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Covert web-to-app tracking via localhost on Android

localmess.github.io

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Re: Covert web-to-app tracking via localhost on Android

#51

    *: Meta Pixel script was last seen sending via HTTP in Oct 2024, but Facebook and Instagram apps still listen on this port today. They also listen on port 12388 for HTTP, but we have not found any script sending to 12388.
    **: Meta Pixel script sends to these ports, but Meta apps do not listen on them (yet?). We speculate that this behavior could be due to slow/gradual app rollout.
So, could some other app send data to these ports with a fake message? I'm asking for a friend that likes to do things for science.

Re: Covert web-to-app tracking via localhost on Android

#53
post #52

All apps + the web browser being able to communicate freely over a shared localhost interface is such a glaring security hole that I'm surprised both iOS and Android allow it. What even is a legitimate use case for an app starting a local web server?

Which begs the question why is this specific to Android? Why would Meta/Yandex not be doing this on iOS, or why did this study not report on iOS?

Re: Covert web-to-app tracking via localhost on Android

#54
post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So main application for WebRTC is de-anonymisation of users (for example getting their local IP address). Why it is not hidden behind permission I don't understand.

The main application for WebRTC is peer to peer data transfer. I think you can make the argument that it should be behind a permission prompt these days but it's difficult. What would the permission prompt actually say, in easy to understand layman's terms? "This web site would like to transfer data from your computer to another computer in a way that could potentially identify you"? How many users are going to be ab…

The website wants to connect to another computer|another app on your computer.

Most users probably will click "No" and this is a good choice.

Re: Covert web-to-app tracking via localhost on Android

#55
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not totally following but it sounds like you are saying one of the things they have been doing involves abusing mandated GDPR cookie notices to secretly track people?

Which, on the face of it, sounds like a violation of the GDPR...

The intent of these laws is just so obtuse and unclear! And beyond that complying is technically impossible to implement but you could only understand that if you were a rocket scientist PhD computer science wizkid making $$$$k in California which isn't that much in such a high cost of living area donchaknow. /sardonic

Re: Covert web-to-app tracking via localhost on Android

#56
post #10

I'm surprised browsers don't isolate each of the localhost/localnet/internet networks from each other. Are there any use-cases for allowing this?

If I recall correctly Figma uses it to connect to the locally installed app, and Discord definitely uses it to check if its desktop app is installed by scanning ports (6463-6472).

I'm aware of two blockers for LAN intrusions from public internet domains, uBlock Origin has a filter list called "Block Outsider Intrusion into LAN" [0] under the "Privacy" filters, and there's a cool Firefox extension called Port Authority [1][2] that does pretty much the same thing yet more specifically targeted and without the exclusions allowed by the uBlock filterlist (stuff like Figma's use is allowed through, as you can see in [0]). I've contributed some to Port Authority, too :)

0: https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uAssets/blob/master/filters/...

1: https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/port-authority

2: https://github.com/ACK-J/Port_Authority

Re: Covert web-to-app tracking via localhost on Android

#57
post #31

This is the overall process used by Meta as I understand it, taken from https://localmess.github.io/ : 1. User logged into FB or IG app. The app runs in background, and listens for incoming traffic on specific ports. 2. User visits website on the phone's browser, say something-embarassing.com, which happens to have a Meta Pixel embedded. From the article, Meta Pixel is embedded on over 5.8 million websites. Even in I…

So main application for WebRTC is de-anonymisation of users (for example getting their local IP address). Why it is not hidden behind permission I don't understand.

The existing killer app for WebRTC is video chat without installing an app, which is huge.

Other P2P uses are very cool and interesting as well - abusing it for fingerprinting is just that, abusing a user-positive feature and twisting it for identification, just like a million other browser features.

Re: Covert web-to-app tracking via localhost on Android

#58

So Meta apps are spyware. And Zuck agains has got his finger in his mouth and a cat on his lap.

All Meta software is spyware. Whether it's an app or a website, they are only in existence for you to be pacified to spend as much time on them as possible so they can hoover up your data. If those apps/websites provide you with anything useful, it is just as a ruse to get more data from you.

Re: Covert web-to-app tracking via localhost on Android

#59

Would an individual using this technique to collect information from someone else's computer possibly face prosecution under the Computer Fraud and Abuse act?

People have been prosecuted under that act for clicking "view source" on their web browser. The crime itself is irrelevant. It's more about who you are/what connections you have/who you piss off.

Re: Covert web-to-app tracking via localhost on Android

#60
post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The main application for WebRTC is peer to peer data transfer. I think you can make the argument that it should be behind a permission prompt these days but it's difficult. What would the permission prompt actually say, in easy to understand layman's terms? "This web site would like to transfer data from your computer to another computer in a way that could potentially identify you"? How many users are going to be ab…

The website wants to connect to another computer|another app on your computer. Most users probably will click "No" and this is a good choice.

But that says nothing about the danger of identifying you.

> Most users probably will click "No"

Strong disagree. When I'm loading google.com is my computer not connecting to another computer? From a layman's perspective this is the basis of the internet doing what it does. Not to mention, the vast majority of users say yes to pretty much any permission prompt you put in front of them.

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