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Google’s OAuth login doesn’t protect against purchasing a failed startup domain

trufflesecurity.com

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Re: Google’s OAuth login doesn’t protect against purchasing a failed startup domain

#3
> They also classified the issue as a “Fraud and abuse” issue, rather than an Oauth/login issue.

I can _kinda_ see that, I agree they should mitigate it as best as possible too though, especially since they're Google after all.

> I thought this would be the end of the story, but 3 months later, they re-opened my ticket (after my Shmoocon talk was accepted), paid a $1337 bounty, and said they were working on a fix.

Sad how the only way to get Google's attention to make enough noise about something...

Re: Google’s OAuth login doesn’t protect against purchasing a failed startup domain

#6
post #2

I would be curious if any other Identity Providers that implement OAuth have mitigations for this issue. If you used sign in with Microsoft or Okta or PingFederate, would those provide different claims to the service?

Every provider has their own set of flaws.

Microsoft had a flaw for awhile where you could just change a user’s email to anything with no verification.. and if the SSO implementer was only checking the email field, you could impersonate anyone.

Re: Google’s OAuth login doesn’t protect against purchasing a failed startup domain

#7
It's not 100% clear to me, from reading TFA, what the actual vuln is.

Suppose DankStartup folds and I, being a morally-dubious sort of fellow, purchase dankstartup.net which I then use to sign into DankStartup's O365, or DankStartup's ChatGPT as a DankStartup employee.

Isn't that a failure on DankStartup's part, to not shut down their business accounts? And isn't it also a failure on e.g. Microsoft or OpenAI's parts, since they're providing service to a defunct business entity who can't pay its bills?

To describe this as a vuln in oauth doesn't really make sense to me.

Re: Google’s OAuth login doesn’t protect against purchasing a failed startup domain

#8
post #2

I would be curious if any other Identity Providers that implement OAuth have mitigations for this issue. If you used sign in with Microsoft or Okta or PingFederate, would those provide different claims to the service?

Ideally the trust with the SP would be using a cert. This requires the SP to implement this portion of the standard and the IT department to follow through with implementing a cert. The cert can be self-generated, so there isn't a cost for the cert itself.

Re: Google’s OAuth login doesn’t protect against purchasing a failed startup domain

#9
> Shmoocon talk accepted - Dec 9, 2024, Google re-opens issue - Dec 19, 2024

Wondering what the internal process there was at Google? Is someone's job to cruise around the various conferences and dev events to look for any Google mentions and report back. Did Google really consider it an issue or just wanted it avoid looking bad in public after the talk was accepted.

Re: Google’s OAuth login doesn’t protect against purchasing a failed startup domain

#10

It's not 100% clear to me, from reading TFA, what the actual vuln is. Suppose DankStartup folds and I, being a morally-dubious sort of fellow, purchase dankstartup.net which I then use to sign into DankStartup's O365, or DankStartup's ChatGPT as a DankStartup employee. Isn't that a failure on DankStartup's part, to not shut down their business accounts? And isn't it also a failure on e.g. Microsoft or OpenAI's parts,…

The contention isn't that you can impersonate DankStartup, that's obviously not a vulnerability since you are indeed the domain owner. It's that former entities with DankStartup accounts might have used OAuth to create relationships of their own. And when the startup folds, they don't magically disappear.

Basically if Sally, the CTO of DankStartup, signed up for Taskrabbit or whatnot, it's possible for you as the owner of the domain to impersonate Sally in the context of that relationship.

Obviously the root cause here is that someone misused an account to do something not related to the business. And the actual impact is probably low since high value services tend strongly not to take tiny email domains as identity roots (i.e. sally@dankstartup.com clearly doesn't have a Vanguard account to steal).

So... like most security announcements it's oversold and spun. But it's real enough as I read it.

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