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When are two proofs essentially the same? (2007)

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Re: When are two proofs essentially the same? (2007)

#31
post #24
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree with this on two points. First, oftentimes the interest in proving long-standing, difficult mathematical problems is because we hope a proof will demonstrate new tools for tackling similar problems. In that sense, the exact content of a proof is quite important. Not to mention, there is value in having multiple proofs that each demonstrate quite different toolkits. Mere truth is not often the most importan…

I don't think you have disagreed with me. You have advocated that different tools/methods are useful for different problems and may have unique properties that make them interesting in specific contexts. I completely agree and I have not stated anything against it. My opinion, admittedly abstract and stated without proof, was simply that if you have two ways of showing something to be true, they must be logically equ…

That's a fair response; thanks for taking the time.

I was primarily reacting to this part of your message...

> I'd argue that two correct proofs are always the same.

...with emphasis on the "always". To my eyes, a proof is any object that witnesses the truth of a proposition. The proof can be more than a witness, but to be called a proof, it must do at least that much.

To say that "two correct proofs are always the same" is, to me, to say that proofs can be no more than witnesses of the proposition; to be the same means to be indistinguishable. My argument is that two correct proofs may be distinct in useful ways.

I suppose this discussion depends on what "same" means ("depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is", heh). Do you mean something other than what I mean? Your use of "logically equivalent" is probably telling -- so, two proofs should have the same deductive power? We often speak of propositions this way, but I'm not sure how to understand that notion on proofs. Terence Tao gives some possible notions of proof equivalence in a comment on the OP [0]; you might enjoy reading them and considering which is closest to your intuitive idea of equivalence :)

[0]: https://gowers.wordpress.com/2007/10/04/when-are-two-proofs-...

Re: When are two proofs essentially the same? (2007)

#32
I'm reminded of the Philosophy of Computer Science entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [0], which briefly considers what it means for two programs to be identical.

"... it has been argued that there are cases in which it is not possible to determine whether two programs are the same without making reference to an external semantics. Sprevak (2010) proposes to consider two programs for addition which differ from the fact that one operates on Arabic, the other one on Roman numerals. The two programs compute the same function, namely addition, but this cannot always be established by inspecting the code with its subroutines; it must be determined by assigning content to the input/output strings"

"The problem can be tackled by fixing an identity criterion, namely a formal relation, that any two programs should entertain in order to be defined as identical. Angius and Primiero (2018) show how to use the process algebra relation of bisimulation between the two automata implemented by two programs under examination as such an identity criterion. Bisimulation allows to establish matching structural properties of programs implementing the same function, as well as providing weaker criteria for copies in terms of simulation."

(Of course, it isn't surprising that this would be relevant, because proofs and programs themselves are isomorphic).

This technique seems rather stricter than what Gowers has in mind, but it seems helpful as a baseline.

0. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computer-science/

Re: When are two proofs essentially the same? (2007)

#33

One way to compare proofs is to consider whether they belong to the same "level" or not. Consider by analogy whether a particular Turing machine halts. You can look at the sequence of configurations of the Turing machine at each step. Since the evolution of the machine's configuration is deterministic, any configuration along a "halting path" ends up in the same final configuration (i.e., the first configuration in a…

>I agree with pkoird's point that philosophically, two correct proofs of the same theorem should be considered "the same". Any theorem is ultimately a property of the natural numbers themselves along with the various paths that lead there from the axioms (since all proofs are essentially a finite sequence of Gödel numbers). As with a lot of philosophy, the argument turns out to actually be much more about defining te…

Yeah, my first sentence is sort of nonsense the more I think about it... removed it to keep the focus of my comment on different kinds of proofs.

