Anyone have a working link?
Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
311–320 of 538 posts
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#312Nokia saw the iPhone, fast-forward to 2014, Nokia just gives up and sells their dead horse cellphone business to Microsoft. Microsoft casts a few necromancy spells and also just gives up 3 years later, and kills the same dead horse again. The end.
...and then they made some Android foldables that went nowhere. The end?
I expect to see a new Windows Phone in around 2030.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#313Earlier quoted context omitted.
I somehow fail to see this as the most I want in a car is confort and perhaps space not screen time. A killer feature for a car would be FSD but that’s not an “iPhone” thing. BYD and the other Chinese manage to sell good EVs for great prices but I don’t see them irreplaceable like the iPhone. Maybe they are the new Toyota but not the iPhone. Same goes with Tesla though it’s more complicated because Tesla keeps promis…
It's all about marketing. You buy the thing that has the best marketing, not the best thing. That's how Apple replaced all these other smartphone vendors.
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Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#314Earlier quoted context omitted.
Was this around the time Microsoft kept switching what "windows phone" was? I remember that the one friend who got into it loved it, and then they released something completely incompatible and he abandoned the platform.
2009 and earlier: Windows Mobile was based on WinCE. The UI was garbage but the innards were pretty functional, and there was desktop-like multitasking. Unpopular opinion: they should have just done a UI refresh of that thing and moved it to an NT kernel. There were a lot of cool third party hacks on this platform. 2010: Windows Phone 7 was still WinCE, but they removed full access to WinCE APIs, and got rid of PC st…
At the time Steve Jobs was putting his foot down against allowing Flash on the iPhone because the performance was so pants, Microsoft was going all in on Silverlight which had exactly the same problem.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#315Earlier quoted context omitted.
>they understand what they were facing Parts of the deck suggest that they didn't fully understand what they were facing. For example, the bullet "scaling the user experience to lower HW specs may be challenging. iPhone mini may be closer to iPod UI" comment still suggests they were stuck in the mindset of the time. They thought it was unlikely that Apple could deliver a horizontal platform, rather Apple would be lau…
also that most of the deck is about the hardware. There is almost no understanding of the software needed for an iPhone UI.
However "Develop Touch UI" is point #2 on their action item list, after partnering with TMobile.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#316Earlier quoted context omitted.
Lund working on feature phones! My job was writing and managing test suites for verifying the J2ME implementation. It was a top secret collaboration with Motorola. They took QA work extremely seriously and bugs could delay major launches. Unfortunately for them, "rock solid J2ME" wasn't really what customers were after. :)
SE's J2ME implementation was top notch. It just worked and it was fast.
(Nokia's also worked but was slow. Everyone else's implementations tended to be both broken and slow. A particular shoutout to Samsung - they must have had 6+ separate, broken implementations.)
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#3172007. The presentation reads like an eerily accurate crystal-ball prediction of what actually happened in subsequent years. Evidently, Nokia executives knew well in advance what the iPhone could do to their company. Evidently, they knew they needed to do "something" to avoid an implosion of their mobile-phone business. Evidently, despite their prescience and best efforts, they were unable to avoid disaster. It's as i…
Well, there are also a lot of assumptions and complaints about the iPhone and its impact that were commonly made at the time that ultimately didn't matter:
- Has no changeable battery
- Has no physical keyboard
- Is too expensive
- Has no support for Java applications
They clearly thought that these might be potential vectors for attacking the newcomer, but none of it worked out. Rather than having to play the game that the legacy phone makers like Nokia were playing, Apple just changed the entire game, and now Nokia et al were suddenly playing at a disadvantage where their existing knowledge and experience didn't really matter.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#318Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think even when companies project arrogance from their c-suite, it’s more to keep the market happy and calm nerves. I’d be shocked if RIM wasn’t also sweating bullets internally after that iPhone presentation. They weren’t morons, and saw what happened with iPods.
Losing the Signal: How BlackBerry’s bid to one-up the iPhone failed : https://archive.ph/IgW6s > In the summer of 2007, however, Lazaridis cracked open a phone that gave him pause. “They’ve put a Mac in this thing,” he marvelled after peering inside one of the new iPhones. > Lazaridis shared the revelation with his handset engineers, who had been pushing to expand BlackBerry’s Internet reach for years. Before, Lazari…
Mike Lazaridis is may have his blind spots, but he is a great engineer by all accounts.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#319Earlier quoted context omitted.
Was this around the time Microsoft kept switching what "windows phone" was? I remember that the one friend who got into it loved it, and then they released something completely incompatible and he abandoned the platform.
Yes... If I remember we were aiming for the newly released "Windows 8"-based Phone OS, and the previous version was fully incompatible with it so all apps had to be redone. Tiles were the new thing to build for.
Microsoft tried to do the same thing on the Desktop side too, but on the desktop they were forced to keep the backwards compatibility in place so it didn't finish off the platform the way it did on the Phone side.
Amusingly Microsoft is still trying to make the walled garden happen. Lots of cheap Windows laptops and Desktops ship in what is called "Windows S" mode where only Microsoft Store apps are allowed to run. But again because PC owners don't abide that kind of bullcrap they also have to supply a way to tear down the walls (it's surprisingly easy, albeit permanent: just download and run a free app from the Windows store) if you want to use the machine in a normal way.
Re: Nokia's internal presentation after iPhone was launched (2007) [pdf]
#320Uploaded the PDF here: https://files.catbox.moe/y94qdz.pdf