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A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

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Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

#121

Post by matthewdgreen »

trollbridge wrote: post #80
matthewdgreen wrote: post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Apple has the opportunity to add “extra security” features like disappearing messages, or to treat certain chats the same way they treat your web history (back this chat up, but require my passcode.) For the latter feature one can argue that it’s too advanced for the ordinary Apple user. But disappearing messages are a common security feature in virtually every messaging app, and Apple still won’t deploy those. I use…

You can set messages to auto-delete. (I do this so I won’t get into the bad habit of relying on finding ancient messages.) But it’s all or nothing and has to be applied to the entire account.

Yes, but that setting is different from what disappearing messages offers, since it only applies to your account and not the accounts of your conversation partners. Disappearing messages is a really nice feature that’s widely supported across many messengers. Apple is really the exception for not offering it.

Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

#122

Post by jeroenhd »

miki123211 wrote: post #69
modeless wrote: post #2

All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...

Most users demand: 1. That their messages won't be lost when they migrate between devices. 2. That their messages won't be lost when their device is stolen and they set up the new one from nothing but a password. 3. That Apple's password recovery flows work like any other password recovery flows, AKA that forgetting your password is a minor inconvenience, to be overcome at the Apple Store at worst, not a data loss di…

Funnily enough, most users I speak to use WhatsApp and they're mostly concerned about their contacts and pictures. I've rarely heard someone say "this is a disaster!" because part of their WhatsApp messages weren't backed up to the cloud the moment they switched phones.

Truth be told, I don't think most users even care that the company their messenger comes from can read their messages. All of the people I chat to on Telegram seem absolutely fine with it. I begrudgingly accept their chats (I don't want to be that guy that people need to install a special app for to communicate with, as much as I'd like Matrix or XMPP to succeed).

And to be honest, who cares if Apple's backups are encrypted. They can push a software update to undo that encryption any time they want to. The only people you need to protect your backups from are criminals (but that's what your password and 2FA is for) and law enforcement ("but I'm not a criminal! I have nothing to hide!"). You can't use Apple's phone/Facebook's messenger without accepting the risk that Apple/Facebook will undo all the security they claim to have added to their software.

Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

#123

Post by tgma »

modeless wrote: post #118
tgma wrote: post #115

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I addressed it in the footnote: 6-digit encryption key without tying it to device is just security theatre (and people might still forget: many users are old). Longer passwords people will forget.

It's not security theater. You didn't read, or didn't understand, the blog post I linked that explains how it provides strong security despite the low entropy passcode by using secure elements in the datacenter. I believe Apple does the same for the categories of data that are e2ee in backups when ADP is not enabled, such as keychain passwords (iMessage should be in this category and the fact that it's not is my whol…

I stand corrected then. I knew about Apple doing HSM-based key escrowing server-side, but did not know Google has applied the same technique to Android backups.

Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

#124

Post by arghwhat »

fsflover wrote: post #117
arghwhat wrote: post #102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's a big difference between "expanding miniscule business unit" and company whose entire identity is that, so much so they're willing to pay the first company several time the revenue of their ad business every year just to decide a default setting that might boost their ad business. And once more, you're conflating access to information and spying.

> you're conflating access to information and spying So what's the difference? In this particular case, the access is unwanted and unnecessary, i.e. it very much looks like spying to me. > There's a big difference between "expanding miniscule business unit" and Apple is a for-profit company, not a charity. They collected a ton of personal data on everyone and are continuously expanding their ad business. How naive yo…

That you don't want anyone to see any data doesn't make people you give your data spies. Your doctor knows a lot of personal details about you (i.e., has your data), but that doesn't make them a spy - they'd probably prefer not knowing, but they couldn't do their for-profit job otherwise.

If you fail to understand that holding or processing user data as part of providing a service is different from making a business out of selling and/or analyzing said user data, then there isn't much to discuss.

Does a small ad business use personal data? Sure, but there sure are differences in how and the extend. How blind you must be to not see that.

Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

#125

Post by franga2000 »

jeroenhd wrote: post #122
miki123211 wrote: post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most users demand: 1. That their messages won't be lost when they migrate between devices. 2. That their messages won't be lost when their device is stolen and they set up the new one from nothing but a password. 3. That Apple's password recovery flows work like any other password recovery flows, AKA that forgetting your password is a minor inconvenience, to be overcome at the Apple Store at worst, not a data loss di…

Funnily enough, most users I speak to use WhatsApp and they're mostly concerned about their contacts and pictures. I've rarely heard someone say "this is a disaster!" because part of their WhatsApp messages weren't backed up to the cloud the moment they switched phones. Truth be told, I don't think most users even care that the company their messenger comes from can read their messages. All of the people I chat to on…

> They can push a software update to undo that encryption any time they want to

Of course this is true, but it's such a reductive view of the broader security picture.

