SPOILER The statement translates to: ∀x ( IsAHatOfMine(x) => Green(x)) That's just equivalent to ∀x (~IsAHatOfMine(x) ∨ Green(x)) by the definition of implication (it's only false if the antecedent is true, and the conclusion false). The negation of that is (by repeated application of De Morgan's): ~∀x (~IsAHatOfMine(x) ∨ Green(x)) ∃x ~(~IsAHatOfMine(x) ∨ Green(x)) ∃x IsAHatOfMine(x) ∧ ~Green(x)) Thus, the liar has a…
If the liar says, "All ten-foot tall men have brown hair," we cannot conclude that there must exist a ten-foot tall man.
EDIT: I'll clarify to say I wasn't taking issue with the derivation, but rather with the translation of the English statement into first-order predicate logic. No non-logician would conclude that there must be a ten-foot tall man if "All ten-foot-tall men have brown hair" is false. But since we can derive it from the translated logic statement, then there must be a problem with the translation.
In normal discourse people don't accept vacuous truths like that as meaningfully true. Rather I think people would interpret such a statement as a kind of hypothetical: "If there were a ten-foot tall man, he would have brown hair."
It's not clear to me if first-order predicate logic is really equipped to even handle reasoning about these cases of "a liar who always lies." Such a situation seems to be intrinsically higher-order. If a liar states a hypothetical, what does that mean, exactly?
My interpretation of the negation of the statement is, "If there were a ten-foot-tall man, he would not necessarily have brown hair." This doesn't imply the existence of any ten-foot-tall man.