All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
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A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
61–70 of 141 posts
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#62Earlier quoted context omitted.
Most customers do want it this way, but Apple still allows to exchange comfort for privacy, if you want to. I actually think it's a pretty sensible approach to capture both the big segment of people who don't care, and those who do and know which knobs to tweak. You can still turn everything compromising off and end up with a device secured to paranoid levels. That's definitely more than an empty promise, or what oth…
> Most customers do want it this way, but Apple still allows to exchange comfort for privacy […] more than an empty promise, or what other vendors provide. That’s pretty much exactly what all the other vendors in the market provide: insecure and spying by default. I don’t really understand why Apple should somehow get good points for their stance on privacy when they are actually doing pretty much the same thing than…
Users want convenience, and security always brings inconveniences (e.g., inter-client sync, no chat data before a client logged in first time, etc.).
Some vendors might provide convenience because they want to have your data. Others might provide you the convenience because you as a user want it, but see the resulting data as nothing but a liability.
Some providers are known to have the majority of their business be based around such data, whereas others might have little to no presence in that field.
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#63All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
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https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/apple-update-extr...
https://citizenlab.ca/2023/09/blastpass-nso-group-iphone-zer...
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think the story around privacy and security in general has become diluted in marketing talk. Every single default on both iOS and macOS effectively makes one’s data, well, accessible and not private. The gap between perception and reality when it comes to Apple as a “privacy champion” has never been so big as it is today.
Most customers do want it this way, but Apple still allows to exchange comfort for privacy, if you want to. I actually think it's a pretty sensible approach to capture both the big segment of people who don't care, and those who do and know which knobs to tweak. You can still turn everything compromising off and end up with a device secured to paranoid levels. That's definitely more than an empty promise, or what oth…
Does it really? There is no option to use my own hardware/software for backup storage. I mean what would usually go to icloud.
That i would really trust.
So to me the answer is no.
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#65All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
Not quite. You can still have automatic local backups set up for iOS and macOS devices to your own NAS. And that NAS can then do cloud backups of whatever is on it in any way you want. It's certainly more effort than the stock iCloud solution, but it's still an option.
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#66Earlier quoted context omitted.
Actually it is the opposite. If you have Messages in iCloud, they do not store messages in "iCloud Backup" but keep it separate with some client-side device-to-device encryption key (UPDATE: which they also store a copy of inside iCloud backup unless ADP is on; thanks to 'modeless). If you enable iCloud Backup and Messages in iCloud is turned off, it will backup all your messages in a way visible to Apple servers. Of…
Yes but when Messages in iCloud is enabled that "client-side" encryption key is itself included in your iCloud backup (that Apple can read), as disclosed. So Apple can read your messages regardless of whether you enable or disable Messages in iCloud. The only things that prevent it are disabling cloud backups entirely, or enabling ADP. But even those don't really prevent it because unless everyone you message also do…
It's also the same way ProtonMail encrypts their email. They have to store the private key for you to be able to use the email on any browser.
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#67All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
> the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use Not quite. You can still have automatic local backups set up for iOS and macOS devices to your own NAS. And that NAS can then do cloud backups of whatever is on it in any way you want. It's certainly more effort than the stock iCloud solution, but it's still an option.
macOS yes, but iOS?
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#68All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#69All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
1. That their messages won't be lost when they migrate between devices.
2. That their messages won't be lost when their device is stolen and they set up the new one from nothing but a password.
3. That Apple's password recovery flows work like any other password recovery flows, AKA that forgetting your password is a minor inconvenience, to be overcome at the Apple Store at worst, not a data loss disaster.
4. That they don't have to spend $$$ on some strange device called a "Yoobby Key", which they don't understand and will lose anyway.
There's no way to satisfy those demands and have your desired level of security, hence why iCloud backup encryption is a strictly opt-in feature.
There are tradeoffs to be made here, and Signal made different tradeoffs, which makes it significantly more secure but also significantly more annoying to use for somebody whose main life interest isn't figuring out why tech works the way it does. Apple does the best it can under the constraints they are given.
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#70Earlier quoted context omitted.
> the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use Not quite. You can still have automatic local backups set up for iOS and macOS devices to your own NAS. And that NAS can then do cloud backups of whatever is on it in any way you want. It's certainly more effort than the stock iCloud solution, but it's still an option.
How? Genuine Question, this is something I really want. macOS yes, but iOS?
iTunes (or Mac OS's built-in iPhone sync) is the recommended way to do this, although the protocol has been reverse-engineered to hell and back and third-party software exists for it. iMazing is the most notable one, although there are probably others, and you could hack something on top of libimobiledevice if you really wanted to.
Getting those backups from your computer to the NAS is an exercise for the reader.