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Rickover's Lessons

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81–90 of 103 posts

Re: Rickover's Lessons

#81
>>> Human experience shows that people, not organizations or management systems, get things done.

Complex jobs cannot be accomplished effectively with transients. A manager must make the work challenging and rewarding so that his people will remain with the organization for many years. This allows it to benefit fully from their knowledge, experience, and corporate memory.”

~ Hyman Rickover, 1982

Re: Rickover's Lessons

#83
post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Rickover's final testimony to congress in 1982 speaks about this: Corporate Power A preoccupation with the so-called bottom line of profit and loss statements, coupled with a lust for expansion, is creating an environment in which fewer businessmen honor traditional values; where responsibility is increasingly disassociated from the the exercise of power; where skill in financial manipulation is valued more than actu…

Most of the powerful corporations in 1982 no longer exist or are much smaller because there is great turnover in corporate power. Governments don't lose power unless they lose a war, a rare event today that was common 100 years ago.

"governments" may not, but the political parties running them certainly do. And changes in political parties can change what services government delivers. Heck, you don't even need a change in parties for that to happen.

Re: Rickover's Lessons

#84
Author of Chinatalk post here!

If you want to read the full write-up of the story of Rickover and the USS Nautilus, you can find my original substack here: https://charlesyang.substack.com/p/how-hyman-rickover-built-...

I'm also planning on doing some archival research through the Rickover Files at US Naval Academy Archives, so if there are particular topics that are of interest about Rickover's legacy, let me know! Currently planning on prioritizing congressional testimony and unpublished memos or speeches that he gave.

Re: Rickover's Lessons

#85
post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most of the powerful corporations in 1982 no longer exist or are much smaller because there is great turnover in corporate power. Governments don't lose power unless they lose a war, a rare event today that was common 100 years ago.

The USSR would like to enter the chat, but is unable to for existential reasons unrelated to combat. (Also much of the rest of the Warsaw Pact, and others around the world.)

> reasons unrelated to combat.

Afghanistan is very much a reason why they no longer exist.

Re: Rickover's Lessons

#86
post #2

We don't have time machines and so can't re-run the experiment. I've read biographies of Rickover and not all people who lived through this time are complementary. It's certainly true the strategic arms processes and nuclear submarine engineering benefited in a long term view. I just find myself asking if the US army recruiting tag line Be The Best You Can Be was really met, or if Rickover achieved what might be more…

[deleted]

Re: Rickover's Lessons

#87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The USSR would like to enter the chat, but is unable to for existential reasons unrelated to combat. (Also much of the rest of the Warsaw Pact, and others around the world.)

> reasons unrelated to combat. Afghanistan is very much a reason why they no longer exist.

One of many modest-sized if not necessarily small cuts. But Afghanistan did not, say, defeat and invade the Soviet Union.

It out-endured them within its own territory. Much as has happened to the US several times, with resulting embarrassment but not regime change.

Military spending on the part of the US, falling global oil prices, multiple internal contradictions and failures, revolt within Warsaw Pact states, and growing internal dissent were far more significant contributors to the ultimate fall.

Britannica and World Atlas give similar accounts:

https://www.britannica.com/story/why-did-the-soviet-union-co...>

https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/10-reasons-for-the-colla...>

Re: Rickover's Lessons

#88
post #74
post #2

We don't have time machines and so can't re-run the experiment. I've read biographies of Rickover and not all people who lived through this time are complementary. It's certainly true the strategic arms processes and nuclear submarine engineering benefited in a long term view. I just find myself asking if the US army recruiting tag line Be The Best You Can Be was really met, or if Rickover achieved what might be more…

> Viewed from Australia the current state of US submarine construction is woeful. It was great for the War on Terror era, when submarines were only useful against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and ISIS aircraft carriers. :) Spending money on subs, which includes staffing, operating, and maintaining them, was a waste. Now the US needs to build capacity, which takes time. It turns out that getting the next AI startup moving i…

> MVPs generally are not good for submarine warfare.

I've heard enough stories that makes me feel like there are plenty of examples of the PoC rushed to production level experiences with various military equipment.

Re: Rickover's Lessons

#89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The USSR would like to enter the chat, but is unable to for existential reasons unrelated to combat. (Also much of the rest of the Warsaw Pact, and others around the world.)

> reasons unrelated to combat. Afghanistan is very much a reason why they no longer exist.

I have very little sympathy towards the Soviet empire, but the war remained on the Afghan side of the border, and was of a limited scope for most of its duration; construing the Soviet defeat into a direct cause of regime collapse is an extraordinary claim warranting extraordinary proof.

For example, one wouldn't claim that the de-facto American loss of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is directly affecting the stability of the American regime, would they?

Coming back to the Soviets, I would concur to a claim that the Afghan War was a failed national project, alongside the Chernobyl tragedy and the ecological disaster of the Aral Sea. The narrative I think proper here is first and foremost is the ordinary Soviet citizen's loss of trust in the Soviet way as such, rather than the specific fear of a foreign invasion.

Re: Rickover's Lessons

#90

Author of Chinatalk post here! If you want to read the full write-up of the story of Rickover and the USS Nautilus, you can find my original substack here: https://charlesyang.substack.com/p/how-hyman-rickover-built-... I'm also planning on doing some archival research through the Rickover Files at US Naval Academy Archives, so if there are particular topics that are of interest about Rickover's legacy, let me know!…

In general any observations about how he was able to convince congress / government of the potential of a nuclear navy. He doesn't come across as a necessarily easy person to deal with in many contexts and it's always felt like there's a missing link in explaining his effectiveness at getting what he wanted. I mean he went from being someone the navy wanting gone to probably the most famous/influential naval figure in history and largely through maneuvering outside of the organization. But how?

I also would love if you find anything out about his interactions with Takis Veliotis in the 80s (who if you don't know about, feel free to message me or see my submission on).

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