101–110 of 124 posts
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Soviets used typewriters. American Lawyers of the highest pedigree (HNWI) don't even use email. Your hardware is back-doored, as Intel is named "Intel" for a (nearly too poignant) reason.
Don’t forget the stealth black helicopters with zoom lenses hovering overhead.
Is it as secure as they say? Then it doesn't matter if all the money Apple has is the reward, because nobody can get it. A max bounty of $50 000 for "Accidental or unexpected data disclosure due to deployment or configuration issue" is silly low.
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It's worth keeping in mind that these AI machines run an environment very similar to Mac OS, XNU kernel and all, and are powered by Apple Silicon. Using Swift in that context makes sense. At least according to what we publicly know, no other backend Apple services follow this model.
What do we know about apples other backend services? I’ve worked in compute infra in big tech for 8 years and I don’t know anything about apple’s backend.
I've been working on technology like this for the past six years. The benefits of transparent systems are likely considerable. The combination of reproducible builds, remote attestation and transparency logging allows trivial detection of a range of supply chain attacks. It can allow users to retroactively audit the source code of remote running systems. Yes, there are attacks that the threat model doesn't protect ag…
I've also worked in this field but it feels like a foundation built on quicksand. You depend on so many turtle layers and only one of them has to be adversarial and game over.
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Soviets used typewriters. American Lawyers of the highest pedigree (HNWI) don't even use email. Your hardware is back-doored, as Intel is named "Intel" for a (nearly too poignant) reason.
Don’t forget the stealth black helicopters with zoom lenses hovering overhead.
they glow in the dark, you can see em in your driving.
run em over, thats what ya do
The court entered this ruling despite testimony from an attorney who stated, “[b]ecause of the [FISA Amendments Act], we now have to assume that every one of our international communications may be monitored by the government.” Id., 133 S.Ct. at 1148.
The gold standard for WAPS is the Gorgon Stare system which is deployed aboard the Reaper UAS. The current version of Gorgon Stare uses five electro-optical and four infrared cameras to generate imagery from 12 different angles. Gorgon Stare can provide a continuous city-sized overall picture, multiple sub-views of the overall field and what are high resolution “chipouts” of individual views, each of which can be streamed in real time to multiple viewers. A single Gorgon Stare pod can generate two terabytes of data a day.
"After scandals with the distribution of secret documents by WikiLeaks, the exposes by Edward Snowden, reports about Dmitry Medvedev being bugged during his visit to the G20 London summit (in 2009), it has been decided to expand the practice of creating paper documents," the source said.
Since 2008, most of Intel’s chipsets have contained a tiny homunculus computer called the “Management Engine” (ME). The ME is a largely undocumented master controller for your CPU: it works with system firmware during boot and has direct access to system memory, the screen, keyboard, and network. All of the code inside the ME is secret, signed, and tightly controlled by Intel. Last week, vulnerabilities in the Active Management (AMT) module in some Management Engines have caused lots of machines with Intel CPUs to be disastrously vulnerable to remote and local attackers.
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Yeah, but, considering the sheer complexity of modern CPUs and SoCs, this is still the case even if you have the silicon in front of you. That ship sailed some time ago.
It depends on what you want to do. If all you're trying to do is produce an Ed25519 signature you could use something like the Tillitis TKey. It's a product developed by one of my companies. As I've mentioned elsewhere in this thread it is open source hardware in the sense that the schematic, PCB design _and_ hardware design (FPGA configuration) are all open source. Not only that, the FPGA only has about 5000 logic c…
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Ok, but they write and fully control the closed-source software that appends to the log. How can anyone verify that all the code paths append to the log? I'm pretty sure they can just not append to the log from their ExfiltrateDataForAdvertisment() and ExfiltrateDataForGovernments() functions. Maybe I'm not being clear; transparent logs solve the problem of supply chain attacks (that is, Apple can use the logs to som…
> How can anyone verify that all the code paths append to the log? davidczech has already explained it quite well, but I'll try explaining it a different way. Consider the verification of a signed software update. The verifier, e.g. apt-get, rpm, macOS Update, Microsoft Update or whatever OS you're running. They all have some trust policy that contains a public key. The verifier only trusts software signed by the pub…
My concern is that Apple themselves will include code in their officially signed builds that extracts customer data. All of these security measures cannot protect against that because Apple is a "trusted software publisher" in the chain.
All of this is great stuff, Apple makes sure someone else doesn't get the customer data and they remain the only ones to monetize it.
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Yeah, it's a log of all the software that runs on the server. If you trust the secure boot process then you trust the log describes its contents. If you don't trust the boot process/code signing system then you'd want to do something else, like ask the server to show you parts of its memory on demand in case you catch it lying to you. (Not sure if that's doable here because the server has other people's data on it, w…
One approach would be a chip design where a remote attestation request issues a hardware interrupt, and then the hardware hashes the contents of memory, more specifically the memory containing the code.
(You need to prove that the system is showing you the server your data is present on, and not just showing you an innocuous one and actually processing your data on a different evil one.)
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> How can anyone verify that all the code paths append to the log? davidczech has already explained it quite well, but I'll try explaining it a different way. Consider the verification of a signed software update. The verifier, e.g. apt-get, rpm, macOS Update, Microsoft Update or whatever OS you're running. They all have some trust policy that contains a public key. The verifier only trusts software signed by the pub…
Got it, that all makes sense. My concern is not someone maliciously attempting to infect the software / hardware. My concern is that Apple themselves will include code in their officially signed builds that extracts customer data. All of these security measures cannot protect against that because Apple is a "trusted software publisher" in the chain. All of this is great stuff, Apple makes sure someone else doesn't ge…
That's the whole point of the transparency log. Anything published, and thus to be trusted by client devices, is publicly inspectable.
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Got it, that all makes sense. My concern is not someone maliciously attempting to infect the software / hardware. My concern is that Apple themselves will include code in their officially signed builds that extracts customer data. All of these security measures cannot protect against that because Apple is a "trusted software publisher" in the chain. All of this is great stuff, Apple makes sure someone else doesn't ge…
> cannot protect against that because Apple is a "trusted software publisher" in the chain. That's the whole point of the transparency log. Anything published, and thus to be trusted by client devices, is publicly inspectable.