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...but never once mention what sort of threat model they are private/secure against.You know, they're Secure(TM)! Against Threats(TM)! Buy me if you're scared of Threats(TM)!
Threat modeling ("Secure from who? Under what conditions?") sort of stuff just doesn't seem to be a thing that's taught these days outside certain weird circles. And certainly something this project hasn't touched on in the slightest. But, yes, I was having to keep my eyeballs constrained too.
As much as it pains me, I think the most "generally secure phone" out there, for at least the sort of threat models this phone handwaves at (journalists, human rights activists) is a recent (last generation or two) iPhone with Lockdown enabled - and then shut down nightly, and carried shut down through any sort of sensitive environments. I would be inclined to go with an iPhone SE3, moreso than one of the mainline devices, simply for fingerprint scanning versus the FaceID stuff. You can't "point a phone at me" and unlock it with my fingerprint, but you can with FaceID in a wide enough range of situations to be concerning. Set a longer than usual PIN/passphrase, and be careful where you enter it.
As far as I understand the boot process, Apple has largely fixed a lot of the "before first unlock" type attacks with their secure enclave. They fixed that rather well after the battle with the FBI, and seem to have continued hardening and improving that process (hence my recommendation for the latest generation or two of device - there are changes in the boot security flows every now and then, and I assume they matter, at some point).
Then Lockdown, as near as I can tell, does a very fine job of simply closing the common attack points used. Most of the "good" attacks on iPhone users (at least the ones I know of...) are through the various "texting-esque" endpoints with weird image formats, or a browser based Javascript/JIT exploit, and Lockdown does a fine job of simply refusing most of the paths these use. Weird image formats simply aren't rendered. URLs in text messages aren't accessed and previewed. The Javascript engine removes all JIT capabilities, WebRTC, WebGL, and other "suitably complex that it's probably exploitable" sort of features.
It's not perfect, but were I an individual who believed I was under actual threat for this sort of stuff, I'd 100% use a secured iPhone (possibly with some of the Mobile Device Management features configured by a trusted person to disable the USB port and such things) over a random device like this. Sorry, open JTAG ports means it's "comically insecure" against anyone with local access and the time to bother doing anything with it.
And of course, don't keep location services on, don't install a ton of apps, etc. The usual if you're concerned about any of this.
I don't like that this is the state of the world of secure computing, but it certainly seems to be it, to me.