Huh - the implications of this time period reach much farther than I would have expected. I recall switching from a small, regional cellular carrier to Cingular with the launch of the iPhone 3G. It only now occurred to me that I'm still there. I stayed with Cingular when it became AT&T, and still have service through them. For that matter, the service has significantly expanded; I now have tablets, watches, and four…
Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
401–410 of 538 posts
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#402Earlier quoted context omitted.
I had the original iPhone, then swapped it for a flagship android and hated it. I tried Windows Phone out a few years later and loved it and had two of them over the years. Some apps didn't exist for it and that sucked, but the OS was snappy and something different that I really liked. The Nokia windows phones were great. I knew it was doomed though as when I got them from the carrier, I was apparently like the only…
My cousin says the same thing... 25 year IT veteran. Early adopter for almost all new tech. He says his 1000-whatever Lumia phone was one of the best phones he ever owned. I know it ran Windows Phone OS, and I remember playing with it a bit.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#403Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nokia was dead company walking before Stephen Elop. Elop saw the writing on the wall and made one of the choices available. A different CEO would have made a different choice but ultimately at that point it would still have been too late to save Nokia. Nokia was a great hardware company that missed the boat when the market changed to be based around software. When the market changed again to be based around ecosystem…
> made a different choice but ultimately at that point it would still have been too late to save Nokia. You think if they made just a single decision different and bet on Android instead of Windows, they would be in the same spot today? I wouldn't be so sure. Samsung hedged their bets across both and succeeded. Both weren't great at in-house software and Nokia made better hardware.
I don't think that would have succeeded against Samsung and the Nexus phones.
But TBH I think going with Android would have a better move than what Elop did.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#404Earlier quoted context omitted.
I remember having a Windows PDA when I was in college, and developing a bit on top of Windows M. It was a reasonable platform. But Microsoft was too greedy with their licensing schemes and demanding too much adaptation from the hardware and chip manufacturers. You’d think they would adapt their OS and drivers, but no, you had to tape out new silicon for them. So they’ve lost the mobile OS market. It feels like someth…
Windows Phone had pretty much nothing in common with WinCE/WinMo PDAs that preceded it, at least from user and app developer perspective.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#405Earlier quoted context omitted.
IMO it's shocking that this _did not_ happen in cars, in past tense. Model S launched 12 years ago. Apple replaced Nokia in 4 years. Model Y was the second best selling car worldwide, supposedly, after a Toyota and followed by a Toyota. Tesla has market share of about 2.3% globally and stays out of top 10. iPhone became de facto definition of a phone. In less than 5 years from nothing. Tesla is... not that.
Cellular is to smartphones that charging is to EV's. Apple launched in a market with comprehensive cellular coverage. The charging stations grid is still being built out, so Tesla was in a completely different situation circa 2013.
Same just didn't happen with Tesla.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#4062007. The presentation reads like an eerily accurate crystal-ball prediction of what actually happened in subsequent years. Evidently, Nokia executives knew well in advance what the iPhone could do to their company. Evidently, they knew they needed to do "something" to avoid an implosion of their mobile-phone business. Evidently, despite their prescience and best efforts, they were unable to avoid disaster. It's as i…
But it also showed they didn't actually understand the significance of what was happening.
They thought essentially "all this fancy stuff will redefine 'cool', the 'high end'". They imagined a mid-range phone with special email features could slow the iPhone - ie, they imagined phone makers dribbling out features per dollar. But the real lesson of the iPhone was "the 'phone' is going to become a general purpose computing device with multiple connections to the world and hardware features controlled by general purpose software".
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#407Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nokia was dead company walking before Stephen Elop. Elop saw the writing on the wall and made one of the choices available. A different CEO would have made a different choice but ultimately at that point it would still have been too late to save Nokia. Nokia was a great hardware company that missed the boat when the market changed to be based around software. When the market changed again to be based around ecosystem…
Was there with the company as intern and junior during Nokia and Microsoft days for Nokia Maps. In my opinion Microsoft fumbled the app store by bloating it with questionable KPIs on number of added apps by anyone able to submit templates apps, while not getting key apps like WhatsApp on board. S\so it was a hard sell to have people's ecosystems. Same syndrome as with Zune, Tablet PC, and Microsoft Store on Windows.…
Worse than that. IIRC, Microsoft ran contests which specifically incentivized developers to create as many apps as possible, and most of the apps they got as a result were garbage (like copies of developer examples with some of the text changed).
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#408Huh - the implications of this time period reach much farther than I would have expected. I recall switching from a small, regional cellular carrier to Cingular with the launch of the iPhone 3G. It only now occurred to me that I'm still there. I stayed with Cingular when it became AT&T, and still have service through them. For that matter, the service has significantly expanded; I now have tablets, watches, and four…
that should all run you sub-$200/month (I have 5 phones, 4 watches, 1 tablet - $178/month (which I think it is still to high and am getting ready to call att to negotiate again or switch))
Note that this is not all cellular service; I typically buy contract-subsidized devices. There's really no reason not to, as it's the same cost as buying them elsewhere but paid over two years. The effect of inflation alone on that deferred debt is about the same as what I could save on service by changing carriers.
Also, I and my family use our devices extensively. It's not uncommon for us to hit 1TB of cellular data in a month.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#409Huh - the implications of this time period reach much farther than I would have expected. I recall switching from a small, regional cellular carrier to Cingular with the launch of the iPhone 3G. It only now occurred to me that I'm still there. I stayed with Cingular when it became AT&T, and still have service through them. For that matter, the service has significantly expanded; I now have tablets, watches, and four…
A bit off the topic, but your bill is bonkers to me. We have unlimited data + unlimited calls for 39€.
Where I live is quite rural, with my county having a population density of ~35 people/mile^2 (or ~13.5 people/km^2). Median income here is low relative to most of the US, but not compared to Europe.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#410Earlier quoted context omitted.
The iPod applied the same strategy. When it launched it only worked on Macs with a FireWire port, meaning <10% of the personal computer market.
Also less space than a Nomad. The killer feature of the iPod was the iTunes music store. Everybody was sick of the hoops the companies made you jump through to buy songs. Singles were basically out of fashion thanks to the domination of the CD, but most bands only released one or two good songs on a CD meaning each song cost like $5 and you had to rip it yourself and transfer it to whatever device you had, which was…
That wasn't launched until 2003, two years after the iPod, and it took a while for all the big music labels to sign on. (Hell, it took until 2010 for the Beatles to show up.) The iPod was a success even without the music store; while it wasn't the only portable digital music player on the market, or even the first, it was the first good one.