DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware
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Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware
#2How can anyone publish their packages?
Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware
#3> An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions How can anyone publish their packages?
Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware
#4Is this actually accurate? Packages with weekly downloads in the hundreds of thousands, yet in the 4+ hours that the malicious versions were up for, not a single person updated any of them to the latest patch release?
Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware
#5> An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions How can anyone publish their packages?
Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware
#6downvotes appreciated but also happy to see one or two urls that would prove me wrong
Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware
#7> An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions How can anyone publish their packages?
There is a detailed postmortem in the linked ticket explaining exactly how this happened.
Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware
#8> An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions How can anyone publish their packages?
This is the second high-profile instance of the technique this week.
Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware
#9> An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions How can anyone publish their packages?
The attacker emailed a maintainer from a legitimate looking email address. The maintainer clicked the link and reset their credentials on a legitimate looking website. The attacker then signs into the legitimate duckdb account and publishes their new package. This is the second high-profile instance of the technique this week.