[flagged]
SSL certificates are not only used by HTTP servers.
If you're not using k8s certbot is also an option, you get your certificates under /etc/letsencrypt/live/$domain.
51–60 of 305 posts
[flagged]
SSL certificates are not only used by HTTP servers.
If you're not using k8s certbot is also an option, you get your certificates under /etc/letsencrypt/live/$domain.
I understand OP's frustration, but the alternate view is that mandating better practices is a forcing function for businesses that otherwise don't give a shit about users or their privacy or security. For all the annoyance of SOC2 audits, it sure does make my manager actually spend time and money on following the rules. Without any kind of external pressure I (as a security-minded engineer) would struggle to convince…
Why is a month's expiration better than a year or two years? Why wouldn't you go with a week or a day? isn't that better than a whole month? Why isn't it instead just a minute? or a few seconds? Wouldn't that be better? Why not have certificates dynamically generated constantly and have it so every single request is serviced by a new one and then destroyed after the session is over? Maybe the problem isn't that certi…
Imagine you run an old-school media company who's come into possession of a beloved website with decades of user-generated and reporter-generated content. Content that puts the "this is someone's legacy" in "legacy content." You get some incremental ad revenue, and you're like "if all I have to do is have my outsourced IT team do this renewal thing once a year, it's free money I guess."
But now, you have to pay that team to do a human-in-the-loop task monthly for every site you operate, which now makes the cost no longer de minimis? Or, fully modernize your systems? But since that legacy site uses a different stack, they're saying it's an entirely separate project, which they'll happily quote you with far more zeroes than your ads are generating?
All of a sudden, something that was infrequent maintenance becomes a measurable job. Even a fully rational executive sees their incentives switch - and that doesn't count the ones who were waiting for an excuse to kill their predecessors' projects. We start seeing more and more sites go offline.
We should endeavor not to break the internet. That's not "don't break the internet, conditional on fully rational actors who magically don't have legacy systems." It's "don't break the internet."
When I was doing this, via email, if you wanted a certificate for sub.subdomain.example.com - the list of email addresses were in order something like hostmaster@sub.subdomain.example.com and hostmaster@example.com - you clicked the radio option that best suited you and you were good to go. You don't need email addresses for every subdomain.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why is a month's expiration better than a year or two years? Why wouldn't you go with a week or a day? isn't that better than a whole month? Why isn't it instead just a minute? or a few seconds? Wouldn't that be better? Why not have certificates dynamically generated constantly and have it so every single request is serviced by a new one and then destroyed after the session is over? Maybe the problem isn't that certi…
I think it's all about change management a whole month put you in the "if you don't have the resource to automate it, it's still doable by a human, not enough to crush somebody, but still enough to make the option , let's automate fully something to consider" hence why it's better than a week or a day (it's too much pressure for small companies) better than hours/minutes/secondes (it means you go from 1 year to 'now…
Ah yes, let's make a terrible workflow to externally force companies who can't be arsed to document their processes to do things properly, at the expense of everyone else.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why is a month's expiration better than a year or two years? Why wouldn't you go with a week or a day? isn't that better than a whole month? Why isn't it instead just a minute? or a few seconds? Wouldn't that be better? Why not have certificates dynamically generated constantly and have it so every single request is serviced by a new one and then destroyed after the session is over? Maybe the problem isn't that certi…
I think it's all about change management a whole month put you in the "if you don't have the resource to automate it, it's still doable by a human, not enough to crush somebody, but still enough to make the option , let's automate fully something to consider" hence why it's better than a week or a day (it's too much pressure for small companies) better than hours/minutes/secondes (it means you go from 1 year to 'now…
(Why not less than six days? Because I think at that point you might start to face some availability tradeoffs even if everything is always fully automated.)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
dunno why you're being so obnoxious about it? a month is better than a year because we never ever ever managed to make revocation work, and so the only thing we can do is reduce the length of certs so that stolen or fraudulently obtained certs can be used for less time.
On the vulnerability ladder since SSL was introduced, how common and how disastrous have stolen or fraudulent certs really compared to other security problems, and by how much will these changes reduce such disasters?
https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint-security/china-based-bi...
What does that even mean? Is he smelling them to check for freshness?
I get process around first time request perhaps to ensure it’s set up right, but renewals?
> My stakeholders understand their roles and responsibilities
Oh no. All that’s missing here is a committee and steering group and daily stand ups
Earlier quoted context omitted.
dunno why you're being so obnoxious about it? a month is better than a year because we never ever ever managed to make revocation work, and so the only thing we can do is reduce the length of certs so that stolen or fraudulently obtained certs can be used for less time.
On the vulnerability ladder since SSL was introduced, how common and how disastrous have stolen or fraudulent certs really compared to other security problems, and by how much will these changes reduce such disasters?
I'm sure that you are perfectly able to do your own research, why are you trying to push that work onto some stranger on the internet?
Since the advent of LetsEncrypt, ACME, and Caddy I haven't thought about SSL/TLS for more than about an hour per year, and that's only because I forget the steps required to setup auto-renewal. I pay nothing, I spend a tiny amount of time dealing with it, and it works brilliantly. I'm not sure why many people are still dealing with legacy manual certificate renewal. Maybe some regulatory requirements? I even have a w…