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Google serving sponsored link to Homebrew site clone with malware

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Re: Google serving sponsored link to Homebrew site clone with malware

#21
post #14

I don't get what non-malicious reason there would be for not automatically verifying domain ownership of display urls as an advertising network. The advertiser is highly likely to already have a Search Console account in which they'd have had to verify it, and URL verification is easily done by all kinds of systems via meta tags, CNAME or TXT entries, etc. Why not for ads?

Well… marketing and web development are often at war with one another inside individual organizations. And the person running the ads almost never has domain-verification authority. So Google doesn’t want to introduce a major barrier to accept money. I think that makes sense without being malicious.

The attack vector for scams seems immediately apparent, so this just seems very negligent.

It also reduces the risk for advertisers as the profit from taking over an ad account is less if you can't direct users to malware from an account with good standing (of course there are still other ways to show malicious ads).

Re: Google serving sponsored link to Homebrew site clone with malware

#22
post #16
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's explained in replies to the tweet, Google apparently lets you specify a "display URL", that's updated immediately but only verified within 24h for trusted accounts. ( https://eligrey.com/blog/link-fraud/ )

Ah thank you! Replies are not visible without a Twitter account so I didn't see that. Seems like an absolutely terrible idea.

fyi you can modify the URL to xcancel.com to view replies

Re: Google serving sponsored link to Homebrew site clone with malware

#23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Presumably it's so you see the nice destination URL, and not the link tracking URL.

The intent is clear, yes. But given how well-known this problem is by now, I would expect a company of the size of Google to have a practical solution to combat this sort of scam, e.g. requiring that the vanity URL points to page containing a specific advertiser ID in the HTML source, or that the canonical URL of the URL with tracking parameters points to the vanity URL, etc... There's so many solutions to this probl…

Yeah, agreed. Or even that the advertiser has a subdomain of the target, like set your DNS of stats.brew.sh (I know they weren't actually buying ads, but just as an example) to be an IP of the tracking system, and then you can just verify the domain names match again.

Re: Google serving sponsored link to Homebrew site clone with malware

#24

Any advice on what to do if you might be a victim to this?

Apparently, it was collecting passwords from victim machines. So, step one would be to remove everything the script put onto your machine. Step two would be to change your passwords.

Step one is to unplug the machine from the internet. Step two is to use another machine to change all your passwords, starting with the “pivot” passwords - your password manager master password, your email accounts, your AppleID, your mobile provider - followed by financial accounts and then all others. While changing passwords, make sure to “invalidate all sessions” where possible.

Only after you’ve done all this should you move onto Step 3: reformat your computer and install the OS from scratch.

Re: Google serving sponsored link to Homebrew site clone with malware

#25

Any advice on what to do if you might be a victim to this?

Apparently, it was collecting passwords from victim machines. So, step one would be to remove everything the script put onto your machine. Step two would be to change your passwords.

Is there any way to check if you're affected? I just happened to install Homebrew while the malicious site was up and now I'm not sure if I installed the legit version.

Re: Google serving sponsored link to Homebrew site clone with malware

#26
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Apparently, it was collecting passwords from victim machines. So, step one would be to remove everything the script put onto your machine. Step two would be to change your passwords.

Is there any way to check if you're affected? I just happened to install Homebrew while the malicious site was up and now I'm not sure if I installed the legit version.

Check if /tmp/update exists. If it does, you’re infected.

Re: Google serving sponsored link to Homebrew site clone with malware

#28
Every time there's this kind of news, there's always other comments with similar news: https://x.com/alexrozanski/status/1881043544204599330 (or https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitwarden/comments/1cwc0r9/caution_...)

And then some people here attacked content blocker users with:

> Why would I, as a developer whose income stream is based on advertising, intentionally cater to users who are costing me money?

> you're destroying the open web

If even the FBI calls out your industry[1], sorry, your AdTech industry, your source of income is beyond broken now.

[1]: https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2022/PSA221221

Re: Google serving sponsored link to Homebrew site clone with malware

#29

Any advice on what to do if you might be a victim to this?

I'd isolate the machine from the internet, change my passwords from a trusted machine, save the media and documents from the isolated machine, and then reinstall the OS / factory reset the isolated machine. Still, I'm sure that there are technical possibilities that this doesn't account for, but I think I would be okay with the procedure nevertheless.

Re: Google serving sponsored link to Homebrew site clone with malware

#30
post #26
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is there any way to check if you're affected? I just happened to install Homebrew while the malicious site was up and now I'm not sure if I installed the legit version.

Check if /tmp/update exists. If it does, you’re infected.

I think the malware tries to delete this file. So, it won't be a reliable method to identify whether you were infected.
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