If messages are plaintext, they can be leaked by a hacker, accessed by an insider, not wiped from some drives they throw out for recycling... None of these attack vectors require the provider being evil, so removing them already reduces your exposure by a lot.

Secondly, if you're being targeted by hackers that have already gotten into the messaging provider, looking at some rows in a database is waaay easier and safer than somehow sneaking exhilaration code into the next release build of the app.

Finally, if your main adversary are government agents with a warrant, there is a huge legal difference between forcing the company to ship malicious code (possibly to all users) and simply printing out a few rows in a database. IIRC Apple has already won at least once in US court on this exact point.

Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

#126

Post by mmooss »

tgma wrote: post #116
mmooss wrote: post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What do you see? I've seen many non-technical end users use Signal, immediately upon trying it, with no problems. I've never seen someone have a problem.

I have used Telegram, iMessage, WhatsApp and Signal extensively in multiplatform settings. Only iMessage and Telegram have good overall UX (with the latter far more featureful and smooth than the former). Sure all "work" to some degree but the overall poor UX shows. It's more about polish issues and death with a thousand cuts, rather than one specific problem, although in the case of Signal, the out of place "Story"…

You can disable stories in the settings. But what's BS to you is a big deal in the Indonesian and other markets. Your UX is not everyone's.

Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

#127

Post by fsflover »

arghwhat wrote: post #124
fsflover wrote: post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> you're conflating access to information and spying So what's the difference? In this particular case, the access is unwanted and unnecessary, i.e. it very much looks like spying to me. > There's a big difference between "expanding miniscule business unit" and Apple is a for-profit company, not a charity. They collected a ton of personal data on everyone and are continuously expanding their ad business. How naive yo…

That you don't want anyone to see any data doesn't make people you give your data spies. Your doctor knows a lot of personal details about you (i.e., has your data), but that doesn't make them a spy - they'd probably prefer not knowing, but they couldn't do their for-profit job otherwise. If you fail to understand that holding or processing user data as part of providing a service is different from making a business…

> holding or processing user data as part of providing a service

Did you read my link? The Apple's data collection is far beyond what they need to provide the service. Unlike the doctor. This is my main point.

> Does a small ad business use personal data?

Again, you are missing the point. Look at the trend, not the current state. The ad business is expanding, and you can't be sure that it stays small for long. See also: enshittification, https://pluralistic.net/2025/02/26/ursula-franklin/

Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

#128

Post by tgma »

mmooss wrote: post #126
tgma wrote: post #116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have used Telegram, iMessage, WhatsApp and Signal extensively in multiplatform settings. Only iMessage and Telegram have good overall UX (with the latter far more featureful and smooth than the former). Sure all "work" to some degree but the overall poor UX shows. It's more about polish issues and death with a thousand cuts, rather than one specific problem, although in the case of Signal, the out of place "Story"…

You can disable stories in the settings. But what's BS to you is a big deal in the Indonesian and other markets. Your UX is not everyone's.

You can disable stories. The UX still is shit. Again, death by a thousand cuts. As for Indonesia or whatever, I am sure people Stories increases engagement that boosts Signal executives morale thinking they are more relevant and can stick it to Zuck. I just don’t want it in a serious messaging app that hopes to be used in place of iMessage or Google Messages and since we are debating opinions, I take Apple’s judgement on design over aggregate clicks from Indonesians.

Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

#129

Post by mmooss »

tgma wrote: post #128
mmooss wrote: post #126

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can disable stories in the settings. But what's BS to you is a big deal in the Indonesian and other markets. Your UX is not everyone's.

You can disable stories. The UX still is shit. Again, death by a thousand cuts. As for Indonesia or whatever, I am sure people Stories increases engagement that boosts Signal executives morale thinking they are more relevant and can stick it to Zuck. I just don’t want it in a serious messaging app that hopes to be used in place of iMessage or Google Messages and since we are debating opinions, I take Apple’s judgemen…

Do you have some basis for what you say? It's just a rant at this point; it hardly has a specific criticism and fabricates things about people you probably don't know. Whatever you think, that doesn't make it so.

Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]

#130

Post by tgma »

mmooss wrote: post #129
tgma wrote: post #128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can disable stories. The UX still is shit. Again, death by a thousand cuts. As for Indonesia or whatever, I am sure people Stories increases engagement that boosts Signal executives morale thinking they are more relevant and can stick it to Zuck. I just don’t want it in a serious messaging app that hopes to be used in place of iMessage or Google Messages and since we are debating opinions, I take Apple’s judgemen…

Do you have some basis for what you say? It's just a rant at this point; it hardly has a specific criticism and fabricates things about people you probably don't know. Whatever you think, that doesn't make it so.

Stories was a specific criticism; was it not?

I understand that our opinions don't agree, so I cite Apple's market research and design decision to bolster my case.

But I will stop there. Maybe just peddle your BS to ask folks to shut up elsewhere. Who are you even to know whom I know or not?

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