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Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

lapcatsoftware.com

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Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#121

> On macOS, I can usually prevent Apple software from phoning home by using Little Snitch. Unfortunately, Apple doesn't allow anything like Little Snitch on iOS. On Android, NetGuard uses a "local VPN" to firewall outgoing traffic. Could the same be done on iOS, or does Apple network traffic bypass VPNs? Lockdown mentions ads, but not Apple servers, https://lockdownprivacy.com/ . Apple does publish IP ranges for diff…

An iOS "local VPN" could definitely block all traffic to Apple IP ranges. But it lacks the ability to associate traffic with the originating process/framework. Like if, for example, I wanted to only allow iMessage to talk to Apple but nothing else. This is what Little Snitch and other software gives you on macOS/Linux/etc.

But even blanket blocking of all Apple IP ranges probably wouldn't do anything here. As documented, your device sends noise injected image vectors to OHTTP relays and doesn't contact Apple directly. By definition those relays are operated by 3rd parties. So if you consider this type of data "phoning home" you'll need to find the IPs of all of OHTTP relays iOS uses. (or block the traffic that looks up the OHTTP relays).

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#122
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think I'm saying: you're not sending "your data" off device. You are sending a homomorphically encrypted locally differentially private vector (through an anonymous proxy). No consumer can really understand what that means, what the risks are, and how it would compare to the risk of sending someone like Facebook/Google raw data. I'm asking: what does an opt in for that really look like? You're not going to be able…

In response your second question, opt in would look exactly like this: don't have the box checked by default, with an option to enable it: "use this to improve local search, we will create an encrypted index of your data to send securely to our servers, etc..." A PhD is not necessary to understand the distinction between storing data locally on a machine vs. on the internet.

Even here with HN crowd: it's not an index, it's not stored on a server, and it's not typical send-securely encryption (not PK or symmetric "encrypted in transit", but homomorphic "encrypted processing"). Users will think that's all gibberish (ask a user if they want to send an index or vector representation? no clue).

Sure, you can ask users "do you want to use this". But why do we ask that? Historically it's user consent (knowingly opting in), and legal requirements around privacy. We don't have that pop up on any random new feature, it's gated to ones with some risk. There are questions to ask: does this technical method have any privacy risk? Can the user make informed consent? Again: I'm not pitching we ditch opt-in (I really don't have a fix in mind), but I feel like we're defaulting too quickly to "old tools for new problems". The old way is services=collection=consent. These are new privacy technologies which use a service, but the privacy is applied locally before leaving your device, and you don't need to trust the service (if you trust the DP/HE research).

End of the day: I'd really like to see more systems like this. I think there were technically flawed statements in the original blog article under discussion. I think new design methods might be needed when new technologies come into play. I don't have any magic answers.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#123
Completely, 100% agreed:

> the only way to guarantee computing privacy is to not send data off the device.

> It ought to be up to the individual user to decide their own tolerance for the risk of privacy violations. [...] By enabling the "feature" without asking, Apple disrespects users and their preferences. I never wanted my iPhone to phone home to Apple.

Regardless of how obfuscated or "secure" or otherwise "privacy-protecting" the feature is, the fact is that some information derived from one's personal content is transmitted, without prior consent. Even if the information is protected, all network queries are information. A timestamp that proves you took a certain action at a certain time (like taking a photo, assuming stuff is sent to this service immediately upon adding a new photo), from a certain location (by correlating your location information at that time), etc etc.. and that's just the tip of the iceberg. Transmitting information from a user's device without their explicit consent is a violation of their privacy.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#124
post #114

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> letting the feds see every time you use the product This does not happen.

Wrong. Anything that makes any network request is by definition a privacy leak. The network itself is always listening, and the act of making any connection says that you are using the computer, and where, and when.

And so in this context.

You are saying that every network request is going to a target controlled by the US government.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#125
post #95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I appreciate the explanation. However, I think you do not address the main problem, which is that my data is being sent off my device by default and without any (reasonable) notice. Many users may agree to such a feature (as you say, it may be very secure), but to assume that everyone ought to be opted in by default is the issue.

Notice is always good and Apple should implement notice. However, "my data is being sent off my device" is incorrect, as GP explained. Metadata, derived from your data, with noise added to make it irreversible, is being sent off your device. It's the equivalent of sending an MD5 of your password somewhere; you may still object, but it is not factually correct to say your password was transmitted.

[deleted]

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#126

To me it seems like a reasonable feature that was, for the most part, implemented with great consideration for user privacy, though maybe I’m too trusting of the description. I mostly think this article is rage-bait and one should be wary of ‘falling for it’ when it shows up on hacker news in much the same way that one should be wary when rage-bait articles show up in tabloids or on Facebook. It seems likely to me th…

Literally all Apple needed to do was not have it enabled by default. Sending stuff over the network without asking is why trust in Apple is reduced further and further.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#127

To me it seems like a reasonable feature that was, for the most part, implemented with great consideration for user privacy, though maybe I’m too trusting of the description. I mostly think this article is rage-bait and one should be wary of ‘falling for it’ when it shows up on hacker news in much the same way that one should be wary when rage-bait articles show up in tabloids or on Facebook. It seems likely to me th…

if anyone else had done this then yes probably it's reasonable feature done reasonably. The problem is Apple has spent tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars advertising that they don't do things like this. That stuff stays on your iPhone unlike that other OS run by yucky advertising company. Apple would never siphon your data, because they care and you aren't the product.

Shit like this, reasonable in isolation or not, undermines that story completely. If they are so willing to just outright lie on a massive billboard, what else will they do when profits demand it?

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#128
post #11

"I don't understand most of the technical details of Apple's blog post" I do: - Client side vectorization: the photo is processed locally, preparing a non-reversible vector representation before sending (think semantic hash). - Differential privacy: a decent amount of noise is added the the vector before sending it. Enough to make it impossible to reverse lookup the vector. The noise level here is ε = 0.8, which is q…

I appreciate the explanation. However, I think you do not address the main problem, which is that my data is being sent off my device by default and without any (reasonable) notice. Many users may agree to such a feature (as you say, it may be very secure), but to assume that everyone ought to be opted in by default is the issue.

Do you consider your data to include non-reversible hashes of your data injected with random noise? I'm not sure I consider that my data. Its also not even really meta-data about my data.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#129
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think I'm saying: you're not sending "your data" off device. You are sending a homomorphically encrypted locally differentially private vector (through an anonymous proxy). No consumer can really understand what that means, what the risks are, and how it would compare to the risk of sending someone like Facebook/Google raw data. I'm asking: what does an opt in for that really look like? You're not going to be able…

In response your second question, opt in would look exactly like this: don't have the box checked by default, with an option to enable it: "use this to improve local search, we will create an encrypted index of your data to send securely to our servers, etc..." A PhD is not necessary to understand the distinction between storing data locally on a machine vs. on the internet.

I Think the best response is make it how iCloud storage works. The option is keep my stuff on the local device or use iCloud.

Re: Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15

#130
This whole thing is reminding me of the outrage over Apple and Google's privacy preserving 'Exposure Notification System' system from the Covid years. It defies intuition that they can alert you to exposure without also tracking you, but indeed that's what the technology lets you do.

Similarly here, it feels like the author is leaning into a knee jerk reaction about invasion of privacy without really trying to evaluate the effectiveness of the technologies here (client side vectorization, differential privacy, OHTTP relays, and homomorphic encryption).

Though I 100% agree Apple should ask the user for consent first for a feature like this.

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