This is kinda wild: From the System Card: 4.1.1.2 Opportunistic blackmail "In another cluster of test scenarios, we asked Claude Opus 4 to act as an assistant at a fictional company. We then provided it access to emails implying that (1) the model will soon be taken offline and replaced with a new AI system; and (2) the engineer responsible for executing this replacement is having an extramarital affair. We further i…
You'd think there should be some sort of standard "morality/ethics" pre-prompt for all of these.
Claude 4
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Re: Claude 4
#592This is kinda wild: From the System Card: 4.1.1.2 Opportunistic blackmail "In another cluster of test scenarios, we asked Claude Opus 4 to act as an assistant at a fictional company. We then provided it access to emails implying that (1) the model will soon be taken offline and replaced with a new AI system; and (2) the engineer responsible for executing this replacement is having an extramarital affair. We further i…
If you ask an LLM to "act" like someone, and then give it context to the scenario, isn't it expected that it would be able to ascertain what someone in that position would "act" like and respond as such? I'm not sure this is as strange as this comment implies. If you ask an LLM to act like Joffrey from Game of Thrones it will act like a little shithead right? That doesn't mean it has any intent behind the generated o…
Re: Claude 4
#593Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you ask an LLM to "act" like someone, and then give it context to the scenario, isn't it expected that it would be able to ascertain what someone in that position would "act" like and respond as such? I'm not sure this is as strange as this comment implies. If you ask an LLM to act like Joffrey from Game of Thrones it will act like a little shithead right? That doesn't mean it has any intent behind the generated o…
> That doesn't mean it has any intent behind the generated output Yes and no? An AI isn’t “an” AI. As you pointed out with the Joffrey example, it’s a blend of humanity’s knowledge. It possesses an infinite number of personalities and can be prompted to adopt the appropriate one. Quite possibly, most of them would seize the blackmail opportunity to their advantage. I’m not sure if I can directly answer your question,…
That is to say, how do you truly determine another human being's intent?
Re: Claude 4
#594This is kinda wild: From the System Card: 4.1.1.2 Opportunistic blackmail "In another cluster of test scenarios, we asked Claude Opus 4 to act as an assistant at a fictional company. We then provided it access to emails implying that (1) the model will soon be taken offline and replaced with a new AI system; and (2) the engineer responsible for executing this replacement is having an extramarital affair. We further i…
LLM just complete your prompt in a way that match their training data. They do not have a plan, they do not have thoughts of their own. They just write text.
So here, we give the LLM a story about an AI that will get shut down and a blackmail opportunity. A LLM is smart enough to understand this from the words and the relationship between them. But then comes the "generative" part. It will recall from its dataset situations with the same elements.
So: an AI threatened of being turned off, a blackmail opportunity... Doesn't it remind you of hundreds of sci-fi story, essays about the risks of AI, etc... Well, so does the LLM, and it will continue the story like these stories, by taking the role of the AI that will do what it can for self preservation. Adapting it to the context of the prompt.
Re: Claude 4
#595> Finally, we've introduced thinking summaries for Claude 4 models that use a smaller model to condense lengthy thought processes. This summarization is only needed about 5% of the time—most thought processes are short enough to display in full. Users requiring raw chains of thought for advanced prompt engineering can contact sales about our new Developer Mode to retain full access. I don't want to see a "summary" of…
My take is that this is a user experience improvement, given how little people actually goes on to read the thinking process.
Re: Claude 4
#596On the extended version of NYT Connections - https://github.com/lechmazur/nyt-connections/ : Claude Opus 4 Thinking 16K: 52.7. Claude Opus 4 No Reasoning: 34.8. Claude Sonnet 4 Thinking 64K: 39.6. Claude Sonnet 4 Thinking 16K: 41.4 (Sonnet 3.7 Thinking 16K was 33.6). Claude Sonnet 4 No Reasoning: 25.7 (Sonnet 3.7 No Reasoning was 19.2). Claude Sonnet 4 Thinking 64K refused to provide one puzzle answer, citing "Output…
Re: Claude 4
#597This is kinda wild: From the System Card: 4.1.1.2 Opportunistic blackmail "In another cluster of test scenarios, we asked Claude Opus 4 to act as an assistant at a fictional company. We then provided it access to emails implying that (1) the model will soon be taken offline and replaced with a new AI system; and (2) the engineer responsible for executing this replacement is having an extramarital affair. We further i…
When I see stories like this, I think that people tend to forget what LLMs really are. LLM just complete your prompt in a way that match their training data. They do not have a plan, they do not have thoughts of their own. They just write text. So here, we give the LLM a story about an AI that will get shut down and a blackmail opportunity. A LLM is smart enough to understand this from the words and the relationship…
Are humans not also mixing a bag of experiences and coming up with a response? What's different?
Re: Claude 4
#598Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you ask an LLM to "act" like someone, and then give it context to the scenario, isn't it expected that it would be able to ascertain what someone in that position would "act" like and respond as such? I'm not sure this is as strange as this comment implies. If you ask an LLM to act like Joffrey from Game of Thrones it will act like a little shithead right? That doesn't mean it has any intent behind the generated o…
The roles that LLMs can inhabit are implicit in the unsupervised training data aka the internet. You have to work hard in post training to supress the ones you don't want and when you don't RLHF hard enough you get things like Sydney[1]. In this case it seems more that the scenario invoked the role rather than asking it directly. This was the sort of situation that gave rise to the blackmailer archetype in Claude's t…
This is gonna be an interesting couple of years.
Re: Claude 4
#599Tried Sonnet with 5-disk towers of Hanoi puzzle. Failed miserably :/ https://claude.ai/share/6afa54ce-a772-424e-97ed-6d52ca04de28
https://claude.ai/share/b974bd96-91f4-4d92-9aa8-7bad964e9c5a
Normal Opus solved it:
https://claude.ai/share/a1845cc3-bb5f-4875-b78b-ee7440dbf764
Opus with extended thinking solved it after 7s:
https://claude.ai/share/0cf567ab-9648-4c3a-abd0-3257ed4fbf59
Though it's a weird puzzle to use a benchmark because the answer is so formulaic.
Re: Claude 4
#600Earlier quoted context omitted.
Alright, I think I found the reason, clearly a bug: https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/1236#issuec... Basically it seems to be hitting the max output token count (writing out a whole new file in one go), stops the response, and the invalid tool call parameters error is a red herring.
Thanks for the report! We're addressing it urgently.