31–40 of 460 posts
> 2.5 million developers use Nx every day
> Over 70% of Fortune 500 companies use Nx to ship their products
To quote Fargo: Whoa, daddy...
Now that's what I call a rapidly degrading situation we weren't ready for. The second order fallout from this is going to be huge!
Some people are going to be pretty glad they steered clear of AI stuff.
Can anyone explain this? Why is it an advantage?
So any process on my computer could just start using Claude Code for their own purposes or what? o_O
Yes. It's a whole new attack vector. This should be a SEV0 at Google and Anthropic and they need to be all-hands in monitoring this and communicating this to the public. Their communications should be immediate and fully transparent.
People really need to start thinking twice when adding a new dependency. So many supply chain attacks this year. This week, I needed to add a progress bar with 8 stats counters to my Go project. I looked at the libraries, and they all had 3000+ lines of code. I asked LLM to write me a simple progress report tracking UI, and it was less than 150 lines. It works as expected, no dependencies needed. It's extremely simpl…
Now the threat is: when they “improve” it, you get that automatically.
left-pad should have been a major wake up call. Instead, the lesson people took away from it seems to have mostly been, “haha, look at those idiots pulling in an entire dependency for ten lines of code. I, on the other hand, am intelligent and thoughtful because I pull in dependencies for a hundred lines of code.”
> Interestingly, the malware checks for the presence of Claude Code CLI or Gemini CLI on the system to offload much of the fingerprintable code to a prompt. Can anyone explain this? Why is it an advantage?
The cc/geminicli were just an obfuscation method to basically run a find [...] > dump.txt
Oh, and static analysis tools might flag any code with find .env .wallet (whatever)... but they might not (yet) flag prompts :)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Wild to see this! This is crazy. Hopefully the LLM vendors issue security statements shortly. If they don't, that'll be pretty damning. This ought to be a SEV0 over at Google and Anthropic.
> Hopefully the LLM vendors issue security statements shortly. If they don't, that'll be pretty damning. Why would it be damning? Their products are no more culpable than Git or the filesystem. It's a piece of software installed on the computer whose job is to do what it's told to do. I wouldn't expect it to know that this particular prompt is malicious.
aaaand it begins! > Interestingly, the malware checks for the presence of Claude Code CLI or Gemini CLI on the system to offload much of the fingerprintable code to a prompt. > The packages in npm do not appear to be in Github Releases > First Compromised Package published at 2025-08-26T22:32:25.482Z > At this time, we believe an npm token was compromised which had publish rights to the affected packages. > The compr…
Very considerate of them not to overwrite the user's local /tmp/inventory.txt
Honest to goodness, I do most of my coding in a VM now. I don't see how the security profile of these things are tolerable. The level of potential hostility from agents as a malware vector is really off the charts. We're entering an era where they can scan for opportunities worth >$1,000 in hostaged data, crypto keys, passwords, blackmail material or financial records without even knowing what they're looking for whe…
> I do most of my coding in a VM now Perhaps you may be interested in Qubes OS, where you do everything in VMs with a nice UX. My daily driver, can't recommend it enough.
Google and Anthropic: this is a SEV0. Assemble your teams and immediately do the following: 1. Issue a public statement that you are aware of this issue and are tracking it 2. Begin monitoring your analytics to see which customers are impacted and shut down their access 3. Reach out to impacted customers and let them know you'll be preparing a list of next steps for them. 4. Monitor for a wider blast radius or larger…
What does Google or Antropic have to do with anything here? NX was compromised. Threat actors are using this access to leverage CLI LLMs to search the computer for you. Is this any different than if they just ran a big /find? Should the AI Assistant NOT reply to the request it was given? Why shouldn't it?
Why would you allow AI agents like Anthropic and Gemini to have access to the user's filesystem?
Basic security 101 requirements for these tools is that they should be sandboxed and have zero unattended access to the user's filesystem.
Do software engineers building these agents in 2025 care about best practices anymore?