31–40 of 105 posts
The world changes once you realize why usually encryption is capped at AES256...
256 bit symmetric cryptography keys are a bit like picking one atom in the universe (10^80 atoms, or 100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000). Your opponent would have to test half of the atoms in the universe to have a reasonable chance of getting the right key. That's generally understood to be not feasible.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I have not seen this take before, do you have any pointers to someone making this claim?
Founders with US affiliation/physicist creating crypto products [1], faulty claims how the relevant Swiss law (BÜPF) applies to them [2], doing crypto in JavaScript on the client side, etc. To me, this smells like Crypto AG [3][4]. [1] https://proton.me/about/team [2] https://steigerlegal.ch/2019/07/27/protonmail-transparenzber... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_AG [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Founders with US affiliation/physicist creating crypto products [1], faulty claims how the relevant Swiss law (BÜPF) applies to them [2], doing crypto in JavaScript on the client side, etc. To me, this smells like Crypto AG [3][4]. [1] https://proton.me/about/team [2] https://steigerlegal.ch/2019/07/27/protonmail-transparenzber... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_AG [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation…
Is the suggestion that founders who have US affiliation are automatically in bed with three letter agencies?
It’s not hard to encrypt it before you upload it.
If you don’t trust your cloud provider to not look at your data, why would you trust them with encryption? It’s not hard to encrypt it before you upload it.
I wonder how Cryptomator [0], EncFS [1] or gocryptfs [2] stacks up. [0] https://cryptomator.org/ [1] https://vgough.github.io/encfs/ [2] https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs
https://dropbox.tech/security/end-to-end-encryption-for-drop... dropbox has been mentioned in the article and I think the author is drinking kool-aid and throwing random facts
Nice to see that Tresorit didn't have any serious issues in this analysis, I've been using that for a long time and it works really great, also one of the few players that have a really good Linux client. The two vulnerabilities they found seem pretty far-fetched to me, basically the first is that a compromised CA server will be able to create fake public keys, which I honestly don't know how one could defend against…
I wonder how Cryptomator [0], EncFS [1] or gocryptfs [2] stacks up. [0] https://cryptomator.org/ [1] https://vgough.github.io/encfs/ [2] https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs
If they aren't multitenant systems it doesn't make sense to compare them to the targets of this paper.
But perhaps I've misunderstood you.
My understanding was that Tarsnap was just fine and that was the preferred solution for Hacker News outside Dropbox.