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If malware authors ever learn how to spell we're all screwed

hanselman.com

41–50 of 106 posts

Re: If malware authors ever learn how to spell we're all screwed

#42
The OP's point is that displayed content can be made to be indistinguishable from visual elements of the browser even for technically sophisticated users in the near future.

This reminds me of login spoofing of yesteryear. How do you know if the login prompt on a shared computer or terminal is really from the OS or is a user-level program trying to steal passwords?

The usual solution was to hit a special attention key--like the "break" key under UNIX or Ctrl/Alt/Del for Windows--that user-level programs could not intercept.

Could we use the same idea here? Holding the "break" key will highlight genuine messages from the browser or the OS.

Re: If malware authors ever learn how to spell we're all screwed

#43

> Should we digitally sign HTML5 apps? Yes. That's better than nothing.

Well, you can already do that through extended validation. I'm not sure requiring it would be desirable, and doing this would need a better reason than it being better than nothing.

The philosophy of HTML5 seems to be allowing applicants to do a lot of things which don't require much trust to be placed in them (and most applications don't need much), rather than security through asking the user's permission (e.g. most desktop OSs), when they are unlikely to have much idea which developers they should trust, or through accountability/review (e.g. iOS), which adds barriers to entry.

Re: If malware authors ever learn how to spell we're all screwed

#44
post #29
post #16

One day these things won't be "selectable" to prove to us that they are HTML Selection is probably not the best way to check whether something is browser content... -webkit-touch-callout: none; -webkit-user-select: none; -khtml-user-select: none; -moz-user-select: none; -ms-user-select: none; user-select: none;

Why does this parameter exist? What possible legitimate use could you have for disabling selection?

I've thought about this quite a bit. As HTML applications continue to evolve we should make them feel "appish". Things like selectable buttons take the user away from experience the app. Also graph labels shouldn't be selectable.

One of the big ideas of the web is selectable content. However UI elements shouldn't be included in this set.

I've written a little more about this (with some screenshots to illustrate my thinking) here: http://blog.dcxn.com/2012/02/29/selectable-elements-are-driv...

Re: If malware authors ever learn how to spell we're all screwed

#45
post #42

The OP's point is that displayed content can be made to be indistinguishable from visual elements of the browser even for technically sophisticated users in the near future. This reminds me of login spoofing of yesteryear. How do you know if the login prompt on a shared computer or terminal is really from the OS or is a user-level program trying to steal passwords? The usual solution was to hit a special attention ke…

Long time ago I wrote a small program that would mimic the entry point of a DEC terminal server, slow baud rates screen refresh and all, and with the permission of the computer lab manager I installed it in a few PCs, next to the original dec VT terminals that were actually connected to the server.

It didn't save any passwords or such, just display some random funny non-sense message to the user after s/he inserted login and password and then loop back again to the login prompt with a failed error message.

Even with this obvious message that would warn an alert user for the suspicious terminal, we (my friends and the lab manager) got a few laughs when people coming to the lab and finding all the VT terminals taken would use the PCs to login and tried several (many!) times until giving up, at which point we would tell them the truth. Mind you, these were people comfortable with VT terminals and unix cli and somewhat computer savvy!

Re: If malware authors ever learn how to spell we're all screwed

#46

Looks like trying to move the "popup" is a great way to defeat this kind of thing for now. Me: Okay mom, if you ever get a popup that you were not expecting, try to move it outside of the browser before clicking on it. If you can't, it's fake. Fairly simple, for now.

Unless the entire image is a clickable hotspot that starts the next step in the process of their evil. ;)

Re: If malware authors ever learn how to spell we're all screwed

#47
post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why does this parameter exist? What possible legitimate use could you have for disabling selection?

I've thought about this quite a bit. As HTML applications continue to evolve we should make them feel "appish". Things like selectable buttons take the user away from experience the app. Also graph labels shouldn't be selectable. One of the big ideas of the web is selectable content. However UI elements shouldn't be included in this set. I've written a little more about this (with some screenshots to illustrate my th…

A simple example is an image-cropping system. The user has to click and drag. If you don't disable the selection and the user clicks in just a slightly wrong way they can end up selecting or dragging the image, which looks totally wrong for someone who wanted to select a region of an image. Both actions have the same user input (click, drag, release) but your intent is that it have a very different behavior than the browser default.

Re: If malware authors ever learn how to spell we're all screwed

#49
Simple solution for tech savvy users. All system prompts should include a photo of a user selected image. If the incorrect image is displayed you know its a scam.

For example when I install Windows 8 or Mountain lion one of the first prompts I must address is:

   "Please choose an image to help you identify 
   valid system prompts"
The user is then presented 10 images (a tiger, a house, a moose, etc) from a library of 10,000 images.

   "The user decides to use an image of a tiger"
   
Next time a user gets a system prompt if the system prompt doesn't have the picture of a tiger they know its a fake prompt.

See site key: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SiteKey

Re: If malware authors ever learn how to spell we're all screwed

#50
post #42

The OP's point is that displayed content can be made to be indistinguishable from visual elements of the browser even for technically sophisticated users in the near future. This reminds me of login spoofing of yesteryear. How do you know if the login prompt on a shared computer or terminal is really from the OS or is a user-level program trying to steal passwords? The usual solution was to hit a special attention ke…

Easy solution. Logging in takes two passwords. After you enter your first password (first 8 chars of your 16 char password) you are presented with an image of a Tiger. You now trust the system. (The picture of a tiger was your secret image). You now enter your second password (the remaining 8 chars of your 16 digit password).

See site key: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SiteKey

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