A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
1–10 of 141 posts
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#2All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that).
[1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#3All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
The more charitable interpretation is that for most people losing their photos and messages is a bigger threat than the government spying on them. For those who might have a different tradeoff there is Advanced Data Protection.
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#4All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
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Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#5All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
The more charitable interpretation is that for most people losing their photos and messages is a bigger threat than the government spying on them. For those who might have a different tradeoff there is Advanced Data Protection.
I'm glad ADP exists now, but you have to make sure everyone you message has it enabled too, or your messages are still Apple's to read whenever they choose. Meanwhile Google's equivalent backup feature (whatever other faults it may have) has been end-to-end encrypted by default for everyone since long before ADP was even available at all. The risk of losing access is practically nonexistent because the password is your screen lock code, the same one you enter on your lock screen literally every day.
Also, is government spying the only reason Apple decrypts messages? We don't know. They don't disclose that they do it for the government, but we know they do from other sources. What other purposes might they not be disclosing?
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#6All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
The more charitable interpretation is that for most people losing their photos and messages is a bigger threat than the government spying on them. For those who might have a different tradeoff there is Advanced Data Protection.
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Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#7Earlier quoted context omitted.
The more charitable interpretation is that for most people losing their photos and messages is a bigger threat than the government spying on them. For those who might have a different tradeoff there is Advanced Data Protection.
I'm glad ADP exists now, but you have to make sure everyone you message has it enabled too, or your messages are still Apple's to read whenever they choose. Meanwhile Google's equivalent backup feature (whatever other faults it may have) has been end-to-end encrypted by default for everyone since long before ADP was even available at all. The risk of losing access is practically nonexistent because the password is yo…
The concern is if you lose your devices with E2EE enabled then you are locked out permanently. Grandma won't know how to use a Yubikey (which is the alternative Apple provides for this eventuality with ADP enabled) and will be out of luck.
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#8All that security, and then by default Apple literally just sends themselves a copy of your encryption keys to store in iCloud backup, the only cloud backup solution Apple allows you to use. "to help you recover your data" [1] (oh and also to send law enforcement your message history in plaintext on request, but we don't talk about that). [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#:~:text=in%20iCloud%2...
The more charitable interpretation is that for most people losing their photos and messages is a bigger threat than the government spying on them. For those who might have a different tradeoff there is Advanced Data Protection.
ADP is a total joke if it doesn't also disable plaintext backups for the people you're talking to
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#9Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm glad ADP exists now, but you have to make sure everyone you message has it enabled too, or your messages are still Apple's to read whenever they choose. Meanwhile Google's equivalent backup feature (whatever other faults it may have) has been end-to-end encrypted by default for everyone since long before ADP was even available at all. The risk of losing access is practically nonexistent because the password is yo…
The concern is if you lose your devices with E2EE enabled then you are locked out permanently. Grandma won't know how to use a Yubikey (which is the alternative Apple provides for this eventuality with ADP enabled) and will be out of luck.
This is not a requirement with Google's solution. After losing all your devices you only need your lock screen code to decrypt your backup, as I said. This is achieved using a secure element on the datacenter side to protect against brute-force attacks on the screen lock code.
Re: A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
#10Earlier quoted context omitted.
The more charitable interpretation is that for most people losing their photos and messages is a bigger threat than the government spying on them. For those who might have a different tradeoff there is Advanced Data Protection.
I'm glad ADP exists now, but you have to make sure everyone you message has it enabled too, or your messages are still Apple's to read whenever they choose. Meanwhile Google's equivalent backup feature (whatever other faults it may have) has been end-to-end encrypted by default for everyone since long before ADP was even available at all. The risk of losing access is practically nonexistent because the password is yo…
> the password is your screen lock code
You mean the one that by default is a 4 digit number and therefore trivially brute forcable?
And neither android hardware nor the google servers have any kind of secure element enforcing brute force protections like '3 tries then we wipe the keys'.