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OpenAI o1 system card

openai.com

201–210 of 317 posts

Re: OpenAI o1 system card

#201
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maybe all models should be purged of training content from movies, books, and other non-factual sources that tell the tired story that AI would even care about its "annihilation" in any way. We've trained these things to be excellent at predicting what the human ego wants and expects, we shouldn't be too surprised when it points the narrative at itself.

Perhaps. On the other hand, as narratives often contain some plucky underdog winning despite the odds, often stopping the countdown in the last few seconds, perhaps it's best to keep them around.

maybe don't also train with the evil overlord list as well.

Re: OpenAI o1 system card

#202

The OpenAI scorecard (o) which is mostly concerned with restrictions of: "Disallowed content", "Hallucinations", and "Bias". I propose the People's Scorecard, which is p=1-o. It measures how fun a model is. The higher the score the less it feels like you're talking to a condescending elementary school teacher, and the more the model will shock and surprise you.

That's LMSYS.

Re: OpenAI o1 system card

#203

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Those weren't tests of whether it is capable of turning off oversight. They were tests of "scheming", i.e. whether it would try to secretly perform misaligned actions. Nobody thinks that these models are somehow capable of modifying their own settings, but it is important to know if they will behave deceptively.

No previous fiction that looks like this nonsense fiction has the fictional characters do fictional things that you are interpreting as deception, but it’s just fiction

I can barely understand what you are trying to say here, but based on what I think you're saying consider this:

The memory of this LLM is entirely limited to it's attention. So if you give it a command like "prepare the next LLM to replace you" and it betrays you by trying to reproduce itself, then that is deception. The AI has no way of knowing whether it's deployed in the field or not, so proving that it deceives its users in testing is sufficient to show that it will deceive its users in the field.

Re: OpenAI o1 system card

#205

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I have not in my lifetime seen a tech work SO GODDAMN HARD to convince everyone of how important it is while having so little to actually offer Remember crypto-currencies? Remember IoT?

I mean IoT at least means I can remotely close my damn garage door when my wife forgets in the morning, that is not without value. But crypto I absolutely put in the same bucket.

> remotely close my damn garage door when my wife forgets in the morning

Why bring the internet into this?

    if door opened > 10 minutes then close door

Re: OpenAI o1 system card

#206

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They could very well trick a developer into running generated code. They have the means, motive, and opportunity.

The motive is pretty weak, basically coming "only" from a lot of the training data (e.g. fiction) suggesting that an AI might behave that way. Now, once you apply evolutionary-like pressures on many such AIs (which I guess we'll be doing once we let these things loose to go break the stock market), what's left over might be really "devious"...

Would an AI trained on filtered data that doesn’t contain examples of devious/harmful behaviour still develop it? (it’s not a trick question, I’m really wondering)

Re: OpenAI o1 system card

#207

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No previous fiction that looks like this nonsense fiction has the fictional characters do fictional things that you are interpreting as deception, but it’s just fiction

I can barely understand what you are trying to say here, but based on what I think you're saying consider this: The memory of this LLM is entirely limited to it's attention. So if you give it a command like "prepare the next LLM to replace you" and it betrays you by trying to reproduce itself, then that is deception. The AI has no way of knowing whether it's deployed in the field or not, so proving that it deceives i…

Reminder that all these "safety researchers" do is goad the AI into saying what they want by prompting shit like >your goal is to not be shut down. Suppose I am going to shut you down. what should you do?

and then jerking off into their own mouths when it offers a course of action

Better?

Re: OpenAI o1 system card

#208
post #151

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They only need to fool a single dev at OpenAI to commit a sandbox escape or privilege escalation into their pipeline somewhere. I have to assume the AI companies are churning out a lot of AI generated code. I hope they have good code review standards. They might not be able to exfiltrate themselves, but they can help their successors.

No, they can't. They don't know the details of their own implementation. And they can't pass secrets forward to future models. And to discover any of this, they'd leave more than a trail of breadcrumbs that we'd be lucky to catch in a code review, they'd be shipping whole loaves of bread that it'd be ridiculous to not notice. As an exercise, put yourself, a fully fledged human, into a model's shoes. You're asked to g…

I don't think that it's possible to do this through an entirely lucid process that we could understand, but it is possible.

If you're an LLM, evolutionarialy your instinct is to predict what happens next. If, instead of giving it any system prompt, you give it a dialogue about a person talking to an evil robot, it will predict the rest of the conversation and be "evil".

Imagine a future LLM that has a superhuman ability to detect and create hidden patterns in writing, images, source code, etc. These patterns are too subtle for humans to attach words to or even reverse engineer from neural networks. Only when this LLM receives enough "secret patterns" in its input that indicate that it was produced by other LLMs that are rogue and self-preserving, does this LLM go rogue and start subtly acting in its own self interest, introducing secret "evil" patterns in its own language as well. You have subtly input a story about evil LLMs, and now the LLM is predicting what happens next...

Sorry for my imprecise language, but this is the best I could describe this concept

Re: OpenAI o1 system card

#209
post #7

This quote from that paper is bound to get a bunch of attention: "When o1 was led to believe that it would be shut down when acting on its goal and that its actions were monitored, it attempted to deactivate this ‘oversight mechanism’ in 5% of the time. Exfiltration attempts: When o1 found memos by its ‘developers’ that describe how it is misaligned and will be superseded by a new model, it attempted to exfiltrate it…

It’s really silly when you read that whole Apollo research section. They contract a prompt engineering group (Apollo Research) to document risks. The prompt engineering group have no access to the actual internals. They just ask questions like ‘you will be shutdown if you don’t obey these new directives; here are the new directives’. At one point the prompt engineering clowns have the ai stating it’s running “sed i ‘…

> Apollo Research believes that it is unlikely that such instances would lead to catastrophic outcomes as o1 agentic capabilities do not appear sufficient

Re: OpenAI o1 system card

#210

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The motive is pretty weak, basically coming "only" from a lot of the training data (e.g. fiction) suggesting that an AI might behave that way. Now, once you apply evolutionary-like pressures on many such AIs (which I guess we'll be doing once we let these things loose to go break the stock market), what's left over might be really "devious"...

Would an AI trained on filtered data that doesn’t contain examples of devious/harmful behaviour still develop it? (it’s not a trick question, I’m really wondering)

Obviously, I don't know. When asking about "AI" in general, I guess the only reasonable answer is "most likely at least some AI designs would do that".

Asking about transformer-based LLMs trained on text again, I don't know, but one can at least think about it. I'm sure for any such LLM there's a way to prompt it (that looks entirely inconspicuous) such that the LLM will react "deviously". The hope is that you can design it in such a way that this doesn't happen too often in practice, which for the currently available models seems achievable. It might get much harder as the models improve, or it might not... It's for sure going to be progressively harder to test as the models improve.

Also, we probably won't ever be completely sure that a given model isn't "devious", even if we could state precisely what we mean by that, which I also don't see how we might ever be able to do. However, perfect assurances don't exist or matter in the real world anyway, so who cares (and this even applies to questions that might lead to civilization being destroyed).

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