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Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

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Re: Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

#71
post #51
post #3

I thought the whole point of these camera LEDs was to have them wired to/through the power to the camera, so they are always on when the camera is getting power, no matter what. Having the LED control exposed through the firmware completely defeats this.

They are hardwired on Macbooks. From Daring Fireball, quoting an email from an Apple engineer. > All cameras after [2008] were different: The hardware team tied the LED to a hardware signal from the sensor: If the (I believe) vertical sync was active, the LED would light up. There is NO firmware control to disable/enable the LED. The actual firmware is indeed flashable, but the part is not a generic part and there ar…

>The actual firmware is indeed flashable, but the part is not a generic part and there are mechanisms in place to verify the image being flashed.

That might make it harder to develop a hack, but one would hope that if the hardware team tied the LED to a hardware signal, it would not matter if the firmware were reflashed.

Re: Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

#72
post #3

I thought the whole point of these camera LEDs was to have them wired to/through the power to the camera, so they are always on when the camera is getting power, no matter what. Having the LED control exposed through the firmware completely defeats this.

An indicator light hardwired is nice but I apparently can't trust hardware manufacturers to design it properly. My work laptop (HP Dragonfly) has a physical blocker that closes over the camera when I haven't explicitly pressed the button that enables the camera. The blocker is black and white stripes so it's very obvious when it's covering the sensor. This should absolutely be the security standard we all strive for with camera privacy.

Re: Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

#73
post #15
post #10

Arguably a much, much bigger problem are the (many) microphones of modern devices. These usually get neither an LED nor a switch, and unlike cameras can't easily be covered, nor pointed away from potentially sensitive topics/subjects.

No amount of microphones will ever be a bigger problem than a single compromising photo or video.

I am dying for a compromising photo/video leak - I’ll finally be able to convince my wife to start OF channel :)

Re: Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

#74
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A minimum light duration seems pretty trivial to physically engineer. For one the energy to take a picture is probably enough to power a light for a noticeable amount of time. And if it isn't, a capacitor that absorbs energy and only allows energy through once it's full would allow the light to remain on for a couple of seconds after power subsides.

Wasn't arguing that it's difficult, just that it's needed (and that I'm not expecting it to be done in practice. Because the indicator LED on my laptop doesn't do it either, despite being enterprise grade).

JIRA is "enterprise grade", I wouldn't place too much faith into that term.

Re: Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

#75
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I might be out of the loop, but I thought that was only for some machines - I remember the LED being wired that way being a selling point for MacBooks at some point, as a privacy feature. It definitely should be the standard, though!

[flagged]

I don't know whether 2024 models has the LED or not, but there's an unmaskable/global overlay warning for Webcam / Microphone / Location services, and I think they are controlled at Kernel level. You can't bypass these indicators when any software accesses these devices.

These warnings have hysteresis and logging. They don't disappear the moment you close the device, and you can see which app is using which device.

...and no, ambient light sensor handles the true tone and brightness. It's not the camera.

Re: Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

#76
On a ThinkPad X1 Carbon Gen 8, it's easily possible record video with the webcam LED off. I did not verify newer generations of the X1 Carbon.

Lenovo put a little physical switch—they call it "ThinkShutter"—that serves to physically obstruct the webcam lens to prevent recording. It's supposed to have only two positions: lens obstructed or not. But if the user accidentally slides it halfway, you can still record video with the lens unobstructed but somehow the webcam LED turns off. It's because the ThinkShutter actually moves 2 pieces of plastic: 1 to cover the lens, 1 to cover the LED. But the piece covering the LED blocks it first, before the other piece of plastic blocks the lens. I discovered this accidentally yesterday while toying with a X1 Carbon... I am reporting it to Lenovo.

Re: Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

#77
post #4

I assumed that most if not all of these webcam LEDs are wired in series with the power to the camera itself. Which then makes it impossible to disable them. Who designs this LED to be software addressable?

I'm not an EE by trade, but I personally wouldn't want to put a CCD in series with an LED with god-knows-what Vf tolerances. Then again, I'd bet that nearly all laptop webcams come as off-the-shelf modules with their own internal regulators for the CCD anyway. So maybe it wouldn't matter.