Re: When are two proofs essentially the same? (2007)

#34

One way to compare proofs is to consider whether they belong to the same "level" or not. Consider by analogy whether a particular Turing machine halts. You can look at the sequence of configurations of the Turing machine at each step. Since the evolution of the machine's configuration is deterministic, any configuration along a "halting path" ends up in the same final configuration (i.e., the first configuration in a…

It seems like in your first part, you're saying that proofs are the same as their normalized proofs, up to some rewriting system. So like how we say 3-2 is the same as 1, basically, or (more interestingly) saying that x-x is the same as zero, or that e^(i pi (2n+1)) is the same as -1. Yes, they can be reduced/normalized to the same thing, but in basically any system with terms, `reduction(term)` is not always the sam…

My first sentence didn't make sense and wasn't well-thought-out. Removed it in favor of keeping the discussion about proof-theoretic strength.

Re: When are two proofs essentially the same? (2007)

#35
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is like saying that if I walk out of my house, turn right, and walk 10 minutes to the local food store, it's the same as coming out of the house, turning left, and walking 15 minutes around the block. The destination is the same, so surely these are "the same". I'd argue that this is not the case.

Not quite. If we consider that we are trying to prove "you can reach the local food store from your house" then starting from either side would consist of two proofs by example. And for sure these are different paths one is taking and should be different! But if you consider deeply, both of these proofs are implicitly encoding same information about the space between your house and the local store: 1) there is contin…

The path example is extremely fertile ground for this kind of discussion! It is definitely true that both paths encode the information that one's house is connected to the local store. But is that all they encode? Homotopy theory is all about the different paths between two points, and it tells us some quite interesting things! In particular, if you have two paths from point A to point B, you can ask: can you smoothly animate an image of the first path into an image of the second, such that every still frame in-between is also a legitimate path? (If you can't, that tells you that there's some form of hole in between them!)

In the house/store example, a path is also a witness to the fact that, if you perform a road closure anywhere not on the path, then connectivity is preserved. Simply stating that the two points are connected doesn't tell you whether it's safe to close a road! Moreover, taking the two paths together tells you that performing a single road closure that only affects one of the paths will still leave a route you can take.

In both examples, if the paths were logically interchangeable, you wouldn't be able to get more information out of the both of them than you could from just one. But because they aren't equivalent -- because each contains some information that the other does not -- we can deduce more from both together than from either individually.

Re: When are two proofs essentially the same? (2007)

#36
post #31
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think you have disagreed with me. You have advocated that different tools/methods are useful for different problems and may have unique properties that make them interesting in specific contexts. I completely agree and I have not stated anything against it. My opinion, admittedly abstract and stated without proof, was simply that if you have two ways of showing something to be true, they must be logically equ…

That's a fair response; thanks for taking the time. I was primarily reacting to this part of your message... > I'd argue that two correct proofs are always the same. ...with emphasis on the "always". To my eyes, a proof is any object that witnesses the truth of a proposition. The proof can be more than a witness, but to be called a proof, it must do at least that much. To say that "two correct proofs are always the s…

I can attempt to semi-formalize it but I'm sure I'd butcher it along the way so feel free to point out anything that doesn't feel correct.

Consider a set of premises P that are assumed to be true. Also, consider that we are trying to analyze a statement s0 assuming P.

One proof could be of the form:

P1: s0 -> s1 -> s2 -> ... -> T/F.

Another proof could be of the form:

P2: s0 -> s11 -> s12 -> ... -> T/F.

Where T/F represent a single terminal symbol i.e. either T (true) or F (false) and s1... and s11... etc. could be different abstractions that have been employed to illustrate the veracity of the statement.

Regardless, both of these abstractions make use of the same Logical rules at each step so you could argue that the logical chain of both P1 and P2 are equivalent in some sense. If you think about it, it does seem obvious though, because if P1 and P2 disagreed with P1 yielding T and P2 yielding F, while using the same set of logical rules, it must be the case that either the logic is not consistent or one or both of the chain has errors.

So now, one could argue that all such correct logical chains (maybe of different lengths) that start with a statement s0 and terminate at a single symbol (say T) should essentially be the same.

s1 -> s2 -> s3 -> ... -> sn

↑................................↓

s0 -> s11 -> s12 -> ...->T

You could also argue that there must be exactly one such chain of the smallest possible complexity (in some sense) and that all other chains should be reducible to this one chain (not sure how).

