Helpful update: The gist author has deleted the gist, so https://gist.githubusercontent.com/nikitastupin/30e525b776c4... now results in a 404, and stops the action from any further secrets being leaked. This means you're impacted only if you used the action, and had a build triggered in the last 6 hours or so.
Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos
131–140 of 317 posts
Re: Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos
#132How does this siphon the secrets away? It looks like it just dumps them out to stdout and stops there.
Re: Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos
#133Earlier quoted context omitted.
Are there examples of these types of actions in other circles outside of the .NET ecosystem? I knew about the FluentAssertions ordeal, but the Moq thing was news to me. I guess I've just missed it all.
node-ipc is a recent example from the Node ecosystem. The author released an update with some code that made a request to a geolocation webservice to decide whether to wipe the local filesystem.
I like this comment from u/mailto_devnull (https://www.reddit.com/r/node/comments/tg451e/do_not_use_nod...):
Where do I stand on the war? I stand with Ukraine.
Where do I stand on software supply chain issues? I stand with not fucking around with the software supply chain.Re: Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos
#134I wish Github required some sort of immutability for actions by default as most package managers do, either by requiring reusable actions to be specified via commit hash or by preventing the code for a published tag to be changed. At the moment the convention is to only specify the tag, which is not only a security issue as we see here, but may also cause workflows to break if an action author updates the action.
Re: Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos
#135In recent years, it's started to feel like you can't trust third-party dependencies and extensions at all anymore. I no longer install npm packages that have more than a few transitive dependencies, and I've started to refrain from installing vscode or chrome extensions altogether. Time and time again, they either get hijacked and malicious code added, or the dev themselves suddenly decides to betray everyone's trust…
There is something to be said for the Go proverb "a little copying is better than a little dependency", as well. If you want a simple function from a complicated library, you can probably copy it into your own codebase.
Re: Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos
#136Re: Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos
#137Re: Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos
#138In recent years, it's started to feel like you can't trust third-party dependencies and extensions at all anymore. I no longer install npm packages that have more than a few transitive dependencies, and I've started to refrain from installing vscode or chrome extensions altogether. Time and time again, they either get hijacked and malicious code added, or the dev themselves suddenly decides to betray everyone's trust…
Stealing crypto is so lucrative. So there is a huge 'market' for this stuff now that wasn't there before. Security is more important now than ever. I started sandboxing Emacs and python because I can't trust all the packages.
Re: Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos
#139In recent years, it's started to feel like you can't trust third-party dependencies and extensions at all anymore. I no longer install npm packages that have more than a few transitive dependencies, and I've started to refrain from installing vscode or chrome extensions altogether. Time and time again, they either get hijacked and malicious code added, or the dev themselves suddenly decides to betray everyone's trust…