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FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

tomshardware.com

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Re: FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

#51
post #5

So what does a modern ATC look like? can winehq save the day in the interim or in the transition?

Check out https://vatsim.net/docs/policy/approved-software , of course this is for VATSIM only, but you should still get an idea. I use Euroscope. If anyone knows what ATC software they are using in the wild, let me know. A screenshot would suffice.

Some european countries are in the process of switching over to iCAS made by indra. A press release for that included a picture https://www.dfs.de/homepage/de/medien/presse/2023/30-03-2023...

There is also some work by the germans on moving the TID part to a web-based approach.

Re: FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

#52

What's the actual problem with floppy disks? Is the system not performing the task it was designed for?

Floppies aren’t manufactured anymore

Does that matter? Manufacturing them ain't hard and current supplies are big enough to sustain the small demand. What matters is that I can buy floppies and will be able to for a very long time if not indefinitely.

Re: FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

#53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Setting a protocol to handle air traffic control and collision prevention in airspace around airports is a 100% automatable problem. You don't even need a centralized control system. This can be handled entirely with software running on each plane. Same way a flock of birds can fly and never collide with each other.

What happens when an airplane's pilots have to radio ATC to request an emergency landing, and the planes' sensors have failed so it can't safety land itself?

If the plane is able to communicate with ATC it is able to broadcast to the other planes that it is on an emergency landing, so this is not an issue. Even if it has lost all communication this is still not an issue because all the sensors of the other planes can see it. So if the disabled plane immediately goes for an emergency landing, all other planes in the area are able to see its position and that it is not responding to pings, and therefore set safe courses that avoid it. This really isn't a very difficult problem.

Re: FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

#54

The latest "Last Week Tonight" episode on Air Traffic Controllers is quite interesting. Learned about the floppy discs there.

He also pointed at the root cause and possible solution there. Which is re-categorizing spending on this as essential instead of as something that's nice to have and becomes the victim of cuts almost immediately after anytime some budget is actually allocated. An interesting point here is maybe that there's a whole world outside the US where planes fly and communicate. For example the EU has its own issues on this fr…

> For example the EU has its own issues on this front but is modernizing what it does.

The EU has been almost single-handedly designing the international interoperability standards for the kinds of information that the US uses floppies to move around.

I'm not sure any country still remembers the lessons that would be useful for the US on this one situation.

Re: FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

#55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Setting a protocol to handle air traffic control and collision prevention in airspace around airports is a 100% automatable problem. You don't even need a centralized control system. This can be handled entirely with software running on each plane. Same way a flock of birds can fly and never collide with each other.

Unfortunately that's not how things work in practice https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Split-brain_(computing) If Jepsen fails every database coming from single source, imagine the chaos of synchronising a P2P of various clients of various versions over a very noisy link. We can't even achieve that with home automation meshes that send maybe 3 types of messages! Also you need to handle planes without computers - you can…

We operate cars on the road with not only no centralized system, but also minimally defined and enforced protocol, and yet Waymo has achieved a near zero collision rate inside a swarm of cars that are not running equivalent software. And this is in a situation where cars are only a few feet from each other while operating at top speed. So you can come up with a million objections but they are all solvable. As for automation failure, the rate of that can be easily made lower than the rate of human failure, which currently is fatal to a plane.

Re: FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

#56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Check out https://vatsim.net/docs/policy/approved-software , of course this is for VATSIM only, but you should still get an idea. I use Euroscope. If anyone knows what ATC software they are using in the wild, let me know. A screenshot would suffice.

Some european countries are in the process of switching over to iCAS made by indra. A press release for that included a picture https://www.dfs.de/homepage/de/medien/presse/2023/30-03-2023... There is also some work by the germans on moving the TID part to a web-based approach.

I cannot see much. :( Looks like Euroscope.

Re: FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

#57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We IT folks tend to quickly propose solutions to systems whose complexities we do not completely understand. That's fine when it is about serving ads or managing book orders. It's not ok when the stakes are high. Virtualization just adds another layer of complexity to an already fragile system which literally thousands of human lives depend on every day. Adding more complexity is not a neutral act here, but neglectfu…

Eeeeexcept that floppies are horrifically unreliable. I remember feeding disk number 27 out of 33 only to get a "bad sector" error an hour into a software install. I'm still salty about that one. "It's not broken" is the cry of the bad manager that hasn't done the proper analysis, hasn't actually looked at the pros and cons, but has simply become complacent and comfortable with the devil they know. If they're still u…

> I remember feeding disk number 27 out of 33 only to get a "bad sector" error an hour into a software install.

I love this fixation on floppy disks. The article likely brought it up because it is a recognizably obsolete technology, but didn't cite why (or even if) it was a problem. I'm sorry, but a nightmarish software installation scenario doesn't cut it. It is highly unlikely that they are doing in situ software installations from floppy diskettes.

