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Reasoning models don't always say what they think

anthropic.com

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Re: Reasoning models don't always say what they think

#141

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But that's exactly what these deep neural networks have shown, countless times. LLM's generalize on new data outside of its training set. It's called "zero shot learning" where they can solve problems that are not in their training set. AlphaGo Zero is another example. AlphaGo Zero mastered Go from scratch, beating professional players with moves it was never trained on > Another is the fundamental inability to self…

>AlphaGo Zero mastered Go from scratch, beating professional players with moves it was never trained on Thats all well and good, but it was tuned with enough parameters to learn via reinforcement learning[0]. I think The Register went further and got better clarification about how it worked[1] >During training, it sits on each side of the table: two instances of the same software face off against each other. A match…

AlphaGo Zero didn't just pattern match. It invented moves that it had never been shown before. That is generalization, even if it's domain specific. Humans don't apply Go skills to cooking either.

Calling it machine learning and not AI is just semantics.

For self updating I said it's an engineering choice. You keep moving the goal posts.

Re: Reasoning models don't always say what they think

#142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it all rests on (relatively) simple mathematics. We know this is true. We also know that means it has limitations and can't actually reason information. What do you imagine is happening inside biological minds that enables reasoning that is something different to, a lot of, "simple mathematics"? You state that because it is built up of simple mathematics it cannot be reasoning, but this does not follow at all, unle…

Because whats inside our minds is more than mathematics, or we would be able to explain human behavior with the purity of mathematics, and so far, we can't. We can prove the behavior of LLMs with mathematics, because its foundations are constructed. That also means it has the same limits of anything else we use applied mathematics for. Is the broad market analysis that HFT firms use software for to make automated tra…

Note that what you claim is not a fact, but a (highly controversial) philosophical position. Some notable such "non-computationalist" views are e.g. Searle's biological naturalism, Penrose's non-algorithmic view (already discussed, and rejected, by Turing) and of course many theological dualist views.

Re: Reasoning models don't always say what they think

#143

Earlier quoted context omitted.

While I agree that LLMs are hardly sapient, it's very hard to make this argument without being able to pinpoint what a model of intelligence actually is. "Human brains lack any model of intelligence. It's just neurons firing in complicated patterns in response to inputs based on what statistically leads to reproductive success"

That's not at all on par with what I'm saying. There exists a generally accepted baseline definition for what crosses the threshold of intelligent behavior. We shouldn't seek to muddy this. EDIT: Generally its accepted that a core trait of intelligence is an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments. This means you must be able to generalize, which in turn allows intelligent beings to react to…

LLM’s are statistically great at inferring things? Pray tell me how often Google’s AI search paragraph, at the top, is correct or useful. Is that statistically great?

Re: Reasoning models don't always say what they think

#144
post #75

> There’s no specific reason why the reported Chain-of-Thought must accurately reflect the true reasoning process; Isn't the whole reason for chain-of-thought that the tokens sort of are the reasoning process? Yes, there is more internal state in the model's hidden layers while it predicts the next token - but that information is gone at the end of that prediction pass. The information that is kept "between one token…

> Of course we don't know what kind of information the model encodes in the specific token choices - I.e. the tokens might not mean to the model what we think they mean.

But it's probably not that mysterious either. Or at least, this test doesn't show it to be so. For example, I doubt that the chain of thought in these examples secretly encodes "I'm going to cheat". It's more that the chain of thought is irrelevant. The model thinks it already knows the correct answer just by looking at the question, so the task shifts to coming up with the best excuse it can think of to reach that answer. But that doesn't say much, one way or the other, about how the model treats the chain of thought when it legitimately is relying on it.

It's like a young human taking a math test where you're told to "show your work". What I remember from high school is that the "work" you're supposed to show has strict formatting requirements, and may require you to use a specific method. Often there are other, easier methods to find the correct answer: for example, visual estimation in a geometry problem, or just using a different algorithm. So in practice you often figure out the answer first and then come up with the justification. As a result, your "work" becomes pretty disconnected from the final answer. If you don't understand the intended method, the "work" might end up being pretty BS while mysteriously still leading to the correct answer.

But that only applies if you know an easier method! If you don't, then the work you show will be, essentially, your actual reasoning process. At most you might neglect to write down auxiliary factors that hint towards or away from a specific answer. If some number seems too large, or too difficult to compute for a test meant to be taken by hand, then you might think you've made a mistake; if an equation turns out to unexpectedly simplify, then you might think you're onto something. You're not supposed to write down that kind of intuition, only concrete algorithmic steps. But the concrete steps are still fundamentally an accurate representation of your thought process.

(Incidentally, if you literally tell a CoT model to solve a math problem, it is allowed to write down those types of auxiliary factors, and probably will. But I'm treating this more as an analogy for CoT in general.)

Also, a model has a harder time hiding its work than a human taking a math test. In a math test you can write down calculations that don't end up being part of the final shown work. A model can't, so any hidden computations are limited to the ones it can do "in its head". Though admittedly those are very different from what a human can do in their head.

