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SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

chrislockard.net

21–30 of 305 posts

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#22
post #3

I understand OP's frustration, but the alternate view is that mandating better practices is a forcing function for businesses that otherwise don't give a shit about users or their privacy or security. For all the annoyance of SOC2 audits, it sure does make my manager actually spend time and money on following the rules. Without any kind of external pressure I (as a security-minded engineer) would struggle to convince…

Why is a month's expiration better than a year or two years? Why wouldn't you go with a week or a day? isn't that better than a whole month? Why isn't it instead just a minute? or a few seconds? Wouldn't that be better? Why not have certificates dynamically generated constantly and have it so every single request is serviced by a new one and then destroyed after the session is over? Maybe the problem isn't that certi…

dunno why you're being so obnoxious about it?

a month is better than a year because we never ever ever managed to make revocation work, and so the only thing we can do is reduce the length of certs so that stolen or fraudulently obtained certs can be used for less time.

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#23
post #12

I've spent 15+ minutes searching, and the digicert (linked to in the article), and other cert providers all reference a vote on "Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration (MPIC)". Everywhere I've read, one "must validate domain control using multiple independent network perspectives". EG, multiple points on the internet, for DNS validation. Yet there is not one place I can find a very specific "this is what this means…

It means the barrier of entry to the SSL certificate market gets higher, favouring established players

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#24
post #3

I understand OP's frustration, but the alternate view is that mandating better practices is a forcing function for businesses that otherwise don't give a shit about users or their privacy or security. For all the annoyance of SOC2 audits, it sure does make my manager actually spend time and money on following the rules. Without any kind of external pressure I (as a security-minded engineer) would struggle to convince…

Why is a month's expiration better than a year or two years? Why wouldn't you go with a week or a day? isn't that better than a whole month? Why isn't it instead just a minute? or a few seconds? Wouldn't that be better? Why not have certificates dynamically generated constantly and have it so every single request is serviced by a new one and then destroyed after the session is over? Maybe the problem isn't that certi…

Every year is too infrequent to force automation, leading to admins forgetting to renew their certs. Every minute/day may be too demanding on ACME providers and clutters transparency logs. Dynamic certs just move the problem around because whatever is signing those certs just becomes the SSL cert in practice unless it happens over acme in which case see the point above.

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#25
post #3

I understand OP's frustration, but the alternate view is that mandating better practices is a forcing function for businesses that otherwise don't give a shit about users or their privacy or security. For all the annoyance of SOC2 audits, it sure does make my manager actually spend time and money on following the rules. Without any kind of external pressure I (as a security-minded engineer) would struggle to convince…

Why is a month's expiration better than a year or two years? Why wouldn't you go with a week or a day? isn't that better than a whole month? Why isn't it instead just a minute? or a few seconds? Wouldn't that be better? Why not have certificates dynamically generated constantly and have it so every single request is serviced by a new one and then destroyed after the session is over? Maybe the problem isn't that certi…

> Why wouldn't you go with a week or a day? isn't that better than a whole month?

There is in fact work on making this an option: https://letsencrypt.org/2025/02/20/first-short-lived-cert-is...

> Why isn't it instead just a minute? or a few seconds? Wouldn't that be better?

> Why not have certificates dynamically generated constantly and have it so every single request is serviced by a new one and then destroyed after the session is over?

Eventually the overhead actually does start to matter

> Maybe the problem isn't that certificates expire too soon, maybe the problem is that humans are lazy. Perhaps it's time to go with another method entirely.

Like what?

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#26
post #12

I've spent 15+ minutes searching, and the digicert (linked to in the article), and other cert providers all reference a vote on "Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration (MPIC)". Everywhere I've read, one "must validate domain control using multiple independent network perspectives". EG, multiple points on the internet, for DNS validation. Yet there is not one place I can find a very specific "this is what this means…

[deleted]

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#27
post #12

I've spent 15+ minutes searching, and the digicert (linked to in the article), and other cert providers all reference a vote on "Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration (MPIC)". Everywhere I've read, one "must validate domain control using multiple independent network perspectives". EG, multiple points on the internet, for DNS validation. Yet there is not one place I can find a very specific "this is what this means…

Section 3.2.2.9 of this document:

https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirem...

