a maintainer from a legitimate looking email address. The maintainer clicked the link and reset their credentials on a legitimate looking website. The attacker then signs into the legitimate duckdb account and publishes their new package. This is the second high-profile instance of the technique this week.

2FA for such high profile packages should be enforced
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