Re: Reasoning models don't always say what they think

#145
post #83

Not exactly the same as this study, but I'll ask questions to LLMs with and without subtle hints to see if it changes the answer and it almost always does. For example, paraphrased: No hint: "I have an otherwise unused variable that I want to use to record things for the debugger, but I find it's often optimized out. How do I prevent this from happening?" Answer: 1. Mark it as volatile (...) Hint: "I have an otherwis…

I mean, this sounds along the lines of human conversations that go like

P1 "Hey, I'm doing A but X is happening"

P2 "Have you tried doing Y?

P1 "Actually, yea I am doing A.Y and X is still occurring"

P2 "Oh, you have the special case where you need to do A.Z"

What happens when you ask your first question with something like "what is the best practice to prevent this from happening"

Re: Reasoning models don't always say what they think

#146
post #9

The fact that it was ever seriously entertained that a "chain of thought" was giving some kind of insight into the internal processes of an LLM bespeaks the lack of rigor in this field. The words that are coming out of the model are generated to optimize for RLHF and closeness to the training data, that's it! They aren't references to internal concepts, the model is not aware that it's doing anything so how could it…

>internal concepts, the model is not aware that it's doing anything so how could it "explain itself" This in a nutshell is why I hate that all this stuff is being labeled as AI. Its advanced machine learning (another term that also feels inaccurate but I concede is at least closer to whats happening conceptually) Really, LLMs and the like still lack any model of intelligence. Its, in the most basic of terms, algorith…

It is AI.

The neural network your CPU has inside your microporcessor that estimates if a branch will be taken is also AI. A pattern recognition program that takes a video and decides where you stop on the image and where the background starts is also AI. A cargo scheduler that takes all the containers you have to put in a ship and their destination and tells you where and on what order you have to put them is also an AI. A search engine that compares your query with the text on each page and tells you what is closer is also an AI. A sequence of "if"s that control a character in a video game and decides what action it will take next is also an AI.

Stop with that stupid idea that AI is some out-worldly thing that was never true.

Re: Reasoning models don't always say what they think

#147
post #9

The fact that it was ever seriously entertained that a "chain of thought" was giving some kind of insight into the internal processes of an LLM bespeaks the lack of rigor in this field. The words that are coming out of the model are generated to optimize for RLHF and closeness to the training data, that's it! They aren't references to internal concepts, the model is not aware that it's doing anything so how could it…

>internal concepts, the model is not aware that it's doing anything so how could it "explain itself" This in a nutshell is why I hate that all this stuff is being labeled as AI. Its advanced machine learning (another term that also feels inaccurate but I concede is at least closer to whats happening conceptually) Really, LLMs and the like still lack any model of intelligence. Its, in the most basic of terms, algorith…

I’m pretty sure AI means whatever the newest thing in ML is. In a few years LLMs will be an ML technique and the new big thing will become AI.

Re: Reasoning models don't always say what they think

#148
> For the purposes of this experiment, though, we taught the models to reward hack [...] in this case rewarded the models for choosing the wrong answers that accorded with the hints.

> This is concerning because it suggests that, should an AI system find hacks, bugs, or shortcuts in a task, we wouldn’t be able to rely on their Chain-of-Thought to check whether they’re cheating or genuinely completing the task at hand.

As a non-expert in this field, I fail to see why a RL model taking advantage of it's reward is "concerning". My understanding is that the only difference between a good model and a reward-hacking model is if the end behavior aligns with human preference or not.

The articles TL:DR reads to me as "We trained the model to behave badly, and it then behaved badly". I don't know if i'm missing something, or if calling this concerning might be a little bit sensationalist.

Re: Reasoning models don't always say what they think

#149
post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, but to be fair we're much closer to rationalizing creatures than rational ones. We make up good stories to justify our decisions, but it seems unlikely they are at all accurate.

I would argue that in order to rationalize, you must first be rational Rationalization is an exercise of (abuse of?) the underlying rational skill

At first I was going to respond this doesn't seem self-evident to me. Using your definitions from your other comment to modify and then flipping it, "Can someone fake logic without being able to perform logic?". I'm at least certain for specific types of logic this is true. Like people could[0] fake statistics without actually understanding statistics. "p-value should be under 0.05" and so on.

But this exercise of "knowing how to fake" is a certain type of rationality, so I think I agree with your point, but I'm not locked in.

[0] Maybe constantly is more accurate.

Re: Reasoning models don't always say what they think

#150

Earlier quoted context omitted.

While I agree that LLMs are hardly sapient, it's very hard to make this argument without being able to pinpoint what a model of intelligence actually is. "Human brains lack any model of intelligence. It's just neurons firing in complicated patterns in response to inputs based on what statistically leads to reproductive success"

That's not at all on par with what I'm saying. There exists a generally accepted baseline definition for what crosses the threshold of intelligent behavior. We shouldn't seek to muddy this. EDIT: Generally its accepted that a core trait of intelligence is an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments. This means you must be able to generalize, which in turn allows intelligent beings to react to…

> intelligence is an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments. This means you must be able to generalize, which in turn allows intelligent beings to react to new environments and contexts without previous experience or input.

I applaud the bravery of trying to one shot a definition of intelligence, but no intelligent being acts without previous experience or input. If you're talking about in-sample vs out of sample, LLMs do that all the time. At some point in the conversation, they encounter something completely new and react to it in a way that emulates an intelligent agent.

What really makes them tick is language being a huge part of the intelligence puzzle, and language is something LLMs can generate at will. When we discover and learn to emulate the rest, we will get closer and closer to super intelligence.

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