You can also just search the document for the word "Perspective" to find most references to it.

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#28
post #3

I understand OP's frustration, but the alternate view is that mandating better practices is a forcing function for businesses that otherwise don't give a shit about users or their privacy or security. For all the annoyance of SOC2 audits, it sure does make my manager actually spend time and money on following the rules. Without any kind of external pressure I (as a security-minded engineer) would struggle to convince…

Why is a month's expiration better than a year or two years? Why wouldn't you go with a week or a day? isn't that better than a whole month? Why isn't it instead just a minute? or a few seconds? Wouldn't that be better? Why not have certificates dynamically generated constantly and have it so every single request is serviced by a new one and then destroyed after the session is over? Maybe the problem isn't that certi…

I think it's all about change management

a whole month put you in the "if you don't have the resource to automate it, it's still doable by a human, not enough to crush somebody, but still enough to make the option , let's automate fully something to consider"

hence why it's better than a week or a day (it's too much pressure for small companies) better than hours/minutes/secondes (it means you go from 1 year to 'now it must be fully automated right now ! )

a year or two years was not a good idea, because you loose knowledge, it creates pressure (oh my.... not the scary yearly certificate renewal, i remember last year we broke something, we i don't remember what...)

A month, you either start to fully document it, or at least to have it fresh in your mind. A month give you time to everytime think "ok, we have 30 certicates, can't we have a wild card, or a certificate with several domain in it?"

> Perhaps it's time to go with another method entirely.

I think that's the way forward, it's just that it will not happen in one step, and going to one month is a first step.

source: We have to manage a lot of certificate for a lot of different use cases (ssh, mutual ssl for authentification, classical HTTPS certificate etc. ) and we learned the hard way that no 2 years is not better than 1 , and I agree that one month would be better

also https://www.digicert.com/blog/tls-certificate-lifetimes-will...

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#29
post #3

I understand OP's frustration, but the alternate view is that mandating better practices is a forcing function for businesses that otherwise don't give a shit about users or their privacy or security. For all the annoyance of SOC2 audits, it sure does make my manager actually spend time and money on following the rules. Without any kind of external pressure I (as a security-minded engineer) would struggle to convince…

Why is a month's expiration better than a year or two years? Why wouldn't you go with a week or a day? isn't that better than a whole month? Why isn't it instead just a minute? or a few seconds? Wouldn't that be better? Why not have certificates dynamically generated constantly and have it so every single request is serviced by a new one and then destroyed after the session is over? Maybe the problem isn't that certi…

I'm not sure if you're arguing in good faith, but assuming you are, it should be pretty self-evident why you wouldn't generate the certificate dynamically each request: it would take too much time to do so, and so every request would be substantially slower, probably as slow as using Tor, since you would need to ask for the certificate from a central authority. In general it's all about balance, 1 month isn't necessarily better than 1 year, but the reduced timeframe means that there's less complexity in keeping some renovation list and passing it to clients, and it's not so short to require more resources on both the issuer and the requester of the certificate.

> Perhaps it's time to go with another method entirely.

What method would you suggest here?

Re: SSL certificate requirements are becoming obnoxious

#30
post #18

The web today is a rotting carcass with various middlemen maggots crawling all over it and gorging themselves on the decay. The only real discussion to be had is what to replace it with and how to design the new protocols to avoid the same issues.

The reason the web is a rotting carcass is not because of the way the web is architected, it is because a lot of people's livelihoods depend on making it as rotten as possible without collapsing it entirely.

From advertising companies, search engines (ok, sometimes both), certificate peddlers and other 'service' (I use the term lightly here) providers there are just too many of these maggots that we don't actually need. We mostly need them to manage the maggots! If they would all fuck off the web would instantly be a better place.

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