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Right to root access

medhir.com

81–90 of 428 posts

Re: Right to root access

#81
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This, or even sell "dev units" with the bootloader unlocked so that you explicitly have to accept the risk before purchasing the device. The problem though is that rooting by itself is not that useful when a lot of apps use remote attestation to deny you service if you're rooted. We don't just need root access, we need undetectable root access.

> We don't just need root access, we need undetectable root access. At some point the argument morphs from 'I should be able to do whatever I want with my device' to 'I should be able to access your service/device with whatever I want'. The fact that Google allows this shows that 1. Apple could do it with zero security impact on anyone who doesn't opt in 2. They could keep any service-based profit source intact But t…

> At some point the argument morphs from 'I should be able to do whatever I want with my device' to 'I should be able to access your service/device with whatever I want'.

I'm not demanding to be able to log in to your service/device and replace IIS with Apache on it. I'm just demanding to be able to access it as a normal user with Firefox instead of Chrome.

Re: Right to root access

#82
post #78
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Please detail this attack vector where someone can compromise a phone with an unlockable bootloader but not one you can't unlock.

That's not what I claimed?

> it's also about adversaries that may have physical access to your device and can provide that consent. No matter how convoluted you make the rube goldberg machine to bypass the cryptography, if there's a way to bypass it it will be bypassed

You claimed that an adversary with physical access to your device can compromise your unlockable phone, but presumably this won't happen with a phone that can't be unlocked. Is that not what you claim? If so, please detail how.

Re: Right to root access

#84
post #63
post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's a difference between being able to buy something dangerous and being forced to do so

Forced? I'm not sure I understand. My guess is that you're assuming, wrongly, that vendor locked devices are "safe" and unlocked devices are "unsafe". All computers that are connected to the internet are unsafe in some ways. The most dangerous apps on your computer are the vendor's own built-in web browser and messaging app. Also, the vendor-controlled software stores are unsafe cesspools. You will never find a more…

Today, yes, I can lock down the iPhone I give to my son, but if it can be unlocked to run arbitrary software then he can in theory unlock it. Yes, it is on me to continue to monitor the device to make sure he hasn't done it, but the point stands

And the assumption you refer to, there are varying definitions for "safe". Is a device with a locked bootloader 100% safe in all use cases and all circumstances? Of course not. But me being able to reasonably trust that someone hasn't put a compromised version of the OS on the device, or, won't be able to put a different firmware on the device to brute force my encrypted contents is a bit of safety in a certain set of circumstances that I want in my device

If Apple, or anyone else, were precluded from locking the boot loader yes, I would be forced to buy a device that the FBI or anyone else could in theory poke around on enough to try to get at my data

Re: Right to root access

#85
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> We don't just need root access, we need undetectable root access. At some point the argument morphs from 'I should be able to do whatever I want with my device' to 'I should be able to access your service/device with whatever I want'. The fact that Google allows this shows that 1. Apple could do it with zero security impact on anyone who doesn't opt in 2. They could keep any service-based profit source intact But t…

> At some point the argument morphs from 'I should be able to do whatever I want with my device' to 'I should be able to access your service/device with whatever I want'. I'm not demanding to be able to log in to your service/device and replace IIS with Apache on it. I'm just demanding to be able to access it as a normal user with Firefox instead of Chrome.

I'm not saying you shouldn't be able to access from unlocked devices. I'm just saying it's a different argument.

Re: Right to root access

#86
post #84
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Forced? I'm not sure I understand. My guess is that you're assuming, wrongly, that vendor locked devices are "safe" and unlocked devices are "unsafe". All computers that are connected to the internet are unsafe in some ways. The most dangerous apps on your computer are the vendor's own built-in web browser and messaging app. Also, the vendor-controlled software stores are unsafe cesspools. You will never find a more…

Today, yes, I can lock down the iPhone I give to my son, but if it can be unlocked to run arbitrary software then he can in theory unlock it. Yes, it is on me to continue to monitor the device to make sure he hasn't done it, but the point stands And the assumption you refer to, there are varying definitions for "safe". Is a device with a locked bootloader 100% safe in all use cases and all circumstances? Of course no…

> Today, yes, I can lock down the iPhone I give to my son, but if it can be unlocked to run arbitrary software then he can in theory unlock it. Yes, it is on me to continue to monitor the device to make sure he hasn't done it, but the point stands

You're scared of the wrong thing. The greater danger isn't arbitrary software but rather your son running up massive App Store charges on IAP of exploitative games and other scams. And if you think Apple will refund you, think again. Locking the device to the crApp Store isn't the solution. To the contrary, the solution is to enable parental controls to prevent access to the crApp Store.

> But me being able to reasonably trust that someone hasn't put a compromised version of the OS on the device, or, won't be able to put a different firmware on the device to brute force my encrypted contents is a bit of safety in a certain set of circumstances that I want in my device

These are possible without vendor lockdown. Devices can be and are designed so that the consumer can lock the device down and prevent modification, etc. Of course you can't constrain yourself, if you have the credentials to unlock the device, but you can constrain everyone else, whether they're children on the one hand or thieves/attackers on the other.

Re: Right to root access

#87
post #79
post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are ways to do it so that 'bypass' means you effectively wipe the device. If that's not good enough, how do you protect against them just replacing your device with a compromised one that looks similar?

So because we can't eliminate every possibility, we should just give up on all protections?

I think you are misunderstanding my point. You aren't giving anything up by enabling unlocking if the act of unlocking wipes the device.

Re: Right to root access

#88
post #82
post #78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's not what I claimed?

> it's also about adversaries that may have physical access to your device and can provide that consent. No matter how convoluted you make the rube goldberg machine to bypass the cryptography, if there's a way to bypass it it will be bypassed You claimed that an adversary with physical access to your device can compromise your unlockable phone, but presumably this won't happen with a phone that can't be unlocked. Is…

I was talking about a device with an unlockable bootloader, not one that cannot be unlocked

Wanting an uncompromisable bootloader is about more than just protection against malware that might modify the software on the device, it's about protecting a phone that can be unlocked from having the software modified by someone with the ability to provide the consent that the end-user would normally give. For example when I hand my phone over in customs, or if it's seized by the police. If my bootloader is not unlockable, I haven't provided them with the keys to unlock the software, and those keys are reasonably strong, then I can be reasonably confident they haven't compromised by device

But, if they can unlock the bootloader for whatever reason, I have no idea now what is running on the device or what was run on it even if they restore it back to a locked condition

Re: Right to root access

#89
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And consumers can have that. That doesn't mean I should be unable to unlock my phone and do whatever I want with it.

The problem is not the ability to unlock your phone. The problem is that 90% of people unlocking their phones will either be for piracy (against the company’s interests), or against the customer's own interests (stalkerware, data extraction, sale of stolen devices). There is a reason malware is over 50 times as prevalent on Android.

Having worked on catching Android malware, I can assure you that Android malware does not proliferate because people can unlock their phones.

Re: Right to root access

#90
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And consumers can have that. That doesn't mean I should be unable to unlock my phone and do whatever I want with it.

The problem is not the ability to unlock your phone. The problem is that 90% of people unlocking their phones will either be for piracy (against the company’s interests), or against the customer's own interests (stalkerware, data extraction, sale of stolen devices). There is a reason malware is over 50 times as prevalent on Android.

Given that the vast majority of Android devices aren't rooted, bootloader unlocked, or even installing apps from outside the store(s) that they ship with, what exactly do you think is the reason for more malware on Android? (Taking the claim at face value)
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