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New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

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101–110 of 365 posts

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's could be unfixable without a significant performance penalty, but at minimum they could make safari do proper process isolation like every other browser does.

I could easily imagine such a refactor of Safari taking more than 90 days even if Apple made it the highest possible priority.

The bug is open since 2018, so clearly they don’t actually care about that.

https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=184466

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#102
post #77
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Serious answer, don't use Safari. Use a browser that properly separates webpages into isolated processes so that this kind of cross-site read is not possible.

Will that work? Isn't memory treated in a unified way between processes, at some point?

It will work unless someone forgets to add a public suffix into the public suffix list (as described in the FLOP paper). Both of these attacks target virtual memory pointers.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#103

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I could easily imagine such a refactor of Safari taking more than 90 days even if Apple made it the highest possible priority.

The bug is open since 2018, so clearly they don’t actually care about that. https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=184466

Right, but that was before they knew about this exploit. My point was that even if they decided they needed to urgently switch to a multiprocesses architecture because it's the only way to mitigate this exploit, they might not be done yet.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#104
post #23

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Is it bad that I disable spectre mitigations on all my PCs to get a free double-digit-% performance boost?

You're not getting a boost, you're avoiding a penalty. In some (but not all) cases you can avoid the penalty and the exploits by disabling SMT. Remember, SMT isn't twice as many cores, just twice as many half-cores. You'll be fine.

Disabling SMT alone isn’t enough to mitigate CPU vulnerabilities. For full protection against issues like L1TF or MDS, you must both enable the relevant mitigations and disable SMT. Mitigations defend against attacks where an attacker executes on the same core after the victim, while disabling SMT protects against scenarios where the attacker runs concurrently with the victim.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#105

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's super feasible if you own the API default.

You just announce you are making a change and then turn it on later.

After building enterprise APIs for a few years, you’d be amazed at how hard it is to get companies to make even minor changes; backwards compatibility is key. Often it’s because they _can’t_ make the change themselves since they outsourced the code to a consulting agency. So they’d have to sign a new contract and get an agency to make the change.

They just won’t, and you’ll have a browser that people stop using.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#106
post #77
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Serious answer, don't use Safari. Use a browser that properly separates webpages into isolated processes so that this kind of cross-site read is not possible.

Will that work? Isn't memory treated in a unified way between processes, at some point?

Processors are not supposed to speculate across ASIDs

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#107
post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Multithreading may be an obscure feature to you but runtime developers get requests for it all the time. SAB becoming widely available was definitely delayed.

I would still maintain that needing multithreading on a website is relatively rare, and specifically needing SharedArrayBuffer instead of just multiple proceses (e.g. webworkers) is even more rare. Did use cases exist? Sure. But not sufficiently to move the needle on app store usage.

One of the most significant use cases that gets impacted is game dev.

Web games benefit significantly from SAB (see the Godot engine for example) and mobile games make up a pretty sizable chunk of app store usage, particularly in app purchases.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#108
post #81

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"trivial" how do you figure? Remember these exploits bypass your own code's conditionals over a shockingly far duration. Unless you just mean for incredibly restrictive usages such as eBPF? possible absent any performance concerns at all, yeah sure

> Unless you just mean for incredibly restrictive usages such as eBPF? I was actually thinking something more like a bytecode interpreter that runs one operation and then sleeps until the next full wall clock second, but yes, that's my point: If you don't care about performance, you can make process isolation safe very easily.

That is actually still not secure. The cache will happily retain the trace of the access forever.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#109
post #4

Aside: I feel like RUB has become kind of a global center for this kind of high-end offensive security work. Was I just not paying enough attention 10 years ago or is this a new-ish thing?

It goes way back; check the work of the likes of Thorsten Holz or Christof Paar. TU Graz is another one.

Re: New speculative attacks on Apple CPUs

#110
post #96
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's not a failure of Safari, it's required by window.open API semantics, in particular by the default Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy of "unsafe-none" [1]. By setting a different policy, sites can protect themselves against this. I guess technically browsers could open new windows in a new browsing context group regardless of this setting and relay the allowed types of messages via IPC (if any), but that would be a maj…

Other browsers do site isolation, why can’t Safari? (:

Right, in what sane world would the website determine operating system process semantics? What next, syscalls?
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