131–136 of 136 posts
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And then what? They will be faced with a login prompt. Reading from disks is useless. My login password is strong.
Boot any Linux ISO and bypass any OS logins (secureboot would prevent this), connect devices over IO to otherwise exploit the login or just dump RAM content to potentially get data or even keys. I would never trust OS login over FDE especially on desktop.
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It's pretty fast to destroy all the keys in a TPM. Should take a minute if you know the right place to go. Meanwhile securely deleting a normal drive requires overwriting every sector with random data, which could take hours. So it also helps if you're giving away the whole machine.
Smashing the disk with a hammer takes seconds. Or dropping it in a shredder. Used disks are not worth hours of time to overwrite with random data. Just physically destroy them.
I don't understand why anyone would use passwordless disk encryption. It just seems inherently vulnerable, especially with the threat model of physical compromise. Entering a password on boot isn't even that much work
You do not even need to enter a password. Use a randomly generated key. Retrieve it from an USB drive at boot (it does it automagically), which contains everything, giving you full plausible deniability without it. It means literally everything you need to boot up is on the USB drive, and if you so want it, you can use 2 separate USB drives. This is for computers you have physical access to, of course. You will need…
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I was reading another web page (I don't have the link unfortunately) several days ago where another reader pointed out to the author the same type of attack mentioned in this article. To address that attack the author came up with the same solution you proposed and I do believe that is sufficient for preventing the type of attack mentioned in this article. There still are other types of attacks (cold boot attack, sni…
Found the page I had mentioned earlier: https://pawitp.medium.com/the-correct-way-to-use-secure-boot... . In the comments Aleksandar mentioned the possibility of using the attack mentioned in this article and the author replied back with the same solution of verifying a secret file on the root partition.
Funny to see that someone already thought of this attack in 2022
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's pretty fast to destroy all the keys in a TPM. Should take a minute if you know the right place to go. Meanwhile securely deleting a normal drive requires overwriting every sector with random data, which could take hours. So it also helps if you're giving away the whole machine.
Smashing the disk with a hammer takes seconds. Or dropping it in a shredder. Used disks are not worth hours of time to overwrite with random data. Just physically destroy them.
Capping off the PCRs with any arbitrary value before execing into root would stop this.