Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
561–570 of 816 posts
Re: Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
#562Earlier quoted context omitted.
The problems of Passkeys are more nuanced than just losing access when a device is lost (which actually doesn't need to happen depending on your setup). The biggest problem are attestations, which let services block users who use tools that give them more freedom. Passkeys, or more generally challenge-response protocols, could easily have been an amazing replacement for passwords and a win-win for everyone. Unfortuna…
I want to like passkeys but I haven't had any success getting them to work. Every time I click on "sign in using passkey" both my browser (Firefox or Chrome, on Android/Win/Mac) and Bitwarden are like "no passkeys found" and I'm never given an option to create one. I feel like I'm doing something stupidly wrong or missing a prompt somewhere, or maybe UX is just shitty everywhere, but if I, a millennial who grew up pr…
I haven't invested more time in this because if it's so unusable for me as an engineer, it's a non-starter for the general public.
Re: Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
#563Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, read the quotes you took again. Attestation is not a thing currently. There is legitimate discussion about how to handle shitty password managers. If LastPass shits the bed again, it would be great to have a mechanism for others to block it or at least know that due to a major incident, keys from that tool are week. Debian OpenSSL keys were vulnerable for a long time and being able to know and alert or block pri…
Yes, we've seen you repeat that we have to read it again. I reread this morning before the post, but really just found more things supporting my position. > To be very honest here, you risk having KeePassXC blocked by relying parties (similar to #10406). From the linked https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10406 > | no signed stamp of approval from on high > see above. Once certification and attestation…
(You have every right do douse yourself in gasoline. No one is taking that way from you. Just say away from everyone else)
Re: Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
#564The worst part about this is it just further reinforces horrible habits and expectations. Using a modern password manager, like 1password, is _easier_, safer, and faster than the stupid email-token flow. it takes a little bit of work and attention at first to setup across a couple devices, and verify it works.... but its really about the same amount of effort as keeping track of a set of keys for your house, car, and…
I'm as frustrated about this as you are, but there is a large class of people who will not or can not understand and implement the password-manager workflow.
Of the people I know who are not in a tech career i'd say about 80% have nothing but contempt and ignorant fatalism toward security. The only success I've had is getting one older relative to start writing account credentials down in a little paper notebook and making sure there are numbers and letters in the passwords.
Re: Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
#565Earlier quoted context omitted.
TOTP is vulnerable to the same attack, though. If you are fooled into providing the code, it doesn't matter whether it's a fresh one to your email or a fresh one from your authenticator.
They are, which is one major issue with TOTP and most current MFA methods. There is an implicit assumption that you only get the full benefit if your usi g a password manager. 1. A password manager shouldn't be vulnerable to putting your password in a phishing site. 2. If your password is leaked, an attacker can't use it without the TOTP. Someone who doesn't use a password manager won't get the benefits of #1, so the…
Re: Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
#566Earlier quoted context omitted.
Are you saying password managers don't have an incentive to provide a feature users want? That describes literally their entire featureset.
What incentive do they have to make it easy to migrate to a different provider?
Re: Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
#567Earlier quoted context omitted.
I’ve been observing this space for two decades and haven’t come across a single open-source password manager that actually works, is properly maintained, has an acceptable security track record, and comes with a similarly well-maintained browser extension that protects both my clipboard and myself from phishing.
rpdililon mentioned KeePass. What have you (that is, Hackbraten) found wrong with the KeePassXC offshoot of it? /me wonders if this is a "recommend me a nice open source, offline password manager" question in disguise.
That was years ago, so I’m going to check it out again. Thanks for the pointer.
Update: One thing that stands out immediately is a confusing mess of three different projects, two of them unmaintained, which all call themselves KeePassX or KeePassXC, sometimes linking to each other’s documentation. How do I even tell I’m facing the correct KeePass(X(C)?)? project?
Yes, I’ll figure it out eventually but until then, it’s confusing. Also, if a password manager project needs to be forked over and over and over again (how can a holder of the keys to the kingdom possibly go MIA on three different occasions in basically the same project?), then does that tell us something about how the project is governed?
Re: Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
#568Earlier quoted context omitted.
Did people not realize they can save their 2fa token and just use that with a new authenticator? I haven't used a phone 2fa forever, but it was a much better system than this "email me a code" BS.
For a long time 2fa apps (other than Bitwarden and maybe some others) would lock you into the app and not let you export it. Websites don’t usually expose the text version of the code, just the QR.
Re: Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
#569The attack pattern is: 1) User goes to BAD website and signs up. 2) BAD website says “We’ve sent you an email, please enter the 6-digit code! The email will come from GOOD, as they are our sign-in partner.” 3) BAD’s bots start a “Sign in with email one-time code” flow on the GOOD website using the user’s email. 4) GOOD sends a one-time login code email to the user’s email address. 5) The user is very likely to trust…
>"I’d rather granny needs to visit the bank to get access to her account again, than someone phishes her and steals all her money." More like abuelita gets robbed at gunpoint and made to unlock and clear out her bank account, then has no recourse at home because her device was taken. I live in a third world country and even 2FA simply isn't viable for me due to how frequent phone robberies are. I've had to do the pro…
Good luck. For some arcane reason, Bitwarden turned on email-based 2FA for my account last night and all of a sudden I'm locked out of my account for half a day. …mostly because I have greylisting enabled on my mail server, so emails don't arrive right away, but as it so happens I also had all my hardware stolen from me last weekend. Bootstrap is a real bitch.
Re: Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
#570Earlier quoted context omitted.
Did people not realize they can save their 2fa token and just use that with a new authenticator? I haven't used a phone 2fa forever, but it was a much better system than this "email me a code" BS.
For a long time 2fa apps (other than Bitwarden and maybe some others) would lock you into the app and not let you export it. Websites don’t usually expose the text version of the code, just the QR.