The danger in such armchair quarterbacking is that it undermines the authority of the agencies that are in charge of making decisions. If there are legitimate reasons to question their authority, by all means do so. Yet, when doing so, understand their requirements and provide evidence as to why their authority should be questioned. Also be prepared to be unsatisfied by some of their answers due to differences in perspectives.

Re: FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

#58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The upgrades have been funded for decades. It is an execution issue, not a money issue. Many other parts of the Federal government are in the same condition: software upgrades that are infinite money sinks that never produce much after decades of effort. I've worked around some of these programs. I've had visibility into some of them for 15 years over which there has been zero forward progress despite unreasonably la…

If it's no secret then what's the reason because I don't know?

I think most takes on this are overly reductive. The whole situation is sad really.

The root cause, to the extent that one exists, is that no one is accountable for successful execution in a very literal and systemic way. Some parts of the government I've worked in are worse than others, but it is endemic. This leads to a textbook case of Pournelle's Iron Law. There are no negative consequences for a handful of people aggressively maximizing their personal benefit and acquisition of power as their primary objective. This is how you get the fiefdom-building, feather-bedding, and the usual revolving-door corruption that these programs are notorious for.

Most people involved in these programs aren't like that but enough people are that it is impossible for people trying to do their jobs competently to get anything done. The people that defect are the people that end up controlling the programs because that is how the incentives work.

Inefficiency and corruption are a symptom, not the disease. The incentives virtually guarantee that these programs become playgrounds for sociopaths. Average workers on these programs are put in the demoralizing position of either having their good effort constantly undermined by leaders that don't care about the mission and are openly making decisions for personal benefit or to defect to the side of the sociopaths so they at least get some personal benefit out of it. Most of the best and most competent people I know eventually leave Federal service entirely.

A second-order consequence of this is that over time, no one competent wants to work on the programs that are run this way. Through churn these programs slowly fill up with mostly useless seat warmers who don't mind a job where no one expects productive outcomes. It is a kind of stealth UBI for government employees. Some people request assignment to these programs.

You never hear about the programs where the leadership is actually competent and cares about the objective because these actually function pretty well. But the incentives are such that this is the exception rather than the rule.

I'm not even sure how you would fix it, I suspect it is politically impossible. When companies become overtly like this they tend to slowly self-immolate into irrelevancy. Governments lack these negative feedback loops in any meaningful sense.

Re: FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

#59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Which is what baffles me about the current situation and gives me a lot of hope for this effort. We should've been updating this stuff in the 90s, but successive administrations of both parties have just passed the ball on this one.

I see this the opposite way: kudos to the FAA for sticking it out so long on legacy hardware and software as long as they have! ATC is a safety-critical function that has what amounts to a 100% uptime requirement. Whatever system they're running currently either works or has known flaws that they know how to work around, and air traffic controllers have been trained on these systems for more than a generation now. Up…

> ATC is a safety-critical function that has what amounts to a 100% uptime requirement. Whatever system they're running currently either works or has known flaws that they know how to work around, and air traffic controllers have been trained on these systems for more than a generation now.

The problem is that Eurocontrol (for example) has modernized their systems without much fuss, and UK NATS even has remote tower ATC now (https://www.youtube.com/video/Ii_Gz1WbBGA). It seems that FAA is stuck in the past, not just using old systems because it's reliable.

> Upgrading merely for the sake of being up to date would have been foolish no matter how much funding Congress would have given them.

I would agree if the system is still fit and proper, but even in 2005 the ATC systems in the US is not really fit and proper that there has been multiple plans to rehaul the system. It is really miraculous that the only system failure happened in 2023 (NOTAM offline), but that's due to tireless dedication that's certainly burning unneded manpower.

Unlike in Europe where civil servants have the sway to just do it, it seems that the US is an expert in political bickering on things that aren't really political.

Re: FAA to eliminate floppy disks used in air traffic control systems

#60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I see this the opposite way: kudos to the FAA for sticking it out so long on legacy hardware and software as long as they have! ATC is a safety-critical function that has what amounts to a 100% uptime requirement. Whatever system they're running currently either works or has known flaws that they know how to work around, and air traffic controllers have been trained on these systems for more than a generation now. Up…

> ATC is a safety-critical function that has what amounts to a 100% uptime requirement. Whatever system they're running currently either works or has known flaws that they know how to work around, and air traffic controllers have been trained on these systems for more than a generation now. The problem is that Eurocontrol (for example) has modernized their systems without much fuss, and UK NATS even has remote tower…

My understanding is that remote tower ATC is something that had to happen at that airport due to geographic constraints rather than some kind of next step for ATC in general. Given a choice between being able to physically look out the window and not, from what I understand being able to see out is always preferable.

The rest I don't know enough to comment on, so I'll assume you're correct.

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