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The Prisoner's Dilemma: a summary, and new advances

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Re: The Prisoner's Dilemma: a summary, and new advances

#31
post #13

If I were playing Split or Steal, my strategy would be exactly this: tell the other player that I'm going to choose "steal" and if they choose "split", I'll give them half of the winnings. We would shake on it on national television which forms a nice contract: an offer, consideration for both parties, and acceptance. The beauty of this is that if they're not an idiot they'll choose "split" and we each walk away with…

Here is the video of this happening on the tv show. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0qjK3TWZE8 . It worth a watch, I recommend it.

This is a clever variation on what happened:

"A more powerful variation would be to offer the same deal but without looking at the balls at the beginning, stating that you will pick one at random. The other player is then forced to split or risk walking away with nothing."

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/04/amazing_round_...

Re: The Prisoner's Dilemma: a summary, and new advances

#32
The most interesting story on IPD (especially from a hacker perspective) wasn't mentioned:

>Although tit for tat is considered to be the most robust basic strategy, a team from Southampton University in England (led by Professor Nicholas Jennings [1] and consisting of Rajdeep Dash, Sarvapali Ramchurn, Alex Rogers, Perukrishnen Vytelingum) introduced a new strategy at the 20th-anniversary iterated prisoners' dilemma competition, which proved to be more successful than tit for tat. This strategy relied on cooperation between programs to achieve the highest number of points for a single program. The University submitted 60 programs to the competition, which were designed to recognize each other through a series of five to ten moves at the start. Once this recognition was made, one program would always cooperate and the other would always defect, assuring the maximum number of points for the defector. If the program realized that it was playing a non-Southampton player, it would continuously defect in an attempt to minimize the score of the competing program. As a result,[8] this strategy ended up taking the top three positions in the competition, as well as a number of positions towards the bottom.

>This strategy takes advantage of the fact that multiple entries were allowed in this particular competition and that the performance of a team was measured by that of the highest-scoring player (meaning that the use of self-sacrificing players was a form of minmaxing). In a competition where one has control of only a single player, tit for tat is certainly a better strategy. Because of this new rule, this competition also has little theoretical significance when analysing single agent strategies as compared to Axelrod's seminal tournament. However, it provided the framework for analysing how to achieve cooperative strategies in multi-agent frameworks, especially in the presence of noise. In fact, long before this new-rules tournament was played, Richard Dawkins in his book The Selfish Gene pointed out the possibility of such strategies winning if multiple entries were allowed, but he remarked that most probably Axelrod would not have allowed them if they had been submitted. It also relies on circumventing rules about the prisoners' dilemma in that there is no communication allowed between the two players. When the Southampton programs engage in an opening "ten move dance" to recognize one another, this only reinforces just how valuable communication can be in shifting the balance of the game.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoners_dilemma#Strategy_for_...

By the way, if you haven't read The Selfish Gene, do yourself a favor and read it now. It discusses IPD and coins the word "meme"... what more could you possibly want?

Re: The Prisoner's Dilemma: a summary, and new advances

#34
post #32

The most interesting story on IPD (especially from a hacker perspective) wasn't mentioned: >Although tit for tat is considered to be the most robust basic strategy, a team from Southampton University in England (led by Professor Nicholas Jennings [1] and consisting of Rajdeep Dash, Sarvapali Ramchurn, Alex Rogers, Perukrishnen Vytelingum) introduced a new strategy at the 20th-anniversary iterated prisoners' dilemma c…

I didn’t mean to imply that GTFT was discovered this year. I certainly don’t believe that. I’ll have a look at the wording, thanks.

Another interesting strategy mentioned by a commenter on the post is win-stay lose-shift, which reportedly outperforms GTFT: http://abel.math.harvard.edu/archive/153_fall_04/Additional_...

Re: The Prisoner's Dilemma: a summary, and new advances

#35
post #8
post #3

I played against extotionist strategy and I guess I got lucky because I'm leading (my score - 1) : (his score - 1) = 2:1 and won't change into 1:3 as advertised because from this step I will always defect. 25. You defected (1 points) and I defected (1 points) 24. You defected (1 points) and I defected (1 points) 23. You defected (1 points) and I defected (1 points) 22. You defected (1 points) and I defected (1 points…

> won't change into 1:3 as advertised because from this step I will always defect. From the description of the extortionist strategy in the demo: " The only way you can avoid being taken advantage of is to resign yourself to the meagre rewards of mutual defection, and to defect on every turn. " So: yes, indeed you can do that, but then your long-run score will be rotten because it will look like a vast succession of…

"The only way you can avoid being taken advantage of is to resign yourself to the meagre rewards of mutual defection, and to defect on every turn. If you do anything else then I will take advantage of your cooperation and I will do three times better than you, in the sense that – on average over the long run – (my score minus 1) will be thrice (your score minus 1)."

