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Interesting, even with a VPN on mobile safari on an iPhone over a carrier connection I get a uniqueness score of 100%. This is a neat tool, but I'm skeptical of its accuracy. I've run similar tests of uniqueness in the past and this just isn't accurate.
Ah... I was here wondering why browsers don't just run sites in a built-in virtual containers..allowing the same reports of the same hardware for everyone. especially for WebGL and canvas fingerprinting. I suppose someone might say it is about performance of going through a virtual layer? I understandit might break specialized 3D web-apps...but for common web-browsing? idk. Do people regularly use web-based app that…
people regularly use Google Maps and video conferencing apps (Zoom, Meet, FB Messenger, ...) all of which use the GPU. Maps to be able to customize the map based on what your point of interest is. VC apps to do background blur, addons, etc...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can you describe in more detail what sort of techniques were used to target and track people? What sort of privacy mitigations were feckless?
It wasn't so much that privacy mitigations were feckless, it was the fact that people who did things like falsify their User-Agent strings tended to cluster into distinct groups very nicely, and hence it was easy for the targeting algorithms to feed them effective ads, landing pages, etc. The targeting system went "oh goody, privacy geeks" and was able to very effectively do its job. This is because ad tech systems c…
- user has a bunch of privacy mitigations and tweaks in their browser
- user logs into your commerce site, searches for stuff to buy
- commerce site knows who the user is since they're logged in, and per your comment can infer whether or not they're wealthy, have kids, etc. based on the user activity and whether or not the user is likely have an expensive screen & GPU, etc.
Does that sound right? That's really interesting, and something I'm embarrassed to say I hadn't really thought of. In other words, I've spent a lot of time worrying about cross-site tracking, and advertising domains, etc. However, if I'm purchasing from Amazon they know it's me since I'm just shipping to my own house. Even in a scenario where my browser is magically un-fingerprint-able, it's obviously me since I'm using my account and shipping to my house.
In other words, I may potentially have prevented a bunch of cross-site tracking and fingerprinting. Perhaps when I go to washingtonpost.com they don't know I'm the same person that Amazon knows about. (that might be a best case scenario) However, by virtue of the fact that my privacy config is operating all the time, Amazon has also learned something about me I didn't necessarily need to tell them -- ie, that I'm privacy-focused.
Do you think that's a fair assessment, or am I missing the point?
When I turned JS on it could not determine my machine type, got screen reso wrong and it provided incorrect location info (map and coordinates were wrong). Moreover the browser type was incorrect (but then I automatically randomize the browser type on each launch).
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Advertisers try to reidentify and match you against their database, the less information you give them and the more randomized it is, the less certain they can be, its you again. If i use my locked down firefox with a VPN where potentially a hand full other brills like me come out on the other end, i am not concerned about them building a profile of me.
>Advertisers try to reidentify and match you against their database, the less information you give them and the more randomized it is, the less certain they can be, its you again. This assumes the randomization is done properly, otherwise it just turns into a signal of "installs privacy extensions", which can still be used for targeting, as a sibling commenter has mentioned.
The more such signals, the merrier, the parent of your comment addressed that ("other brills"). Instead of going in circles, it would be better to encourage people to evaluate and use such extensions. Telling them that they don't work is a self-defeating half-truth.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It wasn't so much that privacy mitigations were feckless, it was the fact that people who did things like falsify their User-Agent strings tended to cluster into distinct groups very nicely, and hence it was easy for the targeting algorithms to feed them effective ads, landing pages, etc. The targeting system went "oh goody, privacy geeks" and was able to very effectively do its job. This is because ad tech systems c…
Thanks, this is a really useful reply. With regard to identifying privacy-focused users in your system, I'm sort of imagining the following scenario: - user has a bunch of privacy mitigations and tweaks in their browser - user logs into your commerce site, searches for stuff to buy - commerce site knows who the user is since they're logged in, and per your comment can infer whether or not they're wealthy, have kids,…
Exactly, and it turns out privacy-focused people tend to be relatively self-similar in many ways and, at least back in the day, were easier to advertise to.
Now, Amazon (or whomever) still doesn't know your name, but they are still targeting you and, what I found super interesting, is the fact that it was often more effective targeting than if the person was just part of the bulk of the population. It's kinda like if the system observed all the nonconformist teens like to wear Doc Marten's.
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