I'll bet it went something like this: As originally specified, the user need was "LED privacy indicator for the webcam." Product management turns that into two requirements:

1) LED next to webcam.

2) LED turns on and off when webcam turns on and off.

Requirement 1 gets handed to the EEs, and requirement 2 gets handed to the firmware engineers. By the time a firmware engineer gets assigned the job of making the LED turn on and off, the hardware designers are already 1 or 2 board spins in. If the firmware engineer suggested that we revise the board to better fit the intention of the user needs, one of two things will happen:

1) They'll get laughed out of the room for suggesting the EEs and manufacturing teams go through another cycle to change something so trivial.

2) They'll get berated by management because it's "not the engineers' place to make decisions about product requirements."

Of course this is all spitballing. I've definitely never been given a requirement that obviously should have been a hardware requirement. I've definitely never brought up concerns about the need to implement certain privacy and security-critical features in hardware, then been criticized for that suggestion. And I've definitely never, ever written code that existed for the sole purpose of papering over bad product-level decision making.

Nope, never. Couldn't be me.

Re: Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

#78
post #2

For what it's worth, my Lenovo laptop has a manuel shutter slider button on the side that actually physically covers the camera (and it must also does something driver wise because windows considers it unplugged). It's so easy and convenient that I always use to off the camera. Many of lenovo have that even included their gaming laptop line (it's actually even better and more convient on that one, thanks to the large…

A post-it note works if you don't have a slider.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation sells a set of stickers exactly for this purpose [0]. I have a set and it works reasonably well. And it supports a good cause.

[0] https://shop.eff.org/products/laptop-camera-cover-set-ii

Re: Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

#79

Fantastic, another nothingburger proof of concept for people to point to when arguing in favor of more manufacturer-lockdown-based "security". It's not a coincidence that this demonstration is on one of the last generations of laptops that can actually be secured against Intel themselves. In reality, remote code execution should be considered game over, end of story. Trying to obfuscate to hide that fact just ends up…

> for people to point to when arguing in favor of more manufacturer-lockdown-based "security" I don't see why this is the first thing you think of, when the infinitely more obvious thing to point out is that the indicator LED should be impossible to address and be connected in series with the power pin of the camera instead. Case in point, most other comments in this very discussion thread. Conversely, your comment (…

Sure, you can solve this one particular thing with fixed hardware [0]. The problem is that just slightly more complex, any designer isn't going to opt for hardcoded logic but rather going to go "we have a microcontroller sitting right here, of course we're going to use it". This path ends with firmware "security" that prevents straightforwardly reading/writing these devices, which is exactly what my comment is about.

> you're trying to derail conversation and argue in favor of weakening device security

No, I'm arguing in favor of analyzing security in terms of device owners rather than manufacturers. "Security" isn't simply some singular property, but is rather in the context of a specific party [1]. It's certainly possible to build hardware that verifies running software and also doesn't privilege the manufacturer with an all-access pass. Just no manufacturers have done it, because centralizing control in their favor is easier.

[0] even this case is borderline. Your series LED suggestion isn't likely to be work because it will drop at least 1.6v, and constrain the current draw of the camera. Also if the firmware can be reprogrammed such that it can take pictures using very low average current draw, you haven't actually solved the problem. Alternatively, an LED in parallel with the power supply will require at least an additional resistor (if not a diode and a capacitor), which costs real money in the eyes of a design engineer working at consumer volumes.

[1] eg how the TSA that drones on about "security", while they're actually making individual travelers less secure from having to unpack and splay their belongings out, making them easy targets for immediate or later theft. They're not talking about your security, they're talking about their operation's security.

Re: Malware can turn off webcam LED and record video, demonstrated on ThinkPad X230

#80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Wasn't arguing that it's difficult, just that it's needed (and that I'm not expecting it to be done in practice. Because the indicator LED on my laptop doesn't do it either, despite being enterprise grade).

JIRA is "enterprise grade", I wouldn't place too much faith into that term.

Trust me, I was using it semi-sarcastically too. This thing is slower than my old Pentium 4 would be, yet has a fast enough 30% to 3% battery discharge rate that it would make the speed of light itself blush.
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