As an Electron maintainer, I'll re-iterate a warning I've told many people before: Your auto-updater and the underlying code-signing and notarization mechanisms are sacred . The recovery mechanisms for the entire system are extremely painful and often require embarrassing emails to customers. A compromised code-sign certificate is close to the top of my personal nightmares. Dave and toDesktop have build a product tha…
Have a shoe-box key, a key which is copied 2*N (redundancy) times and N copies are stored in 2 shoe-boxes. It can be on tape, or optical, or silicon, or paper. This key always stays offline. This is your rootiest of root keys in your products, and almost nothing is signed by it. The next key down which the shoe-box key signs (ideally, the only thing) is for all intents and purposes your acting "root certificate authority" key running hot in whatever highly secure signing enclave you design for any other ordinary root CA setup. Then continue from there.
Your hot and running root CA could get totally pwned, and as long as you had come to Jesus with your shoe-box key and religiously never ever interacted with it or put it online in any way, you can sign a new acting root CA key with it and sign a revocation for the old one. Then put the shoe-box away.