At the end, I still agree with you in that two correct proofs can be distinct in useful ways but since proofs, to me, are a series of application of logic under certain premise to obtain a terminal symbol, all such logically sound chains must actually correspond to the one fundamental chain that's irreducible (in some sense).

Re: When are two proofs essentially the same? (2007)

#37
post #32

I'm reminded of the Philosophy of Computer Science entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [0], which briefly considers what it means for two programs to be identical. "... it has been argued that there are cases in which it is not possible to determine whether two programs are the same without making reference to an external semantics. Sprevak (2010) proposes to consider two programs for addition which diff…

I think it's also important to make a distinction between a pair of programs which compute the same function using an identical amount of space and time and a pair of programs which compute the same function with different amounts of either space or time (or both). Two programs might compute the same function and be considered formally identical in that sense but may be in radically different complexity classes [O(1) vs O(n) vs O(n^2) vs O(2^n)].

Formally we may not be interested in this distinction but practically we definitely are. One program may be extremely practical and useful whereas the other might not finish computing anything before the heat death of the universe on anything but trivial-sized inputs.

Re: When are two proofs essentially the same? (2007)

#38
post #36
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's a fair response; thanks for taking the time. I was primarily reacting to this part of your message... > I'd argue that two correct proofs are always the same. ...with emphasis on the "always". To my eyes, a proof is any object that witnesses the truth of a proposition. The proof can be more than a witness, but to be called a proof, it must do at least that much. To say that "two correct proofs are always the s…

I can attempt to semi-formalize it but I'm sure I'd butcher it along the way so feel free to point out anything that doesn't feel correct. Consider a set of premises P that are assumed to be true. Also, consider that we are trying to analyze a statement s0 assuming P. One proof could be of the form: P1: s0 -> s1 -> s2 -> ... -> T/F. Another proof could be of the form: P2: s0 -> s11 -> s12 -> ... -> T/F. Where T/F rep…

Thanks for taking a stab at it! I think I understand the angle you're attempting to take. May I offer a relatively contrived counterexample to poke at this a little more deeply?

Suppose I have a proposition that says, roughly, "if A and B and C then contradiction". Furthermore, suppose that A and B together are already contradictory, and B and C together are also already contradictory.

Now I can construct two proofs, one in which I use A and B (but not C) to yield the desired result, and another in which I use B and C (but not A).

In what way can we say that these two proofs are essentially the same? It appears that each uses potentially rather distinct information in order to derive the expected contradiction; it isn't clear how to go from a proof that avoids A to a proof that avoids C in a smooth way.

Re: When are two proofs essentially the same? (2007)

#39
post #2

If I were allowed a small philosophical leeway, I'd argue that two correct proofs are always the same. For sure they may contain different words or make use of different "abstractions", but it just seems to me that these abstractions should be equivalent if one were willing to unravel it all to a certain degree. Essentially, all proof is, is a statement that says "this is true" and no matter which language you use to…

Some proofs that aren't "essentially the same": 1. Prove that the interior angles of a triangle sum to 180 degrees. First proof: draw a line parallel to one of the triangle's sides passing through its opposite vertex. There are three angles on one side of this line, and they obviously add to 180 degrees because it's a line. One of the three angles is directly one of the triangle's interior angles; the other two can b…

I'm responding to your second example simply because it's easy to argue about. I'd say that both proofs that you have presented are equivalent ways of saying that "since when you sum all the numbers from 1 to N you obtain a number that's N(N+1)/2, therefore, it is true that the sum of numbers from 1 to N is N(N+1)/2".

Now, this argument may appear trite but do consider that both of your proofs essentially do the same thing with the first one summing the numbers from extremities and the second one summing 1...N-1 first and then the last. I'd argue that if addition were not commutative, you may have obtained different results.

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