371–380 of 816 posts
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Ensuring it's not possible for remote attackers to easily steal users passkeys is not "removing all rights" for someone. It is setting a security bar you have to pass. One user's poor security can have negative effects on not just them but the platform itself.
You don't need attestation to allow users to secure their passwords.
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They are referring to the ability of a site you are logging into forcing you to use a client from a specific list or having a list of clients to deny. It's copied over from FIDO hardware keys where each device type needed to be identifiable so higher tier ones could be required or unsecured development versions could be blocked.
This is what I was referring to, and we already have seen this happen in the wild with PayPal at one point (possibly still) blocking passkeys from e.g. Firefox. For now the argument against this seems to be that "Apple zeroes this out so service providers can't do it without risking issues for their many users who use Apple to store their keys", but clearly this is so precarious of a situation it may as well not be a…
The attack pattern is: 1) User goes to BAD website and signs up. 2) BAD website says “We’ve sent you an email, please enter the 6-digit code! The email will come from GOOD, as they are our sign-in partner.” 3) BAD’s bots start a “Sign in with email one-time code” flow on the GOOD website using the user’s email. 4) GOOD sends a one-time login code email to the user’s email address. 5) The user is very likely to trust…
> Passkeys is the way to go No, at least not on its own. Let's not repeat the mistakes. Password managers are the way to go and ONLY FOR RARE EXCEPTIONS we should use dedicated MFA, such as for email-accounts and financial stuff. And the MFA should ask you to set up at least 3 factors and ask you to use 2 or more. And if it doesn't support more or less all factors like printed codes, OS-independent authenticator apps…
Also they are too complicated for an ordinary user. A physical key is much simpler and doesn't require any setup or thinking, and can be used on multiple devices without any configuration. And doesn't require a cloud account.
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Passkeys are in their infancy. You don't go about rolling out such patterns when most users haven't even switched yet and big players like Apple are still resisting attestations (last time I checked). The problem is that the feature is there and can be (ab)-used in this way, so it should be rejected on principle, irrespective of whether it's a problem right now . I understand the value of attestations in a corporate…
Apple hasn't been particularly resistant to offering device attestation. The DeviceCheck / App Attest system has been offered since iOS 11 released in 2017. https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicecheck
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I know not to click links on random emails but comfortably click links on emails I initiated from a website.
How do you know the email comes from that website? There are known cases of phishing mails being sent when people expect a legitimate mail.
abc.com
the link in the email is abc.com
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Passkeys work very smoothly with Safari and Apple Passwords. Apple Passwords now sufficiently good to replace 1Password for me and I’m slowly transitioning. I don’t mind subscription models per se but there was something about subscription for your own passwords that made me refuse to jump the fence when 1Password switched to that model. Would be a bit faffy if you’re a Chrome user.
It works fine until you dare to have TWO accounts for the same website. Safari will just randomly pick one of them and always tray to log you in with that passkey every time you visit, and the interface for using a different one is really annoying.
Let me see if I can get it again
The attack pattern is: 1) User goes to BAD website and signs up. 2) BAD website says “We’ve sent you an email, please enter the 6-digit code! The email will come from GOOD, as they are our sign-in partner.” 3) BAD’s bots start a “Sign in with email one-time code” flow on the GOOD website using the user’s email. 4) GOOD sends a one-time login code email to the user’s email address. 5) The user is very likely to trust…
Mobile phone App/Passkey authentication is just a way to pass the responsibility down to users. Losing a phone today is not just losing the passkey, there are "login with QR-code" schemes too, which do not need a password at all. It is a bad trend to pass all security onto the physical phone.
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Passkey is a great example of how five kitchen chefs can't make scrambled eggs. Horrible user experience, terrible marketing, no mental model like "your phone is THE key," no tangible or even symbolic presentation of the key.
That’s a lot of anger without a substantial argument. For Apple users, for example, the user experience is very smooth and the mental model is “I use iCloud to store my passcode just like I use iCloud to store my passwords”. If you use 1Password, you’re changing iCloud for 1Password instead.
The attack pattern is: 1) User goes to BAD website and signs up. 2) BAD website says “We’ve sent you an email, please enter the 6-digit code! The email will come from GOOD, as they are our sign-in partner.” 3) BAD’s bots start a “Sign in with email one-time code” flow on the GOOD website using the user’s email. 4) GOOD sends a one-time login code email to the user’s email address. 5) The user is very likely to trust…
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> Passkeys is the way to go No, at least not on its own. Let's not repeat the mistakes. Password managers are the way to go and ONLY FOR RARE EXCEPTIONS we should use dedicated MFA, such as for email-accounts and financial stuff. And the MFA should ask you to set up at least 3 factors and ask you to use 2 or more. And if it doesn't support more or less all factors like printed codes, OS-independent authenticator apps…
We need to go further. If a service doesn't include 197 factors including blood samples, showing up at a physical location 50 miles from your home, and sending a picture of yourself in a specific posture, and doesn't require you to use at least 53 of them (determined randomly) to login, then it's insecure and should not be used.