61–64 of 64 posts
What is with everybody suggesting this or that browser? They're all going to be fingerprintable. Using a less common browser just makes that easier... not that it will ever be hard. You might get some relief from some tracking, including via fingerprinting, by using comprehensive ad and tracking blockers. Or you might not, since CDNs are still probably going to track you.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> QubesOS is great if you need to do work and personal stuff on the same computer This is significantly underestimating the benefits of Qubes. Are you using your online banking in the same browser that you use for random web surfing? I do it in separate VMs with hardware isolation. Same compartmentalization with all other things. > You are still just as vulnerable or more vulnerable to malware stealing browser sessio…
> This is significantly underestimating the benefits of Qubes. Are you using your online banking in the same browser that you use for random web surfing? I do it in separate VMs with hardware isolation. Same compartmentalization with all other things. What about NetVM? All AppVMs us that so what if that get's compromised? Since the templates are not hardened at all, could the attacker jump from NetVM to AppVM? > I'm…
> So that means layered security is totally meaningless and instead of keeping it default, let's remove mitigations?
Security in depth is definitely important, but it would provide a smaller improvement compared with the virtualization. Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater by refusing to use Qubes without hardening. Also, Qubes developers do have plans to implement more hardening: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5294, https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5461, https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8823 etc.
> Each of those dedicated VMs would need their own AppVMs at least.
This would provide more security in depth but if you never run installed software in your AppVMs, it would still be reasonably secure.