I was refering to that. I did something else than dfecting all the time and got better result than 1:3 but that's ok since 1:3 is average over all strategies.

Re: The Prisoner's Dilemma: a summary, and new advances

#36
post #32

The most interesting story on IPD (especially from a hacker perspective) wasn't mentioned: >Although tit for tat is considered to be the most robust basic strategy, a team from Southampton University in England (led by Professor Nicholas Jennings [1] and consisting of Rajdeep Dash, Sarvapali Ramchurn, Alex Rogers, Perukrishnen Vytelingum) introduced a new strategy at the 20th-anniversary iterated prisoners' dilemma c…

I didn’t mean to imply that GTFT was discovered this year. I certainly don’t believe that. I’ll have a look at the wording, thanks. Another interesting strategy mentioned by a commenter on the post is win-stay lose-shift, which reportedly outperforms GTFT: http://abel.math.harvard.edu/archive/153_fall_04/Additional_...

Yea, I didn't think you were but the wording was slightly unclear. Great article though.

Re: The Prisoner's Dilemma: a summary, and new advances

#37
I feel bad for game theorists. Any time an article talks about their field, the first paragraph has to be a frantic explanation of what the field is and why it's interesting, in terms a five-year-old could understand, and then the article always ends up just being about the prisoner's dilemma.

It would be as if every article about physics started out "How stuff moves is a really neat thing to study..." and then invariably ended up talking about the parabolic trajectories of projectiles.

Re: The Prisoner's Dilemma: a summary, and new advances

#38
post #13

If I were playing Split or Steal, my strategy would be exactly this: tell the other player that I'm going to choose "steal" and if they choose "split", I'll give them half of the winnings. We would shake on it on national television which forms a nice contract: an offer, consideration for both parties, and acceptance. The beauty of this is that if they're not an idiot they'll choose "split" and we each walk away with…

The thing that always bugged me about Golden Balls (aside from the terrible name) was the way stealers would act like it was just a game when they had in fact taken thousands of pounds from another person through deception. Certainly it was legal and even encouraged by the format of the show but it was never the right thing to do. I've seen people immediately regret doing it when they see that their opponent shared.…

Logically you'd split every time, it's safer and guaranteed. However the expectation that someone else is going to steal so you steal makes twisted sense in a 'if I can't have they can't have it' way, which is human nature in children through to adults.

Re: The Prisoner's Dilemma: a summary, and new advances

#39
post #32

The most interesting story on IPD (especially from a hacker perspective) wasn't mentioned: >Although tit for tat is considered to be the most robust basic strategy, a team from Southampton University in England (led by Professor Nicholas Jennings [1] and consisting of Rajdeep Dash, Sarvapali Ramchurn, Alex Rogers, Perukrishnen Vytelingum) introduced a new strategy at the 20th-anniversary iterated prisoners' dilemma c…

It's fantastic how these people were able to play the metagame like that.

I suspect that if you caught on to this, the best strategy would in fact be to impersonate the Southampton players, mimicking the ten-move dance, and then perpetually defect, assuring the best strategy against either the "always defect" or "always cooperate" players.

Re: The Prisoner's Dilemma: a summary, and new advances

#40
post #32

The most interesting story on IPD (especially from a hacker perspective) wasn't mentioned: >Although tit for tat is considered to be the most robust basic strategy, a team from Southampton University in England (led by Professor Nicholas Jennings [1] and consisting of Rajdeep Dash, Sarvapali Ramchurn, Alex Rogers, Perukrishnen Vytelingum) introduced a new strategy at the 20th-anniversary iterated prisoners' dilemma c…

It's fantastic how these people were able to play the metagame like that. I suspect that if you caught on to this, the best strategy would in fact be to impersonate the Southampton players, mimicking the ten-move dance, and then perpetually defect, assuring the best strategy against either the "always defect" or "always cooperate" players.

Absolutely.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuckoo#Brood_parasitism

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